State v. Parr
| Decision Date | 17 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-0570 |
| Citation | 175 N.H. 52,280 A.3d 775 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Justin PARR |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
175 N.H. 52
280 A.3d 775
The STATE of New Hampshire
v.
Justin PARR
No. 2020-0570
Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Argued: February 10, 2022
Opinion Issued: March 17, 2022
John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony J. Galdieri, solicitor general (Weston R. Sager, assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Anthony J. Galdieri, orally), for the State.
Lehman Major List, PLLC, of Concord (Sean R. List on the brief and orally), and Law Office of Michael J. Zaino, PLLC, of Hampton (Michael J. Zaino on the brief), for the defendant.
DONOVAN, J.
The defendant, Justin Parr, appeals his conviction, following a bench trial in the Superior Court (Schulman, J.), on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. RSA 159:3, I(a) (2014). The defendant argues that the Superior Court (Kissinger, J.) erred by denying his motion to dismiss his felon in possession of a firearm indictment because, in his view, RSA 159:3, I(a) does not prohibit felons from possessing antique pistols and revolvers. The defendant also argues that several provisions of RSA chapter 159 are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. We conclude that the term "other firearm" in RSA 159:3, I(a) applies to any weapon from which a shot can be discharged by gunpowder, including antique firearms. We further conclude that RSA 159:3, I(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to felons in possession of antique firearms. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Facts
The following facts are undisputed or supported by the record. In April 2018, the defendant was convicted of a felony and placed on probation. In April 2019, the defendant's probation and parole officer (PPO) received information that the defendant was using firearms at his Andover residence, in violation of his probation. After searching his vehicle and the Andover residence, the PPO and local police found black powder, a package of shot, and a firearm (charged handgun), among other things. The New Hampshire State Laboratory examined the charged handgun and classified it as a ".44 caliber ... black powder percussion cap revolver, model 1851 Reb Nord Navy Sheriff" with two lead balls and two powder charges. The laboratory also tested the charged handgun and concluded that it functioned normally.
Ultimately, the State indicted the defendant on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, among other charges. The defendant moved to dismiss the felon in possession of a firearm indictment. Relying upon RSA 159:1 (2014) and federal law, he argued that RSA 159:3, I(a) contains an exception for antique firearms and that, because the firearm found at the Andover residence was an antique, he did not violate the statute.
See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), (16) (2018). The State objected,
arguing that the term "other firearm" in RSA 159:3, I(a) included the charged handgun. See RSA 159:3, I(a). After a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the term "other firearm" in RSA 159:3, I(a) "prohibit[s] felons from possessing any weapon within the broad class of firearms," which includes "antiques or replicas if they are weapons from which shots can be discharged by gunpowder." (Quotation omitted.) The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.
Thereafter, to preserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, the defendant stipulated to the facts and requested a bench trial. The State made an offer of proof, to which the defendant did not object, and the trial court convicted the defendant on the felon in possession of a firearm indictment. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. Statutory Interpretation
The defendant first argues that, in denying his motion to dismiss, the trial court misconstrued RSA 159:3, I(a) as applying to antique firearms. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See State v. Pinault, 168 N.H. 28, 31, 120 A.3d 913 (2015). In matters of statutory interpretation, the intent of the legislature is expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. See id. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Further, we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. Finally, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id.
RSA 159:3, I(a) provides:
I. A person is guilty of a class B...
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