State v. Papazoni, No. 92-437

• Docket Nº: No. 92-437
• Citation: 159 Vt. 578, 622 A.2d 501
• Case Date: January 08, 1993
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont

Page 501

622 A.2d 501 159 Vt. 578 STATE of Vermont
v.
Darrell L. PAPAZONI. No. 92-437. Supreme Court of Vermont. Jan. 8, 1993.
Reargument Denied, Feb. 1, 1993.

Page 502

[159 Vt. 579] Scot L. Kline, Chittenden County State's Atty., and Pamela Hall Johnson, Deputy State's Atty., Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee.

E.M. Allen, Defender Gen., and William Nelson, Appellate Atty., Montpelier, for defendant-appellant.

Before [159 Vt. 578] ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

[159 Vt. 579] DOOLEY, Justice.

In 1987, defendant Darrell Papazoni was convicted of driving under the influence, death resulting, and was sentenced to a term of three to fifteen years, all suspended except one year. The conviction was upheld by this Court, State v. Papazoni, 157 Vt. 337, 338, 596 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1991), and defendant unsuccessfully pursued habeas corpus relief in federal court. Throughout defendant's challenges to his conviction, execution of the unsuspended part of the sentence was stayed and he was placed on probation. While the federal appeal was pending, defendant completed his probation and was discharged. He [159 Vt. 580] argued below that the discharge from probation relieved him of all further obligations for the crime, including the one-year prison sentence, and has appealed from the refusal of the district court to release him. We affirm.

Defendant's argument is based on 28 V.S.A. § 255, which provides:

Upon the termination of the period of probation or the earlier discharge of the probationer in accordance with section 251 of this title, the probationer shall be relieved of any obligations imposed by the order of the court and shall have satisfied his sentence for the crime.

Defendant relies on the plain meaning of the statute. He argues that because he fulfilled his probationary obligation, he "satisfied his sentence for the crime" and cannot be required to fulfill his prison sentence. The State argues, to the contrary, that the statute does not apply to split sentences like that given to defendant and thus does not mandate his release.

Page 503

We ordinarily rely on the plain meaning of the words to construe statutes because we presume that it shows the intent of the Legislature. See Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93, 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983). Indeed, we have abandoned giving effect to plain meaning only in "narrow and particular circumstances," Dykstra v. Property Valuation & Review Division, 156 Vt. 215, 218, 591 A.2d 63, 65 (1991), because presumably the Legislature was aware of the words it used and their meaning. See State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 213, 591 A.2d 53, 56 (1991). Nevertheless, our overriding goal in construing a statute is to discern the intent of the Legislature. In re C.S., 158 Vt. 339, ----, 609 A.2d 641, 643 (1992). When that intent conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute, " 'we are not confined to a literal interpretation of the statutory language.' " Id. (quoting State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 511, 438 A.2d 1135, 1140 (1981)). ¹ [159 Vt. 581] If we must look beyond plain meaning, numerous other aids exist that are helpful in statutory construction. For example, we normally look at " 'the subject matter, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law.' " Nash v. Warren Zoning Board of Adjustment, 153 Vt. 108, 112, 569 A.2d 447, 450 (1989) (quoting In re R.S. Audley, Inc., 151 Vt. 513, 517, 562 A.2d 1046, 1049 (1989)).

Another construction aid is helpful in this case. Section 255 is taken from § 301.2(3) of the Model Penal Code, see 10 U.L.A. 599 (1974), a familiar source of drafting for Vermont criminal justice statutes. See State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 305, 561 A.2d 392, 397 (1989) (13 V.S.A. §§ 1023 and 1021 are derived from the Model Penal Code). When our statute is taken from a model act, it is often helpful to examine the intent behind the model act. See Martel v. Stafford, 157 Vt. 604, 608, 603 A.2d 345, 348 (1991). It is helpful in this case because the State argues that § 255 was not intended to be applied to split sentences of the type involved here. The Model Penal Code prohibits such a split sentence,...