State v. Owens

Decision Date01 November 2019
Docket NumberNo. 115,441,115,441
Citation451 P.3d 467
Parties STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Ken'Dum Dan'Sha OWENS, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Clayton J. Perkins, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Luckert, J.:

Ken'Dum Dan'Sha Owens appeals a district court order rejecting his argument that a 19-month delay between his arrest and trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. In part, Owens argues a Court of Appeals panel erred in holding that the six months Owens spent in juvenile detention should not be counted in determining the length of the delay. See State v. Owens , No. 115,441, 2017 WL 4082317, at *4 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). He also argues the panel erred in weighing the factors used by courts when analyzing a constitutional speedy trial claim.

We agree Owens' six-month period of juvenile detention should be included in a calculation of how long it took to get to trial. But Owens has not established a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, even considering the full 19-month delay rather than the 13 months considered by the panel. We affirm the district court and the Court of Appeals. See Owens , 2017 WL 4082317, at *1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the late evening hours of February 16, 2012, two men approached Nathan Davis after he exited his vehicle in the parking lot of his apartment complex. One of the men—later identified as Owens—pointed a gun at Davis and demanded his car keys. Davis handed over his keys, and the two men got into Davis' vehicle and drove away. Davis immediately called 911 and told a dispatcher his car had been stolen at gunpoint. He described the man holding the gun as a black male, 20 to 22 years old, about 6 feet tall with a stocky build, and wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, red or black ball cap, and blue jeans.

A nearby law enforcement officer, Brent Johnson, heard the information relayed by dispatch and saw a vehicle matching the description of Davis' car stopped in the middle of the street a few blocks from Davis' apartment. Officer Johnson activated his patrol car's sirens and emergency lights. The man seated in the driver's seat of Davis' vehicle exited and ran away. Officer Johnson chased the man on foot through the surrounding residential area but lost sight of him a few minutes into the pursuit. Officer Johnson described the suspect as a black male wearing blue jeans, white tennis shoes, a red baseball cap, and a black jacket.

Officer Johnson maintained a perimeter around the area where he believed the suspect was likely hiding while waiting for backup officers to arrive. A K-9 officer soon arrived and began searching the area with his police dog. The officers found a black male—later identified as Owens—wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, white tennis shoes, and brightly colored pajama pants hiding behind a tree in the back yard of a nearby residence. The officers arrested Owens and discovered a red and black baseball cap in the same yard. The officers also located a silver handgun in the yard of another nearby residence. But they did not find any blue jeans.

The officers brought Davis to the location where they held Owens. Davis identified Owens as the man who pointed the gun at him and stole his car. Officers found a cell phone in Davis' car, and they later identified it as belonging to Owens.

The State originally alleged Owens committed juvenile offenses; he was 17 at the time. After about six months, the State dismissed the juvenile case and filed a criminal information, charging Owens with aggravated robbery, criminal use of a weapon, and criminal deprivation of property. After the defense made 10 requests for continuance, Owens filed a pro se motion for new counsel. In part, he complained his attorney had been seeking continuances without his consent and without ensuring that Owens was present at continuance hearings. But Owens withdrew his request for new counsel when told his case would be given a "hard jury trial setting." The trial began just more than 19 months after Owens' arrest.

At trial, Officer Johnson identified Owens as the man he chased and officers later arrested. Officer Johnson testified Owens was wearing blue jeans when he began chasing him but was wearing brightly colored pajama pants when he was apprehended. A post-arrest photo of Owens was admitted into evidence showing the pajama pants and other clothing he was wearing at the time of his arrest. Davis identified the man in the photograph as the person who stole his car at gunpoint but noted the difference in pants. Davis also identified the gun the officers discovered as the one Owens had used. Owens took the stand and claimed his phone had been stolen while he was playing basketball near where he was arrested. He denied being involved in the aggravated robbery of Davis.

