State v. Paredes, No. 2
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
| Writing for the Court | ROLL; FERNANDEZ, C.J., and HOWARD |
| Citation | 810 P.2d 607,167 Ariz. 609 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Edwardo PAREDES, Appellee. 90-0319. |
| Decision Date | 29 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | CA-CR,No. 2 |
Page 607
v.
Edwardo PAREDES, Appellee.
Division 2, Department B.
Review Denied May 20, 1991.
Page 608
[167 Ariz. 610] Stephen D. Neely, Pima County Atty. by Kate Dawes, Tucson, for appellant.
Susan A. Kettlewell, Pima County Public Defender by John F. Palumbo, Tucson, for appellee.
ROLL, Presiding Judge.
The state appeals from the trial court's granting of defendant Edwardo Paredes' motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand.
Defendant Edwardo Paredes was stopped by Department of Public Safety (DPS) officers while operating a motor vehicle on Interstate 19 south of Tucson on November 7, 1989. The vehicle had no front or rear license plates and only a portion of a temporary paper registration was visible.
Officer Gordon Hopke asked the defendant for his driver's license and vehicle registration. The defendant had no driver's license, although he produced an Arizona identification card. He also furnished the officer a sales slip indicating that the car belonged to a third person. Officer Hopke proceeded to conduct a records check. While Officer Hopke was so engaged, Officer Aviles asked the defendant if he was carrying any illegal drugs, currency, or weapons. The defendant replied that he was not. The officer then asked the defendant if the officer could look through the vehicle. The defendant said yes. The officer walked around the vehicle, then retrieved a narcotics-detection dog from the DPS squad car in which he and Officer Hopke had been travelling. While the dog was standing next to the vehicle the defendant had been operating, it alerted to the trunk. The dog was then placed inside the vehicle and alerted to the back seat. The officers opened the trunk of the vehicle and found approximately 150 pounds of marijuana.
Procedural Background
The defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of marijuana for sale and unlawful transportation of marijuana. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the marijuana. An evidentiary hearing was conducted. The trial court ordered that the evidence be suppressed, finding that (1) no reasonable suspicion existed to warrant asking the defendant any questions regarding contraband, and (2) even if reasonable suspicion for further questioning did exist, the defendant's consent to search was inadequate because "the Defendant was not told of the thoroughness of the search or that a dog would be used in the search."
On appeal, the state argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the defendant did not consent to the search. We also address related issues presented by the parties.
Page 609
Standing
The state concedes that notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was operating a borrowed vehicle, the defendant has standing to contest the search of the vehicle. State v. Acosta, 166 Ariz. 254, 801 P.2d 489 (Ct.App.1990).
Jurisdiction
The defendant argues that because the state's notice of appeal was flawed, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the state's appeal, citing Litak v. Scott, 138 Ariz. 599, 676 P.2d 631 (1984). The state's notice of appeal indicated that the state was appealing from "the Order confirming the dismissal of the indictment...." The notice also indicated that appeal was taken pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4032(7). Dismissal occurred on the state's motion, following the trial court's granting of the motion to suppress. Although the notice of appeal incorrectly referred to appeal from the order of dismissal, it correctly cited A.R.S. § 13-4032(7) as the basis of appeal. A.R.S. § 13-4032(7) states:
An appeal may be taken by the state from:
* * * * * *
7. An order granting a motion to suppress the use of evidence.
In Litak, the state attempted, among other things, to appeal from an order suppressing evidence. The notice of appeal stated that appeal was being taken from dismissal of certain complaints, and cited only A.R.S. § 13-4032(1). That provision refers to appeal from dismissal. The supreme court held that the Litak notice of appeal precluded appeal from the suppression order. The state's notice of appeal in the instant matter is distinguishable from that in Litak. The notice of appeal filed by the state is not fatally defective.
Legality of Stop
The defendant concedes that the initial stop of the vehicle was lawful under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The trial court so found.
1. Request for Driver's License
The defendant contends that when the police officer requested that the defendant produce his driver's license, the stop exceeded the permissible scope of a founded suspicion contact under Terry. This argument, however, has been previously rejected. In State v. Gradillas, 25 Ariz.App. 510, 544 P.2d 1111 (1976), this court ruled that it is permissible for a law enforcement officer to immediately request production of a driver's license in connection with a stop concerning a possibly faulty vehicle registration.
The defendant also relies upon the recent decision of State v. Mullen, 75 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 42, (Ct.App. December 11, 1990). In Mullen, Division One of this court ruled that a Terry stop was unfounded where the officer had no basis for believing that some specific crime had been or was about to be committed. There, police detention was prompted by the defendant staring at a police car which drove past the bus stop where he was sitting. Here, the defendant concedes the propriety of the officer's initial contact.
2. Records Check
The defendant next contends that detaining the defendant while a records check was conducted constituted an unlawful detention of the defendant. However, in State v. Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 520, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975), the supreme court held that law enforcement officers are entitled to detain a defendant while a records check is conducted when a defendant has been stopped for a safety violation and is unable to produce a valid driver's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Bell, E015215
...dogs were present at the scene when the defendant gave consent and defendant "stood silent" when dogs were used]; State v. Paredes (1991) 167 Ariz. 609, 613, 810 P.2d 607 [use of drug-sniffing dog did not exceed scope of consent to search vehicle where "the dog was present on the scene when......
-
People v. Haley, No. 01SA148
...surrounding a vehicle where the odor of narcotics escapes from the interior of a vehicle into that public airspace); State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 810 P.2d 607, 611 (1991) (holding that a dog sniff of the outside of a car subsequent to a valid traffic stop did not constitute a search); S......
-
The State of Ariz. v. KINNEY, 2 CA-CR 2010-0004.
...And the court could have suppressed the statements at the station, had it been requested to do so. ¶ 17 Citing State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 810 P.2d 607 (App.1991), and State v. Ybarra, 156 Ariz. 275, 751 P.2d 591 (App.1987), however, the state claims the officers were permitted to deta......
-
State v. Juarez-Godinez, JUAREZ-GODINE
...warehouse did not constitute a "search." Many state courts have held similarly under their own state constitutions. See State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 810 P.2d 607, rev. den. (1991) (drug detection dog's alert to vehicle while standing outside vehicle near trunk did not constitute search)......
-
People v. Bell, No. E015215
...dogs were present at the scene when the defendant gave consent and defendant "stood silent" when dogs were used]; State v. Paredes (1991) 167 Ariz. 609, 613, 810 P.2d 607 [use of drug-sniffing dog did not exceed scope of consent to search vehicle where "the dog was present on the scene when......
-
People v. Haley, No. 01SA148
...surrounding a vehicle where the odor of narcotics escapes from the interior of a vehicle into that public airspace); State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 810 P.2d 607, 611 (1991) (holding that a dog sniff of the outside of a car subsequent to a valid traffic stop did not constitute a search); S......
-
The State of Ariz. v. KINNEY, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0004.
...And the court could have suppressed the statements at the station, had it been requested to do so. ¶ 17 Citing State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 810 P.2d 607 (App.1991), and State v. Ybarra, 156 Ariz. 275, 751 P.2d 591 (App.1987), however, the state claims the officers were permitted to deta......
-
State v. McKinney, Nos. CR-93-0362-A
...171 Ariz. 576, 618, 832 P.2d 593, 635 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993); State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 612, 810 P.2d 607, 610 (App.1991). Neither the record nor any discovered authority supports Hedlund's submission that the search of the drawer ......