State v. Pape

Decision Date13 January 1916
Citation96 A. 313,90 Conn. 98
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. PAPE.

Appeal from District Court of Waterbury; Isaac Wolfe, Acting Judge.

Demurrer to information against William J. Pape was sustained, and a judgment of not guilty entered, and the State appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Leonard J. Nickerson, of Cornwall, and Edward B. Reiley, of Waterbury, for the State. Nathaniel R. Bronson and Lawrence L. Lewis, both of Waterbury, for appellee.

WHEELER, J. The information charges in two counts that the accused did unlawfully write, print, and publicly exhibit and distribute in a newspaper certain offensive, indecent, and abusive matter concerning a Mr. Peasley, which it quotes at length.

The offense is charged in the language of General Statutes, § 1284.

The accused demurred generally to the information, the demurrer was sustained, and judgment entered in favor of the accused. The state claims the demurrer should have been overruled because (1) not specific. We think the general demurrer as filed accords with our practice in criminal causes. And because (2) the information does charge a crime, and properly charge it.

The accused supports the decision upon the demurrer mainly upon three grounds: (11 That the clause of section 1284, upon which the information is based, does not apply to newspapers; (2) that the articles quoted are not within the legal definition of the terms as used in this clause; (3) that this clause purporting to charge a crime is in contravention of our constitutional guaranties of liberty of speech and of the press and of the right to defend by proving the truth of the publication. We will consider these grounds in the order made.

1. The statute upon which the information is based was enacted in 1865 (chapter 86). It created it a crime for one to "write or print, and publicly exhibit, or cause to be exhibited, or distribute, or cause to be distributed, any indecent, libelous or obscene and abusive matter, of or concerning any person or persons." The history of this act lends no support to the claim that newspapers are excepted from its provisions. It was re-enacted in the Revision of 1866. In the Revision of 1875, it was incorporated in shortened form in the breach of the peace statute. The revisers made this act a part of the breach of peace statute, we presume, having in mind that libel was originally made punishable as a misdemeanor on the ground that such a publication had a tendency to disturb the public peace. 1 Hawk. P. C. (8th Ed.) 542, § 3; State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266, 18 Am. Dec. 105.

The words "libelous" and "obscene" are omitted in this Revision from the classes of defamatory matter named in the statute. These omissions were, it seems most likely, made through a desire to avoid superfluous matter. "Indecent" includes "obscene." As the avoidance of surplusage was the obvious purpose of dropping "obscene," it is highly probable that its associated word, "libelous," was dropped for a like reason. "Abusive" and "indecent" are general terms which include all vituperative, scurrilous, insulting, gross, vile, impure, and obscene language. These terms may well have been thought to include the whole range of defamatory language, and so to have made it unnecessary to continue the word "libelous." This seems a more reasonable view than that the omission was intended to eliminate criminal libel as applied to newspapers. This argument is made in forgetfulness that the law makes no distinction between the libel by the newspaper and the individual. "Libelous" refers to all libelous matter, and plainly abusive and indecent matter may be libelous matter. Later, there was added to this statute, as appears in Revision 1888, § 1509, the words, "or who shall publicly exhibit, post up, or advertise any offensive * * * matter." And with these additions and omissions the crime created by the act of 1865 stands. We find nothing in the act or in its history which countenances the claim that newspaper libels are excluded from the clause of the section of the statute we are considering. The terms of this clause of the statute, in their natural meaning, include every one who commits the offense charged. The terms of this clause suggest no exception. Unless the intention to exclude a class from the operation of a general statute is manifest from its terms, or its necessary implications, it cannot be found.

It is said the common-law crime of libel is adequate to protect against any form of criminal defamation. If this be granted, it could not prevent the General Assembly creating a statutory crime of libel, or a statutory crime, punishing the printing or writing and publication of defamatory matter; or from changing the form of the crime of libel by enlarging its scope, or lessening its sphere, or by increasing or diminishing its penalties, or by incorporating this crime in a statute covering other crimes. It is insisted that the General Assembly did not intend to make it an offense to print and publish in a newspaper any offensive, indecent, or abusive matter regardless of the occasion of its publication, or of its truth, or of its innocent purpose. We fully agree with the counsel for the accused that a statute accomplishing ends such as these would violate our constitutional guaranties of liberty of speech and of the press. And we are further of the opinion that it would then be subversive of those principles of the common law which control and govern the writing or printing and publication of all defamatory matter. Later on we shall endeavor to show that this clause of the statute does not lead to such ends, and is not unconstitutional. But if we thought otherwise, we could not write into the statute an exception in the interest of newspapers, and, until this had been done, the statute could not be read other than as applying to all persons and all classes. We cannot see the force of the suggestion that the words "publicly exhibit or distribute" indicate an intention to punish only the public exhibition by way of pamphlet, poster, or other like printing matter of the kind designated in the statute. The language used is not capable of such a restricted construction, and nothing in the history of the act tends to aid this view.

2. The newspaper articles criticize the public conduct of a state Senator. The criticism is severe, extremely caustic, and somewhat ironical, and the articles plainly violate the canons of good taste. They represent that the Senator, on the night of his nomination, stated that:

...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Cologne v. Westfarms Associates
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 17 d2 Janeiro d2 1984
    ...the power of government to punish speech which is libelous. State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 29, 46 A. 409 (1900); and see State v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 105, 96 A. 313 (1916). So limited a discussion can hardly be deemed to constitute a comprehensive contemporaneous construction either of the rig......
  • State v. Hughes
    • United States
    • Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
    • 4 d4 Março d4 1965
    ...See State v. Gallagher, 72 Conn. 604, 606, 45 A. 430; State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 24, 46 A. 409, 49 L.R.A. 542; State v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 100, 96 A. 313; State v. Murphy, 90 Conn. 662, 664, 98 A. We come now to the main points raised by the defendants upon oral argument and in their brie......
  • State v. Baccala
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 11 d2 Julho d2 2017
    ...cases rejecting state constitutional free speech challenges to statutes proscribing abuse of expressive liberties. In State v. Pape , 90 Conn. 98, 103, 96 A. 313 (1916), this court reversed a demurrer that had dismissed an information filed against the defendant alleging that the defendant ......
  • Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of N.Y.
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 3 d3 Julho d3 1957
    ...term to make a valid censorship standard. 'Indecent' may include anything from vulgarity or impropriety to real obscenity (State v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 101, 96 A. 313). Since the law does not penalize or proscribe mere breaches of decorum, the word 'indecent', to accomplish anything at all, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT