State v. Pain

• Citation: 19 So. 138,48 La.Ann. 311
• Decision Date: 20 January 1896
• Docket Number: 11,934
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHARLES PAIN

19 So. 138

48 La.Ann. 311

STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHARLES PAIN

No. 11,934

Supreme Court of Louisiana

January 20, 1896

Submitted January 4, 1896

APPEAL from the Eleventh Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Landry. Perrault, J.

M. J Cunningham, Attorney General, and E. B. Dubuisson, District Attorney, for Plaintiff, Appellee.

E. P Veazie and John N. Ogden, for Defendant, Appellant.

OPINION

MILLER J.

Defendant appeals from a sentence for murder and relies on bills of exception to the rulings of the lower court, permitting testimony of threat of the defendant against the deceased; allowing the State, on cross-examination of character witnesses produced by defendant, to ask whether the witnesses had not heard particular acts of violence imputed to the accused, and excluding the wife of the accused from testifying.

It is, we think, too clear to admit of discussion that threats of violence against the deceased, made by the accused preceding the homicide with which he is charged, are admissible in evidence to show malice: 1 Bishop Criminal Law, Ed., p. 1110; State vs. Edwards, 34 An. 1012; State vs. Birdwell, 36 An. 859. The learned judge of the lower court, in signing the bill, discriminates the principle, authorizing such testimony, from the test of admissibility of testimony of threats of deceased when relied on by the accused. In the decision cited by the defendant in this case, the accused sought to prove in his defence on a charge of murder a conditional threat against his life made by the deceased and communicated. The court excluded the testimony on the ground the condition of the threat had not occurred. It is manifest the decision has no application here, in which the threat is not by the deceased, but by the accused, who followed it by killing the deceased against whom the threat was directed. State vs. Vance, 32 An. 1177. It was for the jury to determine the weight of the testimony, but its tendency to show malice on the part of the accused is, in our view, not to be questioned.

Witnesses testifying to the good character of the deceased for peace and quietness may properly be cross-examined as to the grounds on which they found their testimony. In testifying on direct examination on this point the witness is confined to his knowledge of the general reputation of the party whose character is under investigation. General reputation is made up of that which people in general say of the party of which the witness has knowledge. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 101. It would seem, therefore, competent to ask the character witness on cross-examination if he has not heard evil conduct imputed to the party. In this case the questions on cross-examination were whether the witnesses had not heard the accused had whipped a woman, and whether the witness had not also heard of another instance in which the accused had drawn a pistol on another. The court admitted the testimony, not to prove the particular acts, but to test the knowledge of the witnesses and enable the jury to properly appreciate their testimony as to the character of the accused. For that purpose, we think the testimony was admissible. Mr. Rice, in his volume on Evidence, in criminal cases, thus...