State v. Parris

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRIGHT, J.
• Citation: State v. Parris, 352 Conn. 652, 338 A.3d 1139 (Conn. 2025)
• Docket Number: SC 20837
• Decision Date: 29 July 2025
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Robert PARRIS
• topic: Criminal procedure,Criminal Law,Civil Procedure

338 A.3d 1139

352 Conn. 652

STATE of Connecticut

v.Robert PARRIS

(SC 20837)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 14, 2025

Officially Released July 29, 2025

Erica A. Barber, assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, were Spencer Buckley and Lauren Klobutcher, certified legal interns, for the appellant (defendant).

Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney., with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Melissa Holmes, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.

BRIGHT, J.

₆₅₄A jury found the defendant, Robert; Parris, guilty of, among other offenses, murder in violation of ₆₅₅General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), for shooting and killing the victim, Michael Rosario. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that he is entitled to a new trial because (1) multiple instances of prosecutorial impropriety during the state’s closing and rebuttal arguments ¹ deprived him of his right to a fair trial, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting portions of his statement to the police that included homophobic slurs. We agree with, the defendant that there were multiple instances of prosecutorial impropriety that, deprived him of a fair trial but disagree; with him that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his entire statement to the police. Because the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial was violated, we reverse the judgment of the; trial court as to the defendant’s murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on that charge.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant, who had been experiencing homelessness for more than one decade, secured housing’ through an assistance program. The victim, who was the superintendent of the building where the defendant lived, and his. two children lived next door to the defendant.

The victim and the defendant had a tumultuous relationship.²

₆₅₆On the morning of December 19, 2019, the victim’s daughter, who was home alone in the apartment she shared with her brother and the victim, heard the defendant pacing back and forth in the hallway outside their apartment and talking to himself.³ As the day progressed, the defendant’s voice became louder, he sounded upset, and he said something about “a small member and a small tommy gun …. ”⁴ The defendant’s odd behavior continued for three to four hours. As the defendant’s behavior became “more chaotic,” the victim’s daughter called the victim to tell him that she was afraid to leave the apartment until he got home. When the victim’s son returned to the apartment a little before 4 p.m., the defendant was still in the hallway, although he had stopped speaking so loudly. The victim’s daughter eventually heard the victim’s footsteps and his key make contact with their apartment door, but she heard no voices in the hallway. She then heard a loud thud, which she described as “a drop of a body,” and, when she opened the door, she discovered the victim lying on the floor. Another resident called 911. The defendant, who was in the hallway, stepped over the victim’s body and left the building. The victim’s daughter then noticed that the victim had a gunshot wound to the head, which had caused his death.

On December 20, 2019, the morning after the homicide, the defendant turned himself in to the New Haven ₆₅₇Police Department. He consented to an interview with two detectives, which lasted approximately three hours. During the interview, the defendant confessed to shooting the victim with a small handgun. He stated that, after the homicide, he walked to a nearby cemetery where he had once worked, discarding the gun along the way.⁵He also discussed his struggles with homelessness, his stepmother,⁶ and the victim.

The state charged the defendant with murder, criminal possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver while subject to a restraining order. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a notice of his intent to rely on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance with respect to the murder charge, which, if accepted by the jury, would result in the defendant’s conviction of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2) instead of murder.⁷ Throughout trial and closing argument, defense counsel focused on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, discussing the defendant’s behavior during the hours leading up to the shooting, the conflict ₆₅₈between the defendant and the victim, the defendant’s concerns about losing his housing, and the defendant’s problems with his stepmother. The prosecutors argued, among other things, that the defendant had planned the victim’s death and that his claim of extreme emotional disturbance was contrived.

The jury rejected the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense and found him guilty of three crimes, including murder.⁸ He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of forty-five years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutors committed numerous instances of impropriety during their closing and rebuttal arguments. Specifically, the defendant contends that the prosecutors acted improperly when they misstated the law regarding the extreme emotional disturbance defense, denigrated the defense, and invited the jury to engage in jury nullification. We conclude that the prosecutors committed impropriety by misstating the law regarding the extreme emotional disturbance defense and that doing so deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

[1–3] “When considering a prosecutorial impropriety claim, the court engages in a two step process. We must determine (1) whether [impropriety] occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived [the] defendant of his due process right to a fair trial…. It is the defendant’s burden to satisfy both steps…. With respect to the second step, we must examine not only whether any individual impropriety deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial, but also whether the cumulative effect of multiple improprieties ₆₅₉deprived [him] of his … right to a fair trial…. To [do so], we must determine whether the sum total of [the prosecutor’s] improprieties rendered the defendant’s [trial] fundamentally unfair …. We review the instances of impropriety in the context of the entire trial and not in a vacuum.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428, 437, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025).

A

The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. During the charging conference held prior to closing arguments, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance. Section 53a-54a (a) provides in relevant part: “[I]t shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.”

The prosecutor objected to the charge, arguing that there was “essentially no testimony as to what the defendant’s state of mind was … specifically at the time of this incident that [there was] no evidence from any expert witnesses … who ha[d] discussed specifically the defendant’s mental state [or] any mental disease or defect that he may suffer from, and also [that there was] no one to speak to the reasonableness” of the defendant’s explanation or excuse. In response, defense counsel argued that there was “a lot of evidence that supports all of the elements of the defense, both from ₆₆₀observations of witnesses that day [who] testified … as well as the defendant’s statement … to the police multiple times indicating what his state of mind was. As far as [there being] no expert witness testimony], [the defense is] not required to present an expert witness…. [W]e’re not required to introduce expert testimony on reasonableness, either.”

The trial court agreed to give an instruction on the extreme emotional disturbance defense, stating: “[The defendant], in his interview with the police, certainly talked about his mental state in general, both as it relates to [his] stepmother [and the victim], There’s evidence from [the victim’s] daughter that he was talking to himself, pacing outside in the hallway immediately before the shooting, so I think there’s sufficient evidence for this defense to go to the jury, [and] I am going to give an instruction on extreme emotional disturbance.”

The court provided the parties with its proposed extreme emotional disturbance charge, which, as to the second element of the defense, provided in relevant part that “the reasonableness [of the defendant’s explanation or excuse] is determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation.” The prosecutor requested that the charge be altered slightly so that it read “reasonableness … determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and reiterated that the defense involves “a reasonable person standard that has an objective part and a subjective part, and it’s a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation.… ” The prosecutor did not otherwise object to the language of the extreme emotional disturbance charge.

During closing argument, after discussing the defendant’s police interview, the prosecutor argued: “Now, ₆₆₁remember … this is a...