State v. Parker

• Decision Date: 13 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 118,349,118,349
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Willie E. PARKER, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

459 P.3d 793

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Willie E. PARKER, Appellant.

No. 118,349

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed March 13, 2020.

Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Kansas Capital Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Daniel G. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and David Greenwald, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Rosen, J.:

Willie Parker takes this direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court from his conviction of one count of premeditated first-degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Willie Parker was employed as a driver for First Class Medical Transportation, a delivery company that takes patients to and from the Kansas City Transitional Care Center, which is across the street from the University of Kansas Medical Center. Michel Ziade was his employer. On July 28, 2015, Parker and a coworker delivered a patient around noon and then returned to a parking garage where their van was located. Parker and Ziade got into a verbal altercation in which Parker complained about his working hours and having to work night shifts.

Ziade accused Parker of being late picking up a passenger, and the two exchanged insults and profanity. At one point, Parker said, "You can't fucking tell me what to do." The argument devolved into a fist fight. Witnesses reported that Ziade was bent over while Parker repeatedly hit him in the face. The witnesses did not see Ziade hit or strike Parker. Another employee, Stanley Burleson, pulled them apart and stood between them, and Ziade asked the bystanders to call the police.

Parker then went to his van, opened the door, and stood for a short time retrieving something. After about 60 seconds, Ziade went into the parking garage and walked over to his car. He was about to get in when Parker came after him, wielding a pistol. Ziade turned and walked quickly or ran from the parking garage. Parker pursued Ziade at a fast walking pace, brandishing a gun, and shot at Ziade several times. After the first shot, Ziade ran out of the underground parking garage. Parker followed him and fired four more shots. Ziade fell to the sidewalk and rolled over on his back. Parker walked up to him and shot him one more time before turning and walking back into the parking garage. He went to his van, grabbed a bag, and then walked away down an alley.

Although he was taken to the hospital almost immediately, Ziade died within minutes of the shooting. He died from a bullet that had been fired into his back and penetrated his heart.

On July 31, 2015, based on the statements of eyewitnesses and a search of Parker's home, the State filed an Information charging Parker with premeditated first-degree murder. On August 6, 2015, investigators located Parker in a church building where he barricaded himself for some six hours before tear gas forced him to surrender into custody. Within about an hour, detectives began a lengthy interrogation, in which Parker admitted killing Ziade.

Parker was sent to Larned State Hospital for a competency evaluation, which disclosed that, despite signs of possible mental illness, he was competent to communicate with counsel and to be tried. Parker nevertheless was uncooperative, refusing to speak with at least one of his appointed counsel.

The case went to trial in June 2017, and Parker presented no witnesses in his defense. The court instructed the jury on premeditated first-degree murder and on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The jury found Parker guilty of first-degree murder. He took a timely appeal to this court.

ANALYSIS

Motion to Suppress

Parker made several self-incriminating statements during the interrogation that took place immediately after his arrest. Before his trial, Parker moved to suppress these statements. The district court denied that motion. Parker argues on appeal that the district court should have suppressed his statements because the investigators did not take sufficient steps to ensure that he understood his Miranda rights. We conclude that, despite the unusual manner in which Parker received an explanation of his rights—necessitated by his refusal to allow the detectives to explain the rights out loud—no reversible error occurred.

A dual standard is used when reviewing a decision ruling on a motion to suppress a confession. We review the factual underpinnings of a district court's ruling under a substantial competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. We will not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. State v. Dern , 303 Kan. 384, 392, 362 P.3d 566 (2015).

The voluntariness of a waiver of a defendant's Miranda rights is a question of law that an appellate court determines de novo based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Kirtdoll , 281 Kan. 1138, 1144, 136 P.3d 417 (2006).

Statements made during a custodial interrogation must be excluded under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution unless the State demonstrates it used procedural safeguards, i.e., Miranda warnings, to secure the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. These safeguards are triggered only when an accused is (1) in custody and (2) subject to interrogation. State v. Regelman , 309 Kan. 52, 59, 430 P.3d 946 (2018). On appeal, the appellate court assesses whether a Miranda waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under a totality of the circumstances test. State v. Mattox , 305 Kan. 1015, 1042, 390 P.3d 514 (2017).

The voluntariness of a defendant's Miranda rights waiver can be implied under the circumstances. Kirtdoll , 281 Kan. 1138, Syl. ¶ 1, 136 P.3d 417. Certain factors may contribute to a finding of voluntariness, such as the defendant explicitly saying that he or she understood his or her rights and then proceeding to answer questions. 281 Kan. at 1146-47, 136 P.3d 417 ; see also State v. Wilson , 215 Kan. 28, 30, 523 P.2d 337 (1974) (when defendant says he or she understands his or her rights and makes no showing that statements were coerced or in some other way involuntary, Miranda safeguards are satisfied).

There is no requirement that Miranda rights be read aloud in order to obtain a legally sufficient waiver of the right to remain silent. See, e.g., United States v. Collins , 40 F.3d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 1986, 131 L.Ed.2d 873 (1995) ; United States v. Bailey , 468 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Alexander , 441 F.2d 403, 404 (3d Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Van Dusen , 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970) ; State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250, 252-53, 165 P.3d 228 (Ct. App. 2007), review denied (2008); Wise v. Commonwealth , 422 S.W.3d 262, 271 n.4 (Ky. 2013) ; State v. A.M. , 237 N.J. 384, 400, 205 A.3d 213 (2019) ; People v. Warren , 2 A.D.3d 1317, 1318, 770 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2003), leave to appeal denied 1 N.Y.3d 636, 777 N.Y.S.2d 34, 808 N.E.2d 1293 (2004) ; State v. Strobel , 164 N.C. App. 310, 313-14, 596 S.E.2d 249 (2004), cert. denied 545 U.S. 1140, 125 S.Ct. 2977, 162 L.Ed.2d 889 (2005).

There is also no requirement that interrogators follow a specific protocol for determining whether questioned individuals understand their rights. To be sure, interrogators may not wait until questioning is underway to administer Miranda warnings and then rely on statements made before they gave the warnings. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert , 542 U.S. 600, 617, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004) (when investigators intentionally employ two-step interrogation strategy, postwarning statements related to substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures taken before postwarning statement is made).

Here, however, the detectives provided Parker with a written statement of his rights along with an offer to read them out loud, and he read the statement of rights, all before the substantive interrogation began. Although the better practice is that interrogators read the Miranda summary of rights out loud and make follow-up inquiries about whether the person being questioned understands those rights, that protocol was not possible in this case, because Parker insisted that an oral explanation of the rights was condescending behavior that he would not tolerate. In this unusual situation, we must look to the circumstances and the words used by both the detectives and Parker in order to determine whether he understandingly waived his rights against self-incrimination.

State v. Davis , 306 Kan. 400, 417, 394 P.3d 817 (2017), sets out a nonexclusive list of factors to be examined in evaluating whether a confession was voluntary. The factors are:

" ‘(1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the duration and manner of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency with the English language. [Citations omitted.]’ "

Before denying Parker's motion to suppress, the district court went through these factors in order, resolving them in favor of the State:

"The court resolves factor number one, the issue of competency, in favor of the State. Parker seems to be competent. He did not appear to be suffering from any type of delusions about why he was there. As previously indicated he did not seem to be under lingering effects of any chemical agents, he seemed to understand the reason for the interview and there was no violation as far as number one is concerned. As to factor number two the court is directed to consider the duration and manner of the interrogation. The interrogation lasted one hour 49 minutes and 45 seconds. At no time were the

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