State v. Owens
| Citation | 552 S.E.2d 745,346 S.C. 637 |
| Decision Date | 04 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 25354.,25354. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Freddie Eugene OWENS, Appellant. |
Assistant Appellate Defender Katherine Carruth Link, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia; John M. Rollins, Jr., of Greer; and Karl B. Allen, of Greenville, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Tracey C. Green, of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of a violent crime, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He was sentenced to death for murder and imprisonment for thirty years, five years, and five years for armed robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of a violent crime, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, respectively.
The charges against appellant stem from the 4:00 a.m. November 1, 1997, armed robbery of a Speedway convenience store and fatal shooting of the store's clerk, Irene Graves. Appellant was jointly tried with co-defendant Stephen Andra Golden. During jury qualification, Golden pled guilty.
During trial, the State introduced the Speedway security video which recorded the robbery and shooting. The video reveals two individuals entered the store. One individual shot Graves.
Golden admitted he was one of the Speedway robbers and claimed appellant was his accomplice. He testified appellant shot Graves in the head after she stated she could not open the safe. No forensic evidence connected appellant to the crime scene.
Nakeo Vance testified he, Golden, appellant, and Lester Young planned to rob the Speedway and, simultaneously, a nearby Waffle House. Golden and appellant robbed the Speedway. Vance and Young went to the Waffle House but did not carry out the robbery. After the Speedway shooting and robbery, Vance testified appellant admitted he shot the store clerk.
Appellant's girlfriend testified appellant told her he had robbed a store and shot the clerk.
Detective Wood and Investigator Willis testified appellant initially gave a written statement denying involvement in the Speedway robbery and shooting. According to both witnesses, appellant later admitted he shot Graves.
Appellant maintained he was at home in bed at the time of the Speedway robbery and shooting.1 He suggested the Sheriff's Department's investigation into the identity of Golden's accomplice was inadequate. For instance, he asserted the Sheriffs Department initially interviewed another individual who tested positive for gun powder residue, but failed to pursue this individual as a suspect. Alternatively, he suggested Vance was the accomplice. Appellant intimated witnesses who testified against him had various reasons to inculpate him in the crime. He also suggested witnesses falsely testified he made statements admitting he robbed the Speedway and shot the store clerk. Additionally, he claimed the Sheriffs Department intimidated his mother into giving a written statement in which she asserted appellant admitted shooting the clerk. Appellant's mother denied giving the statement.
Appellant argues the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try him for murder because the murder indictment failed to allege malice aforethought as required by South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-19-30 (1985). We disagree. With limited exceptions, the South Carolina Constitution requires a person be indicted by the grand jury before standing trial for a crime. S.C. Const. art. I, § 11. Accordingly, except for certain minor offenses, the circuit court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to convict a defendant of an offense unless (1) there has been an indictment which sufficiently states the offense (2) there has been a waiver of indictment; or (3) the charge is a lesser included charge of the crime charged in the indictment. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 495 S.E.2d 773 (1998).
South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-19-30 provides:
Every indictment for murder shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which, in addition to setting forth the time and place, together with a plain statement, divested of all useless phraseology, of the manner in which the death of the deceased was caused, charges the defendant did feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased.
(Underline added).
An indictment for murder is sufficient "if the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce, the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer, and if an acquittal or a conviction thereon may be pleaded as a bar to any subsequent prosecution." State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 165, 359 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1987); see State v. Munn, 292 S.C. 497, 357 S.E.2d 461 (1987)
(). Malice aforethought is an element of the offense of murder. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (1985) (); see Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975).
Here, the murder indictment states:
While the murder indictment does not specifically state appellant killed the victim with malice aforethought, it does state appellant killed the victim in violation of South Carolina Code Ann. § 16-3-10. This section defines murder as "the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied." Specific reference to § 16-3-10 in the body of the indictment provided appellant with notice of the elements of murder. See State v. Crenshaw, 274 S.C. 475, 266 S.E.2d 61 (1980)
(); State v. Beam, 336 S.C. 45, 518 S.E.2d 297 (Ct.App.1999) (). While the better practice is to set forth the elements of the crime in the indictment rather than referring to the statutory section alleged to have been violated, the indictment here was sufficient as it informed appellant of the elements of murder, including malice aforethought.2
We note appellant relies on Carter v. State, supra,
to support his claim that reference to the statute is insufficient to notify the defendant of the elements of the offense. In Carter, the Court determined reference to the statute on the caption of the indictment was not controlling where it conflicted with the description of the offense in the body of the indictment. Carter did not hold reference to the statute in the body of the indictment is insufficient to authorize jurisdiction.
Appellant argues the trial judge erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of his alleged involvement in the Prestige Cleaners and Conoco convenience store robberies on October 31 and November 1, 1997. He contends evidence of these two robberies was not admissible as part of the res gestae. We disagree.
Six weeks prior to trial, the trial judge heard appellant's motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of two uncharged crimes: the armed robbery of Prestige Cleaners at 6:45 p.m. on October 31, 1997, and the armed robbery of a Conoco convenience store at 2:00 a.m. on November 1, 1997. The solicitor stated the Prestige Cleaners and Conoco robberies occurred less than ten hours before the Speedway robbery. The solicitor asserted:
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