State v. Paredez
| Decision Date | 31 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 28,270.,28,270. |
| Citation | 2004 NMSC 36,136 N.M. 533,101 P.3d 799 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ramon PAREDEZ, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Steven J. Potter, Assistant Appellate Defender, Sheila Lewis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Steven S. Suttle, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.
Tova Indritz, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae, New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, New Mexico Civil Liberties Foundation, and The National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild.
{1} Defendant Ramon Paredez pleaded guilty to criminal sexual contact of a minor in the third degree, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-9-13(A)(2) (2001). After sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis he was not adequately informed of the immigration consequences of his plea. The district court entered an order denying his motion, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a memorandum opinion. State v. Paredez, No. 24,082 (N.M.Ct.App. Aug. 20, 2003). We granted certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(B) (1972) and Rule 12-502 NMRA 2004. In this opinion, we hold that the district court's admonition to Defendant that his guilty plea "could" affect his immigration status was sufficient advice to satisfy federal due process and Rule 5-303(E)(5) NMRA 2004; however, Defendant's attorney had an affirmative duty to determine his immigration status and provide him specific advice regarding the impact a guilty plea would have on his immigration status. A prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel is established by the appellate record; thus, we remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's claim.
{2} On October 30, 2002, Defendant was charged by information with criminal sexual contact of a minor thirteen to eighteen years of age. A plea agreement was entered on February 4, 2003, which the district court accepted. Defendant's attorney advised the court at the plea hearing that his client was a permanent resident alien from Guatemala and that the attorney had advised him the plea "could" affect his immigration status. Before accepting the plea, the district court addressed Defendant and also informed him his plea "could" affect his status under immigration laws. On February 25, Defendant was sentenced to three years incarceration in the New Mexico Department of Corrections. Consistent with the plea agreement, he received a suspended sentence and was placed on supervised probation for a period of three years. Six days later, on March 3, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea alleging he was not fully informed as to the effect his plea would have on his immigration status. A hearing was held on the motion, after which the district court issued an order denying the motion. Defendant appealed.
{3} The Court of Appeals noted that the district court complied with Rule 5-303(E), which prohibits the district court from accepting a guilty plea without first informing the defendant that the conviction may affect his or her immigration or naturalization status. Paredez, No. 24,082, slip op. at 2. The Court rejected Defendant's argument that the district court was required to provide a more specific explanation of the immigration consequences of Defendant's guilty plea. Id. at 3. Furthermore, the Court stated that the record was insufficient to address on direct appeal the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel and refused to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Id. at 3-4.
{4} If Defendant's guilty plea for criminal sexual contact of a minor stands, he almost certainly will be deported back to Guatemala. Under federal law, "[a]ny alien ... in and admitted to the United States shall, upon order of the Attorney General, be removed" if the alien is within a statutorily defined class of deportable aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000) (emphasis added). One class of deportable aliens includes those who are convicted of an "aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Criminal sexual contact of a minor is an "aggravated felony" as that term is used in § 1227. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2000) (). Furthermore, not only did Defendant's plea render him deportable, he is ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2000) () (emphasis added). Defendant was not informed by the district court of these consequences of his guilty plea. Also, the record reflects that Defendant's attorney likewise may have failed to inform him that his guilty plea would result in his virtually automatic deportation. We now turn to whether the district court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea.
{5} "A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court's denial of such a motion only for abuse of discretion." State v. Garcia, 1996-NMSC-013, 121 N.M. 544, 546, 915 P.2d 300, 302. The district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "when the undisputed facts establish that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given." Id. The relevant inquiry is whether Defendant's plea was voluntary and knowing, which requires this Court to examine whether Defendant should have been informed that his guilty plea in this case almost certainly would result in his deportation, and if so, whether it was the responsibility of the district court or his defense attorney to inform him of that consequence
{6} We first address the district court's role in informing criminal defendants of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Whether a district court must advise a defendant of certain consequences of a guilty plea prior to accepting the plea is an issue of law that we review de novo. SeeState v. Moore, 2004-NMCA-035, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 210, 86 P.3d 635. For the following reasons, we hold that the district court's admonition to Defendant that his plea "could" have an effect on his immigration status was sufficient to satisfy both our Rule 5-303 and the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. Defendant does not provide any reason for interpreting our state due process clause, N.M. Const. art. II, § 18, differently from its federal counterpart; therefore, we decline to address his argument under our state constitution. See Compton v. Lytle, 2003-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 n. 4, 134 N.M. 586, 81 P.3d 39
.
