State v. Parduhn
| Decision Date | 27 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | 20090737,Nos. 20090744,20090816.,s. 20090744 |
| Citation | 266 P.3d 765,2011 UT 57 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff, v. Branson Parduhn, Defendant and Appellant.Salt Lake County, Intervenor and Appellee.State of Utah, Plaintiff, v. Randy Fetch Jeffs, Defendant and Appellant.Salt Lake County, Intervenor and Appellee.State of Utah, Plaintiff, v. Antony DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.Salt Lake County, Intervenor and Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jonathon W. Grimes, Edward D. Flint, Sean Hullinger, Salt Lake City, for appellant Branson Parduhn.
David O. Drake, Midvale, for appellant Randy Fetch Jeffs.
Sean B. Druyon, Bountiful, for appellant Antony Davis.Donald H. Hansen, Craig J. Wangsgard, Salt Lake City, for appellee, Salt Lake County.Joan C. Watt, Patrick L. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for amicus Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.William K. McGuire, Troy S. Rawlings, Farmington, for amicus Utah Association of Counties.Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 In this opinion, we address issues raised in three consolidated cases: (1) State v. Parduhn, (2) State v. Jeffs, and (3) State v. Davis. All three cases come to us on interlocutory appeal and involve nearly identical facts and issues. Mr. Parduhn, Mr. Jeffs, and Mr. Davis (collectively, the Defendants) have all been charged with crimes in Salt Lake County (the County). Although each of the Defendants was found to be indigent, and therefore qualified for representation by a public defender, each of the Defendants retained private attorneys. Sometime after retaining their attorneys, each of the Defendants filed a motion in the district court 1 requesting funding for expert witnesses and other defense resources. After determining that the Defendants had all failed to demonstrate a “compelling reason” for the funding they requested, the district court denied these motions.
¶ 2 On appeal, we are asked to resolve two issues. First, we must determine whether our holding in State v. Burns—that the Utah Indigent Defense Act (the Act) requires local governments to provide indigent defendants with funding for necessary defense resources, even when the defendant is represented by private counsel 2—remains good law after amendments to the Act. Second, we must decide whether the district court erred in requiring the Defendants to demonstrate a compelling reason for the funding they requested from the County.
¶ 3 We first hold that the amendments to the Act have not overruled or superseded our holding in Burns. We reach this conclusion based on the plain language of the Act, which expressly states that local governments must provide indigent defendants with funding for necessary defense resources and does not condition the availability of such funding on a defendant's representation by public counsel. Second, we hold that the district court erred in requiring the Defendants to demonstrate a compelling reason for the funding they requested. The Act requires a defendant to demonstrate a compelling reason to receive funding for defense resources only when a local government has contracted to provide such resources to all indigent defendants, and the County has conceded that it has not so contracted. Based on these conclusions, we reverse the district court's denial of the Defendants' motions for funding and remand the Defendants' cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The following discussion provides a brief overview of the factual background in each of the Defendants' cases and of the arguments asserted by the Defendants and the County on appeal.
¶ 5 In 2007, the County charged Branson Parduhn with five counts of forgery, a third degree felony, and two counts of theft by deception, also a third degree felony. At Mr. Parduhn's initial appearance on these charges, the district court concluded that he was indigent and appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (LDA) to represent him. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Parduhn received a one-time monetary gift from his grandparents that he used to retain private counsel. After he retained private counsel, LDA withdrew from representation.
¶ 6 Several months later, Mr. Parduhn filed a motion in the district court in which he requested that the court order the County to provide him with funding to hire a handwriting analyst to examine the instruments he allegedly forged. After hearing arguments on the motion, the district court found that, despite Mr. Parduhn's ability to retain private counsel, he remained indigent. But the court denied Mr. Parduhn's motion after concluding that he had failed to demonstrate a “compelling reason” for the funding he requested.
¶ 7 After the district court rejected his motion for funding, Mr. Parduhn filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of appeals granted the petition and certified the case to us.
¶ 8 In 2008, the County charged Randy Jeffs with four counts of attempted aggravated murder, a first degree felony, one count of attempted unlawful discharge of a firearm, a third degree felony, and one count of domestic violence in the presence of a child, also a third degree felony. The County also charged Mr. Jeffs with one count of reckless endangerment, a class A misdemeanor, and one count of interfering with arrest, a class B misdemeanor. At Mr. Jeffs's initial appearance on these charges, the district court found him to be indigent and appointed LDA to represent him. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Jeffs retained private counsel, and LDA withdrew from representation.
¶ 9 Several months later, Mr. Jeffs filed a motion in the district court in which he requested that the court order the County to provide him with funding to hire a private investigator, a ballistics expert, and a medical expert. After hearing arguments on the motion, the district court found that, despite Mr. Jeffs's ability to retain private counsel, he remained indigent. But the court denied Mr. Jeffs's motion after concluding that he had failed to demonstrate a “compelling reason” for the funding he requested.
¶ 10 After the district court rejected his motion for funding, Mr. Jeffs filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which we granted.
¶ 11 In 2009, the County charged Antony Davis with two counts of rape of a child, a first degree felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, also a first degree felony. At Mr. Davis's initial appearance on these charges, the district court found him to be indigent and appointed LDA to represent him. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Davis retained private counsel, and LDA withdrew from representation.
¶ 12 Several months later, Mr. Davis filed a motion in the district court in which he requested that the court order the County to provide him with “funds to pay experts and investigators necessary to adequately prepare for trial.” After hearing arguments on the motion, the district court found that, despite Mr. Davis's ability to retain private counsel, he remained indigent. But the court denied Mr. Davis's motion after concluding that he had failed to demonstrate a “compelling reason” for the funding he requested.
¶ 13 After the district court rejected his motion for funding, Mr. Davis filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which we granted.
¶ 14 On appeal, the Defendants argue that the plain language of the Act requires local governments to provide an indigent defendant with the defense resources necessary for a complete defense, even if the defendant is represented by private counsel. In support of this position, the Defendants contend that our holding in State v. Burns3 remains good law and is determinative in this case. Second, they argue that the compelling-reason standard articulated in the Act applies only when a local government has contracted with an entity to provide necessary defense resources to all indigent defendants and that the County has not so contracted. Accordingly, the Defendants contend that the district court should not have required them to demonstrate a compelling reason for the funding they requested.4
¶ 15 In opposition, the County raises three arguments. First, it contends that our holding in Burns is no longer good law and is not controlling on the issue of whether local governments are required to provide indigent defendants represented by private counsel with funding for necessary defense resources. Second, it argues that “LDA is the exclusive source from which indigent legal defense resources, including expert witnesses, may be provided, unless a court, after proper notice and a hearing, finds a compelling reason for the appointment of a noncontracting defense resource.” Finally, the County claims that the district court correctly concluded that the Defendants had failed to demonstrate a compelling reason for the funding they requested. We have jurisdiction to hear these appeals pursuant to sections 78A–3–102(3)(b) and 78A–3–102(3)(h) of the Utah Code.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 16 “We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions.” 5
ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Before reaching the merits of the questions on appeal, we first provide some background concerning the rights of indigent criminal defendants. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” 6 In Foster v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court explained that this provision requires that “counsel ... be furnished to an indigent defendant prosecuted in a federal court in every case, whatever the circumstances.” 7 Subsequently, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a fundamental right.8 As a result of this status, the right to counsel is now applicable to...
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