State v. Pace

• Decision Date: 08 January 1943
• Citation: 29 A.2d 755,129 Conn. 570
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. PACE.

29 A.2d 755

129 Conn. 570

STATE

v. PACE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 8, 1943.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Pickett, Judge.

Albert Pace was convicted of nonsupport in the City Court of New Haven and appealed to the Court of Common Pleas where the prosecuting attorney filed an information in lieu of that in City Court charging nonsupport of defendant's wife and minor child, wherein defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court to which the state demurred and the questions were reserved by the court for advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.

Questions answered in accordance with opinion.

Before MALTBIE, C. J, and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

Edwin S. Pickett, Pros. Atty, of New Haven, for the State.

Louis Feinmark, of New Haven, for defendant.

Jeremiah D. Shea, of New Haven, amicus curiae.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The defendant was found guilty of the crime of nonsupport in the City Court of New Haven and appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. There the prosecuting attorney filed an information in lieu of that in the City Court under § 6449 of the General Statutes. This contained two counts, charging in one nonsupport of the defendant's wife and in the other nonsupport of his minor child. The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, to which the state demurred. The case comes to us on reservation for advice as to the proper ruling upon that demurrer. Section 1702c of the 1935 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes penalizes nonsupport of a wife, child, grandchild, parent or grandparent, and subsection (b) is as follows: 'Any person who shall violate any provision of this section may be prosecuted before any court of this state in the same manner as if such offense had been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of such court." There can be no question that the intent of this statute was to confer jurisdiction upon any court in the state to hear and determine an accusation of violation of the statute whether or not the offense was committed within the territory over which it had jurisdiction. The substantial issue presented is the constitutionality of that subsection.

The plea to the jurisdiction alleges, and the demurrer admits, that the defendant had been for some time and was at the time of the alleged commission of the crime a resident of Branford; his wife ever since the marriage and the child since birth had been and were at the time of the alleged commission of the crime residents of Ansonia; and the matrimonial domicil of the defendant and his wife has never been in any other place than Ansonia. The crime charged could not, then, have been regarded as having been committed in New Haven. McDonald v. Hugo, 93 Conn. 360, 363, 105 A. 709; 16 C.J. 187, § 263; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, p. 278, § 185b. The criminal jurisdiction of the New Haven City Court as regards violations of state laws is restricted to those committed within the city or town of New Haven; 13 Spec.Laws, 1899, p. 442, § 185; and, if the City Court did not have jurisdiction of the offense charged against the defendant, the Court of Common Pleas, acting upon an information under § 6449 of the General Statutes, would not. McDonald v. Hugo, supra, 93 Conn. 365, 105 A. 709. Hence the only jurisdiction these courts could have would be under § 1702c(b).

Our constitution, unlike those of some states, contains no provision restricting the place of trial of persons accused of crime. As the defendant points out, it does prescribe that in all criminal prosecutions "the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and by counsel" and "to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favour"; Art. I, § 9; and that "no person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law." Art. I, § 10. As the defendant maintains, the fair import of these and other provisions in the constitution is that an accused shall be granted a fair and impartial trial. But neither the provisions we have quoted nor any other in the constitution can be construed to prevent the legislature from providing that an accusation of crime may be tried and disposed of by a court in a territorial subdivision of the state other than that within which it is committed. The right of one accused of crime to have a fair and impartial trial has been the basis of Anglo-Saxon criminal jurisdiction ever since Magna Carta. But that has never been regarded as involving as a necessary element the requirement that in all cases an accused be tried within the county or other territorial jurisdiction within which the offense was committed. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, Vol. 4, p. 304, states that accusations of murder might be tried by the King's Special Commission in any shire or place in England, and offenses against "the black act," 9 Geo. I, Chap. 22 (unlawfully killing game with face blackened or in disguise), might be tried in a court in any county. At the time of the adoption of our constitution, our law provided that persons charged with bigamy might be tried "in the county where they shall be apprehended." Rev.1821, p. 171.

It is true that it might impose hardship upon an accused to be presented for trial in some court at a place considerably distant from that of his residence. But the possibility of that occurring is present under the very rule for which the defendant contends, for he may be charged with committing a crime in the place where it is alleged to have been committed and be arrested at his residence and brought to such place for trial, though it is remote from his home and he was but a temporary sojourner there. In fact, an accused may be tried in a territorial jurisdiction in which he has never been personally present; e. g., a nonresident may be tried in this...