State v. Parisi
| Decision Date | 20 October 1981 |
| Citation | 436 A.2d 948,181 N.J.Super. 117 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph PARISI, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Richard M. Milstead, Asst. Cumberland County Prosecutor, for plaintiff-appellant (Kenneth A. Pagliughi, Cumberland County Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Carl W. Cavagnaro, Vineland, for defendant-respondent (Reuss & Cavagnaro, Vineland, attorneys).
James R. Zazzali, Atty. Gen., amicus curiae. (Judith A. Yaskin, former Acting Atty. Gen., on the brief; Kathleen Bridget McGill of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges MILMED, JOELSON and SEIDMAN.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOELSON, J. A. D.
This is an appeal by the State upon leave granted from an order suppressing evidence obtained as the result of consensual telephonic interceptions and by a search warrant which was supported by information learned through the consensual interceptions. The suppression was based upon the trial judge's determination in a reported opinion that the consensual interceptions were illegal. State v. Parisi, 177 N.J.Super. 451, 426 A.2d 1081 (Law Div.1980). We do not differ with the trial judge in his view that a search warrant based on illegally obtained information is itself tainted and all evidence seized pursuant to it must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Our disagreement is with the trial court's conclusion that the consensual interceptions were illegal. Accordingly, we reverse.
N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c) provides that is shall not be unlawful for
Any person acting at the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception; provided, however, that no such interception shall be made unless the Attorney General or his designee or a county prosecutor within his authority determines that there exists a reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal conduct will be derived from such interception.
The prosecutor submitted to the trial judge an affidavit that on three occasions he authorized in writing the consensual telephone interceptions here under attack and that he further authorized in writing the use of a body microphone by consent of the person on whom the microphone was placed. The prosecutor's affidavit stated that he was unable to find these authorizations which he signed, but he attached a copy of the form which he used. It is entitled "Request for Consensual Interception Authorization (pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 c)," and it contains the following statement:
I HAVE REVIEWED THE FOREGOING REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CONDUCT A CONSENSUAL INTERCEPTION AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE EXISTS A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT WILL BE DERIVED FROM THE INTERCEPTION. I, THEREFORE, APPROVE THE CONSENSUAL INTERCEPTION.
Nevertheless, the trial judge found the interceptions to be unlawful because "the authorization form utilized failed to include any specific reason for the interception or any factual statement upon which the prosecutor could have reached the conclusion that there existed a 'reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal conduct will be derived from such interception.' " In so finding the judge read into N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 c requirements that it does not contain. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to circumscribe this expressly permitted method of intercepting communications to any greater degree than the single condition imposed in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 c. State v. Schultz, 176 N.J.Super. 65, 422 A.2d 105 (App.Div.1980). There is nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 c which mandates that the prosecutor must particularize his reasons for finding reasonable suspicion to exist. As a matter of fact, although a written memorialization of reasonable suspicion on the part of the prosecutor may be desirable for the purpose of proof, the statute does not even appear to require...
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