State v. Pace
Citation | 602 N.W.2d 764 |
Decision Date | 17 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-930.,98-930. |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lawrence Albert PACE, Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Crowl, County Attorney, and Jeff TeKippe, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, TERNUS, CADY, and HARRIS,1 JJ.
Lawrence Pace appeals from a judgment and sentence following his convictions for burglary in the first degree and going armed with intent. He claims there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction and he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Lawrence Pace went to the rural Pottawattamie County home of Duane Myers around noon on July 27, 1997. Myers was in the home with his girlfriend, Maureen Pace. Maureen and Pace were formerly married. Maureen was the primary caretaker of their three minor children. Pace was a joint custodial parent with visitation rights and was entitled to exercise visitation of the children at the time he went to Myers' home.
Myers' home was set back approximately 120 feet from a gravel road located in front of the home. A gravel driveway ran from the road to a garage located around eighty feet behind the home. The house included a room which extended off the back of the house. The room had a doorway with a screen door on the outside which opened to the outside, and a heavy wooden door on the inside which opened to the inside. Myers used the room as a porch. It had exterior walls consistent in appearance with the remainder of the house and was covered by the roof of the house. A narrow cement sidewalk extended from the driveway to the back door with a small cement step located just outside the door. There was no roof or overhang above the door. A yard surrounded the house, with farm fields a greater distance from the house.
Pace drove his pickup truck from the road onto the gravel driveway. He parked on the driveway near the house, exited the vehicle, walked to the back door, and rang the doorbell. Maureen stepped onto the porch. Pace asked her where he could locate their children.
Although Maureen had previously left a message for Pace that the children would be at his sister's house, she reiterated that he could pick up the children at his sister's house. Maureen then opened the door of the porch and stepped outside. An argument quickly followed. Myers came to the back door and directed Maureen to return to the house. Maureen returned to the porch and Myers shut the screen door behind her. Myers told Pace, "You're done." Pace then sprayed mace through the screen door onto Myers and Maureen. Pace was standing on the cement area just outside the back door at the time.
After Myers was sprayed with the mace, he exited the porch to approach Pace. Pace promptly struck him with a metal club. Myers was unable to recall his precise location when he was first struck with the club, although he believed it occurred in an area just outside the door. Myers was then struck several other times while the two men struggled together in the back yard outside the door. Within a short period of time, Myers retreated towards the house. He opened the screen door to enter, and attempted to shut the wooden door behind him. Pace, however, was in pursuit. He prevented Myers from closing the door by pushing inward on the door with his hands. Myers eventually succeeded in closing the door. He then locked it and placed a telephone call to law enforcement authorities.
Pace was subsequently charged with burglary in the first degree, going armed with intent, and domestic abuse assault. At the close of the evidence by the State at trial, Pace moved for judgment of acquittal on the charge of burglary in the first degree. He claimed insufficient evidence had been presented to show he entered or remained upon an occupied structure. The district court overruled the motion.
Trial counsel for Pace later moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor attempted to cross-examine Pace about his prior assaultive behavior. Defense counsel believed the questioning violated a prior ruling by the district court made in response to a motion in limine. The district court sustained the objection to the prosecutor's questions, but held the motion for mistrial in abeyance. The trial, however, was concluded without a ruling by the trial court on the motion for mistrial. The jury found Pace guilty of burglary in the first degree and going armed with intent.
Pace raises two claims of error on appeal. He asserts he did not commit the crime of burglary in the first degree because there was insufficient evidence to show he entered an occupied structure without a right, license or privilege, or remained on an occupied structure after the right, license or privilege had expired. He acknowledges he entered the driveway, walkway, and area just outside the back door, but claims he was privileged to do so and the areas were outside the definition of an occupied structure. He also asserts he did not inflict any bodily injury while in or upon an occupied structure. Secondly, Pace claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the vagueness of the term "appurtenance" in the statutory definition of "occupied structure" and by failing to request a ruling on the motion for mistrial.
We review claims of insufficient evidence for errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4. We will uphold a finding of guilt if "substantial evidence" supports the verdict. State v. Schmidt, 588 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 1998). "Substantial evidence" is that upon which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. We give consideration to all of the evidence, not just that which supports the verdict, including reasonable inferences which could be derived from all the evidence. Id.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arise from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1999)
; U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Iowa Const. art. 1, § 10. We review such constitutional claims de novo. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d at 207.
Burglary is committed under our Iowa statute when:
Any person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who, having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure, such occupied structure not being open to the public, or who remains therein after it is closed to the public or after the person's right, license or privilege to be there has expired, or any person having such intent who breaks an occupied structure. . . .
Iowa Code § 713.1 (1997).
Our legislature has classified burglary by three degrees, depending upon the severity of the circumstances. Burglary in the first degree is committed "if while perpetrating a burglary in or upon an occupied structure in which one or more persons are present," the person, among other circumstances, "intentionally or recklessly inflicts bodily injury on any person." Id. § 713.3. Burglary in the second degree is committed, in part, when a burglary is perpetrated "in or upon an occupied structure in which one or more persons are present" but none of the aggravating circumstances of first-degree burglary exist. Id. § 713.5. Third-degree burglary generally involves burglary where no persons are present in the occupied structure and no aggravating circumstances occur. Id. § 713.6(1). In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we review all the evidence in view of the offenses charged.
At common law, burglary could only be committed in a dwelling house. 3 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 325, at 251 (15th ed.1995) (hereinafter "Wharton's"). The crime was considered to be an offense against the security of habitation or occupancy, and was tied to the ancient maxim that "a man's home is his castle." Id. §§ 316, 325, at 223, 253. It was not designed to protect property or ownership, rather the notion that people should be able to feel secure in their homes. Id. As one court put it:
State v. Nible, 200 Cal.App.3d 838, 844, 247 Cal.Rptr. 396 (1988) (quoting State v. Lewis, 274 Cal.App.2d 912, 920, 79 Cal.Rptr. 650 (1969)). A "dwelling house" at common law included not only the house regularly used for sleeping, but also out-buildings within the curtilage of the home. See Wharton's § 326, at 259. The curtilage encompassed the cluster of buildings which were in reasonably close proximity to the dwelling house and closely associated with it. Id. The rationale for making buildings located within the curtilage the subject of burglary was derived from the continuing need to protect the occupants of the house when they used nearby buildings as a part of their occupation of the principal dwelling. Id. § 326, at 262.
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