State v. Padula
| Decision Date | 25 July 1927 |
| Citation | 138 A. 456,106 Conn. 454 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. PADULA. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Wolfe, Judge.
Tony Padula was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. No error.
When defendant asserts self-defense, his state of mind and reasonableness of apprehension of violence from deceased become material.
Carl Foster, of Bridgeport (Daniel Keogh, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellant.
Lorin W. Willis, of Bridgeport (William H. Comley, State's Atty., of Bridgeport, on the brief), for the State.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.
The state offered evidence to prove that as Genario Clementi was leaving the house of his uncle, one Parella, he was accosted by the accused, who demanded payment of a loan which he claimed to have made him; that Padula's demands became so loud that Parella and his wife and daughter came out of their house; that Padula drew a knife with his left hand and brandished it about, whereupon Clementi grasped his left wrist to prevent him from doing injury with the knife; that Padula then drew a revolver and, freeing himself from the grasp of Clementi and still holding the knife in his left hand, stepped back several paces and shot Clementi twice, the second time while Clementi was lying on the ground; that Padula then ran away and escaped, carrying with him the revolver and the knife, which were later found buried in the woods at a point disclosed by Padula to a relative with a request to him to get " my knife and gun."
The defendant's version of the affair as related by him on the trial was that during the argument about the money Clementi told him that he had killed two people in Italy and that if Padula asked him again for the money he would be the third one; that Clementi punched him with his fist on the forehead, and later pulled a knife out of a sheath, raised it as if to strike the defendant, and threatened to kill him; that defendant was then afraid of Clementi and fired two shots, both while Clementi was standing on his feet; that the knife and sheath, which he carried away belonged to Clementi.
The finding discloses that the defendant made no statement upon direct examination whether he knew that Clementi had a reputation for violence, or whether he was afraid of Clementi when he met him on the night in question, but on crosss-examination he testified that he had had no previous quarrel with Clementi, that at the time of their meeting in the street Clementi had not done anything to him, or had trouble with him, and that the only time he was afraid of Clementi was when he came toward him with the knife.
The defendant attempted to introduce evidence of the reputation of the deceased, Clementi, for violence, and it is contended that this evidence was admissible as tending to show the state of mind or intent of the defendant at the time of the shooting, and that its exclusion was erroneous. When a defendant charged with murder asserts that he killed in self-defense, his state of mind--the existence and reasonableness of apprehension of such violence by the deceased as to justify the defensive measures adopted--becomes material. If the reputation of the deceased be that of a violent, dangerous, or turbulent character, such reputation, if known to the defendant, may be a circumstance contributing to a reasonable belief by the accused that his life is in peril and his consequent state of mind as to the necessity of defending himself and the means justifiably to be taken in so doing. Evidence of such reputation, if shown to be known to the defendant, is therefore, in proper cases generally held to be admissible. 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § § 63, 246; 13 R. C. L. " Homicide," § 219. To render evidence of such character admissible, however, there must be some demonstration by the deceased, which, if considered independently of his character, would not be regarded as sufficient to warrant extreme defensive measures, but when observed and considered in connection with such character may reasonably arouse a belief of imminent peril. Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 136, 9 So. 835, 29 Am.St.Rep. 232; Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452, 45 Am.Rep. 526; De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351, 361; Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494, 66 N.E. 32, 93 Am.St.Rep. 208.
Such a situation is not here presented. Even had it appeared that the reputation of Clementi was that of a violent character there is nothing in the record intimating that it was known to the defendant. Furthermore, it plainly...
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State v. Shabazz
...and that he was aware of the victim's violent character. State v. Miranda, [supra, 176 Conn. 109], citing State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 456-57, 138 A. 456 (1927). More recently, we joined a majority of courts when we expanded this rule to allow the accused to introduce evidence of the vic......
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State v. Streit
...self-defense or defense of another").12 In Miranda , this court rejected the approach taken in its earlier decision in State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 138 A. 456 (1927), which did not permit the admission of character evidence to prove that the decedent was the aggressor on the ground that ......
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State v. Gonzalez-Rivera, GONZALEZ-RIVERA
...and that he was aware of the victim's violent character.' State v. Miranda, [supra, at 109, 405 A.2d 622], citing State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 456-57, 138 A.2d [A.] 456 (1927). More recently, we joined a majority of courts when we expanded this rule to allow the accused to introduce evid......
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State v. Carter, 14508
...he was aware of the victim's violent character. State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107, 109, 405 A.2d 622 (1978), citing State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 456-57, 138 A. 456 (1927). More recently, we joined a majority of courts when we expanded this rule to allow the accused to introduce evidence of......