{7} By entering a guilty plea, a criminal defendant waives a number of constitutional rights, including his or her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to a jury trial, and right of confrontation. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has held that these waivers "not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Defendant contends that his plea was not voluntary or knowing because the district court informed him he "could" be deported as a consequence of his guilty plea, rather than advising him that deportation would automatically result from his plea.
{8} The procedures established in Rule 5-303 "are designed to ensure a guilty plea is made knowingly and voluntarily." Garcia, 121 N.M. at 546, 915 P.2d at 302. In this case, the district court strictly complied with Rule 5-303, which provides:
We deem it advisable for the Rules of Criminal Procedure Committee to review the language of Rule 5-303 and consider whether the district court prior to accepting a defendant's guilty plea must inquire into the immigration status of the defendant and affirmatively determine whether the defendant has been advised by his attorney of the immigration consequences of the plea. See Wash. Rev.Code § 10.40.200(2) (2002) () (emphasis added). However, we cannot conclude that Rule 5-303 as written required more of the district court than informing Defendant that the plea "could" affect his immigration status. We next consider whether the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution required the district court to have been more specific when informing Defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
{9} Neither the Supreme Court nor the federal circuits have held that the trial court must inform defendants of all possible consequences flowing from a guilty plea. The trial court only has a duty to ensure that the defendant understands the "direct" consequences of the plea but is under no duty to advise the defendant of the plea's "collateral" consequences. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C.Cir.1982). Each federal circuit that has directly...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Padilla v. Ky., No. 08-651
... ... Also, informed consideration of possible deportation can benefit both the State ... and noncitizen defendants, who may be able to reach agreements that better ... satisfy the interests of both parties. This decision will not ... omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent ... assistance"); see also State v. Paredez , ... 2004-NMSC-036, 2004 NMSC 36, 136 N. M. 533, 538-539, 101 P.3d 799. A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite ... ...
-
Padilla v. Kentuchy, 08–651.
... ... protection to minimize the risk of unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation that such alien shall not be deported. Id., at 890. 3 This procedure, known as a ... Paredez, 136 N.M. 533, 538539, 101 P.3d 799, 2004NMSC036. A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite two absurd results. First, it would give ... ...
-
State v. Gutierrez
... ... The district court then granted Defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and vacated her conviction on grounds that defense counsel did not advise Defendant of the immigration consequences associated with the plea as required by our Supreme Court in State v. Paredez , 2004NMSC036, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799, 103 P.3d 799. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND {2} On November 7, 2010, Defendant was arrested after entering the United States through the Port of Entry at Columbus, New Mexico with nineteen bricks of marijuana weighing more than twenty-one pounds concealed in ... ...
-
Chaidez v. United States
...N.W.2d 856, 858 (App.1987).9 People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527–529 (Colo.1987) ; State v. Paredez, 2004–NMSC–036, ¶¶ 17–19, 136 N.M. 533, 539, 101 P.3d 799, 805.10 The dissent is therefore wrong to claim that we emphasize "the absence of lower court authority" holding that an attorney's fai......
-
Plea bargaining
...and Medicaid deprived client of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel justifying withdraw of plea). • New Mexico: State v. Paredez , 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799, 803-804 (N.M. 2004) (holding as a matter of state law that failure to inform client of immigration consequences of guilty plea was ......
-
Restructuring Public Defense After Padilla.
...the client was in fact an alien," the attorney "may reasonably be required to investigate relevant immigration law"); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004) (holding that "criminal defense attorneys are obligated to determine the immigration status of their clients" and advise on "......
-
Padilla v. Kentucky: the Criminal Defense Attorney’s Obligation to Warn of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conviction
...ineffective assistance" (quoting United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985))). But see State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004) (holding that the defendant's counsel had an affirmative obligation to determine the defendant's immigration status and advise him on the......
-
Rethinking the increased focus on penal measures in immigration law as reflected in the expansion of the "aggravated felony" concept.
...plea defective so long as the court used a reasonable means to ascertain defendant's understanding of his plea). (133) State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. (134) See id. (135) Id. (136) Joseph, supra note 118, at 56; Michae......