State v. Palamia

• Decision Date: 27 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-584,82-584
• Citation: 124 N.H. 333,470 A.2d 906
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Joseph R. PALAMIA.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 906

470 A.2d 906

124 N.H. 333

The STATE of New Hampshire v.Joseph R. PALAMIA.

No. 82-584.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Dec. 27, 1983.

Gregory H. Smith, Atty. Gen. (Peter W. Mosseau, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief, and T. David Plourde, Atty., orally, Concord), for the State.

William A. Bolton, on brief, and Michael Manzi, on brief and orally, Lawrence, Mass., for defendant.

BROCK, Justice.

In September 1981, the defendant, Joseph R. Palamia, was indicted for accomplice to burglary (RSA 626:8) and burglary (RSA 635:1).The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal from a ruling is whether the Trial Court(Pappagianis, J.) erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his confession, which was obtained after an admittedly illegal arrest.Because the taint of the illegal arrest was not removed, we hold that the confession was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and must be suppressed.Accordingly, we reverse.

We are without a transcript of the suppression hearing.The facts referred to below are taken from the parties' agreed statement of facts.An automobile in which the defendant was a passenger, was stopped in Wilmington, Massachusetts, by the Wilmington police at approximately 11:00 p.m. on November 21, 1982.The driver of the car was arrested for driving under the influence.The defendant-passenger was handcuffed, placed in a separate cruiser, and transported to the Wilmington police station.The defendant testified that when he asked why he was arrested, he was told, "Don't worry, we'll find something."

Upon learning that the defendant's driver's license listed Groton, Massachusetts, as his address, the Wilmington police contacted the Groton police department and were informed that the Pepperell, Massachusetts police had a fugitive warrant outstanding against the defendant.The defendant was subsequently transported from the Wilmington police station to the Billerica House of Correction in Billerica, Massachusetts, where he was held for a period of time, and then to the Ayer police station, in Ayer, Massachusetts.The record is silent as to what prompted the involvement of the Ayer police.

The defendant had no contact with family, friends, or anyone other than members of the Ayer police department until approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 22, 1982.At that time, two members of the Hudson, New Hampshire police department arrived to interview the defendant about a breaking and entering that had occurred in Hudson in December 1980.The defendant was advised of his Miranda rights after which he reviewed and executed a waiver of rights form.He then made and signed the confession which is the subject of his motion to suppress in this case.We note that the defendant was never charged with anything as a result of the November 21, 1982, incident.

Based upon counsels' statements at oral argument, it is our understanding that the defendant is not contesting the voluntariness of his statement for federal fifth amendment purposes, but rather argues that under a federal fourth amendment analysis, the confession is an inadmissible fruit of the illegal arrest.The State concedes, for purposes of all the proceedings, that the arrest was illegal, but argues that the taint of the illegal arrest was removed before the officers received the confession.

Our analysis begins from the illegal arrest.The defendant's confession was obtained as a result of that arrest.For the confession to be admissible, the State must show that the act of giving the statement was sufficiently a product of the defendant's free will so as to break the causal connection between the illegality and the confession.Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d 314(1982);State v. White, 119 N.H. 567, 570-71, 406 A.2d 291, 293(1979).The relevant factors in determining whether the confession was obtained by exploiting the illegal arrest are whether the Miranda warnings were given, "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances," and "particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416(1975);State v. White, 119 N.H. at 570-71, 406 A.2d at 293.

In the present case, Miranda warnings were given.However, it is clear that Miranda warnings per se do not remove the taint of the illegal arrest.Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. at 690, 102 S.Ct. at 2667;State v. White, 119 N.H. at 570, 406 A.2d at 293.

With regard to the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, this defendant was held in custody for eighteen hours in three different locations under three different authorities.He was not allowed to contact family or friends.The State argues that the eighteen hours between the arrest and the subsequent confession, and the lack of allegations of coercion, intimidation, or physical abuse, suggest that the defendant had ample opportunity for detached reflection and thus his statement was an exercise of his free will.

We conclude that the mere passage of time in this case not only did not remove the taint, but may well have exacerbated the taint.SeeDunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2260, 60 L.Ed.2d 824(1979)(Stevens, J., concurring)("If there are no relevant intervening circumstances, a prolonged detention may well be a more serious exploitation of an illegal arrest than a short one.").Moreover, the fact that the conditions of his confinement were not physically debilitating or abusive does not, in these circumstances, militate a finding that his statement was therefore a product of his free will.SeeTaylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. at 693, 102 S.Ct. at 2669;State v. White, 119 N.H. at 571, 406 A.2d at 293.

We further conclude that there were no intervening circumstances of...