State v. Parrish
| Decision Date | 24 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-4993-14T4 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WALLACE L. PARRISH, a/k/a WALI, WAWA and QUASHAWN T. BETHEA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Carroll and Leone.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 11-04-0373.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Defendant Wallace L. Parrish appeals his June 19, 2015 judgment of conviction for felony murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and unlawful possession of a handgun. We affirm.
The trial record includes the following facts. On September 28, 2010, at 4:02 a.m., Jimmy Morel, working as a dispatcher and driver for United Taxi, received a blocked call from a man requesting a cab at an address on West Sixth Street in Plainfield.1 The call came from a cellphone number later determined to be assigned to defendant's cousin K.M., who testified he lent the cellphone to defendant.
Morel dispatched one of his taxi drivers, Jose Gomez, to pick up the man. Gomez arrived at the location for the fare, and saw a man. As the man started to get into the back seat of Gomez's taxi, the man pulled out what Gomez believed to be a silver or white handgun.
Gomez sped off and called 911 at approximately 4:06 a.m. to report an attempted armed robbery by the man. Plainfield Officer Romeo Simeon searched the area, but was unable to locate anyone matching the man's description.
At 5:35 a.m., Morel received a call from a man requesting a cab on Spooner Avenue in Plainfield. Later investigation showed that call came from a telephone used by co-defendant Johnathan Morgan.
Morel dispatched another of his drivers, Isidro Leonardo, to pick up that fare. Leonardo's practice was to call Morel right away to say whether he picked up a fare, but Morel did not hear from Leonardo. Morel and Gomez called Leonardo several times, but no one answered. Eventually, Morel sent Gomez, who was in the area, to check on Leonardo. Gomez arrived on Spooner Avenue at the same time as Officer Simeon, who had been dispatched at 5:51 a.m. to respond to a call about a vehicle accident.
Officer Simeon saw Leonardo's taxi cab pinned against a parked vehicle. The taxi was still in gear and Leonardo was in the driver's seat with his head against the headrest. Officer Simeon opened the door, but Leonardo did not respond and was making gurgling sounds. Simeon discovered Leonardo had a gunshot wound to the back of his head.
Leonardo was taken to the hospital where he later died. The autopsy revealed the presence of gunpowder residue on Leonardo's skull, indicating the gun was fired at close range.
Union County Sheriff's Officer Adrian Gardner found defendant's left palm print on the rear side of the partitionseparating the front and rear seats. Defendant was questioned by a detective. Defendant initially denied being in a taxi on September 28, and later claimed he got a taxi elsewhere. Ultimately, defendant offered a third version.2
Defendant admitted his cellphone was used to call United Taxi for the fare Gomez was dispatched to pick up. Defendant denied making any calls from the cellphone that night. However, the phone records showed that the cellphone was used to call defendant's girlfriend, followed immediately by blocked calls to Flash Taxi at 3:58 a.m., 3:59 a.m., 4:00 a.m., and 4:01 a.m., and then the call to United Taxi at 4:02 a.m. At 6:53 a.m., the cellphone was again used to call defendant's girlfriend.3
Defendant denied any involvement in the attempted robbery of Gomez or Leonardo. Defendant admitted Morgan "was talking about trying to rob people . . . , everybody was, but that wasn't the main objective," which was to "jump somebody in the projects."Defendant said he, Morgan, and a man known as "Fuzz" went onto the streets but when they could not find anyone to jump, they abandoned the plan. However, defendant's cousin A.L., known as Fuzz, testified he was not with defendant and Morgan on September 28.
Defendant stated the three men made several calls to taxi cab companies, and that Leonardo's cab finally answered their call. Defendant claimed that an argument over payment erupted between the three men, that Leonardo stopped the cab on Spooner Avenue and told the men to get out because they did not have the money, that he and Fuzz exited the cab, and that defendant then heard a gunshot.
Defendant admitted he knew Morgan often carried a silver revolver, but asserted he did not know Morgan was armed at the time. Defendant claimed he had never used a gun before, and that he did not take part in Leonardo's murder.
The grand jury indicted defendant and Morgan with: count one - first-degree purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2); count two - first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; count three - first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); count four - second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; count five - second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and count six - second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawfulpurpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1). Defendant was tried by a jury between March 19 and April 15, 2013.4
The jury acquitted defendant on count one, but found defendant guilty on the remaining counts, specifically finding that defendant conspired to rob Leonardo, Gomez, and other cab drivers. The trial court sentenced defendant to thirty years in prison with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility on count three, and a concurrent seven years in prison on count four, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The remaining counts merged for sentencing purposes.
Defendant appeals, arguing:
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to admit testimony from his cousin K.M. about alawsuit. We must hew to our standard of review. "The trial court's evidentiary rulings 'are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion.'" State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (citation omitted). "[C]onsiderable latitude is afforded a trial court in determining whether to admit evidence." State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015) (citation omitted). "In light of the broad discretion afforded to trial judges, an appellate court evaluates a trial court's evidentiary determinations with substantial deference." State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 449 (2017). "A reviewing court must not 'substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court' unless there was a 'clear error in judgment' - a ruling 'so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (citation omitted).
The State called K.M. to testify about defendant's use of his cellphone, and defendant's attempts to see him after September 28. On cross-examination, defendant's trial counsel elicited that defendant gave K.M. $6 on October 1. Trial counsel asked:
The prosecutor objected. The trial court told the jury it was "striking that portion of [trial counsel's] question which encompassed Mr. Parrish receiving money in a lawsuit and the answer that may have been given to that question about the lawsuit," and instructed the jurors not to consider the question or any answer in their deliberations.
Defendant argues he was trying to show he had money and thus had no financial motive for committing robbery. Generally, "evidence of a defendant's financial state should not be admitted nor commented on." State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 266 (1993). Thus, as the prosecutor noted, the State may not introduce evidence solely to establish "that defendant had no apparent means of income and hence was likely to commit a crime for dollar gain." Ibid. (quoting State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 472 (1966)); see State v. Patterson, 435 N.J. Super. 498, 510 (App. Div. 2014) (same).
As our Supreme Court explained in Mathis: 47 N.J. at 471. The Court followed Wigmore's treatise:
However, Wigmore took the opposite position on whether a...
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