The jury convicted Owens as charged. He appealed his convictions and sentence, raising five issues. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no reversible error. See Owens , 2017 WL 4082317, at *1.

Owens timely petitioned for our review. We granted review only as to Owens' claim that the delay between his arrest and trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The State filed a conditional cross-petition for review, arguing in part that the panel erred in one aspect of its speedy trial analysis—specifically, in finding the length of the delay presumptively prejudicial. We granted only that portion of the State's request for review.

This court's jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (petition for review of Court of Appeals decision); see also Supreme Court Rule 8.03(b) and (c) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 53) (petition for review and cross-petition for review from Court of Appeals opinion).

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
Standard of Review

The factual findings underpinning a district court's decision regarding a defendant's constitutional speedy trial right are reviewed for substantial competent evidence, but the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. In re Care & Treatment of Ellison , 305 Kan. 519, 533-34, 385 P.3d 15 (2016).

Analysis

Owens argues his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights was violated because his jury trial did not occur until more than 19 months after his arrest. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." This provision applies in state court through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 222-23, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967). Owens also cites § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which guarantees the right of an accused "[i]n all prosecutions" to "a speedy public trial by an impartial jury."

The United States Supreme Court has identified four nonexclusive factors to be analyzed when a criminal defendant makes a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. Those factors, set out in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), are: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." This court applied these factors in State v. Otero , 210 Kan. 530, 532-36, 502 P.2d 763 (1972). In doing so, the Otero court noted that "the approach to the problem is a balancing test in which the conduct of both prosecution and accused is to be weighed. This approach suggests an ad hoc basis in which various factors are to be taken into account." 210 Kan. at 532, 502 P.2d 763. Because the test requires a balancing, none of these factors is a necessary or sufficient condition for finding a violation. Instead, we consider them together along with any other relevant circumstances. See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555, 564-65, 103 S. Ct. 2005, 76 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1983) ; State v. Fink , 217 Kan. 671, 673, 538 P.2d 1390 (1975).

We will examine each of the four Barker factors in turn.

1. Length of the delay

As to the first factor—length of the delay—the Court of Appeals panel held (1) Owens' constitutional right to a speedy trial attached upon the filing of adult criminal charges and (2) the 13-month delay from that point until Owens' trial was presumptively prejudicial. Owens , 2017 WL 4082317, at *4. Owens agrees the delay was presumptively prejudicial, but he argues the delay was 19, not 13, months. He contends his right to a speedy trial attached when he was arrested and thus before adult criminal charges were brought.

In briefing, the State argued the delay was only 13 months. It softened its view at oral argument in light of State v. Robinson , 56 Kan. App. 2d 567, 434 P.3d 232 (2018). Robinson , filed after the parties had submitted their brief to this court, held a juvenile offender has the same constitutional right to a speedy trial as an adult criminal defendant. 56 Kan. App. 2d at 571, 434 P.3d 232. The State also argued that, regardless of whether the delay is 13 or 19 months, the panel went astray in concluding either length of time is presumptively prejudicial. The State further contends the delay here was not presumptively prejudicial because the delay was mainly caused by Owens. And, it argues, this point alone requires us to reject Owens' speedy trial claim.

We first address when Owens' speedy trial right attached. The Court of Appeals, in deciding not to include the...

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  • State v. Queen
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • March 19, 2021
    ...(2) the cause of the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted the right, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant. State v. Owens , 310 Kan. 865, 869, 451 P.3d 467 (2019) (citing Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 [1972] ). Queen has not argued the State vi......
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    ...applies in state court through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Owens , 310 Kan. 865, 869, 451 P.3d 467 (2019) (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 222-23, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 [1967] ). The Kansas Supreme C......
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    ...the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. See State v. Owens , 310 Kan. 865, 872, 451 P.3d 467 (2019) ; State v. Rivera , 277 Kan. 109, 112, 83 P.3d 169 (2004). Our review of a district court's legal rulings regarding all......
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