State v. Pate
| Decision Date | 19 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-39508 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS R. PATE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY Matthew E. Chandler District Court Judge
Raul Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Van Snow, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
{¶1} Defendant Dennis R. Pate, appeals a jury's convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-16(A) (2018, amended 2022), and possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23 (2011, amended 2021). In addition to Defendant's other arguments, this appeal requires us to consider the impact of our Supreme Court's suspension of criminal jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic on a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. In line with New Mexico's long-standing case-by-case approach to speedy trial analysis, see State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387, we decline to broadly assign responsibility to any party for delay that occurred during the period in which criminal jury trials were suspended. Instead, we consider-as we always do-the facts and circumstances of a particular case in order to determine the reasons for a particular period of delay and weigh that delay in the constitutional balance. Careful balancing of the facts of the present case demonstrates no speedy trial violation. We further conclude that Defendant demonstrated no reversible error arising from the district court's denial of a mistrial and, although defense counsel's conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is best suited for a habeas corpus proceeding to develop an appropriate record of prejudice. We therefore affirm.
{¶2} On January 14, 2019, Clovis law enforcement executed a search warrant and discovered drugs and a firearm in a residence. Mail with the name "Dennis Ray Pate" was also recovered from the residence mailbox, which bore the name "Pate." Following arrest on April 9, 2019, Defendant was indicted and held in custody pending an August 16, 2019 trial setting. Trial was continued seven times before a jury found Defendant guilty of both charges on August 20, 2020. Defendant appeals. We will further develop additional facts as those facts become necessary to our analysis.
{¶3} Defendant makes three arguments on appeal: (1) the right to speedy trial was violated; (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial; and (3) defense counsel was ineffective. We first consider Defendant's speedy trial argument.
{¶4} In a speedy trial analysis,[1] "we give deference to the district court's factual findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the . . . factors de novo." State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19, 283 P.3d 272 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). To evaluate a speedy trial claim, we balance and weigh several factors, which include "the length of delay, the cause of the delay, timely assertion of the right, and prejudice to the accused." Id. ¶ 1. We begin with the length of delay, considering first whether the length of the delay is sufficiently prejudicial to trigger the remainder of the analysis and next evaluating how to weigh the length of the delay "in the final speedy trial inquiry." Id. ¶ 20.
{¶5} We calculate the length of delay in the present case from the date of arrest, April 9, 2019.[2] See State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 279, 87 P.3d 1061. Between April 9, 2019, and the date of trial, August 20, 2020, sixteen months and eleven days elapsed. The district court found-and the parties agree-both that this was a simple case and that the time between Defendant's arrest and trial exceeded the twelve-month presumptively prejudicial period. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2. A four-and-a-half month delay beyond the presumptively prejudicial period does not weigh heavily in Defendant's favor, see Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 24, but because this period exceeded the "specified amount of time" for a simple case, we continue to evaluate the remaining three factors, see id. ¶ 20, beginning with the reasons for the delay.
{¶6} The reasons for delay are "[c]losely related" to the length of delay and those reasons "may either heighten or temper the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We consider and "weigh the reasons for delay in each . . . period[] separately." State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 13, 145 N.M. 242, 195 P.3d 1254, abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48. The first fourmonth period between Defendant's arrest on April 9, 2019, and the date that the State's first opposed motion to continue was granted by the district court on August 8, 2019, weighs neutrally, because "the case proceeded with customary promptness." See State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 13, 148 N.M. 253, 233 P.3d 782. The next period of delay, caused by the State's second opposed motion to continue due to delayed lab tests, was from August 8, 2019 to October 16, 2019. This two-month period weighs against the State, because Defendant opposed the first continuance sought by the State in August 2019. See Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 26 (). Defendant did not oppose the State's second request for a continuance in October, and so the next threemonth period beginning on October 16, 2019, and ending on January 15, 2020, weighs neutrally.
{¶7} On January 15, 2020, Defendant filed a notice of intent to plea but two days later moved to withdraw the plea, and Defendant's new counsel requested more time to "explore all aspects of representation." The district court vacated the January 22, 2020 trial setting and reset trial for March 11, 2020. On March 6, 2020, however, Defendant moved to continue the March 11, 2020 trial, in order to accommodate defense counsel's vacation plans. The district court quickly granted the motion and reset the trial for May 12, 2020. While the first month-and-a-half, the time between January 15, 2020 and March 6, 2020, weighs against Defendant based on the withdrawn plea, the period between March 6, 2020 and May 12, 2020, requires additional scrutiny because (1) our Supreme Court suspended criminal jury trials on March 17, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic; and (2) Defendant contends that he did not consent to the continuance that defense counsel obtained on March 6, 2020. We first consider the suspension of jury trials due to the onset of the COVID- 19 pandemic.
(Emphasis added.) The March 2020 Order continued and provided for other circumstances in which a district court could proceed with trial absent a motion by the parties. See March 2020 Order at 3. The suspension of criminal jury trials continued until, on May 28, 2020, when our Supreme Court ordered[4] that criminal jury trials could "recommence between June 15, 2020, and July 15, 2020," subject to the approval of plans for safe resumption.
{¶9} The State maintains that the time during which criminal jury trials were suspended should weigh neutrally, because the delay was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant suggests that the time should weigh against the State, "especially when the State consistently opposed release of a defendant charged with non-violent possessory offenses." Speedy trial analysis, however, under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520 (1972), "'necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.'" Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 6 (quoting Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13). As a result, we decline to categorically assign to either party the weight of delay caused by the suspension of criminal jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, we consider the circumstances of the particular case, because the right to speedy trial does not lend itself to "inflexible, bright-line approaches." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13.
{¶10} The need to consider the circumstances of every case becomes apparent in the present case, because the delay of the March 11, 2020, trial setting resulted from defense counsel's request to reset the trial date, which the district court accommodated by moving the trial to May 12, 2020. Pandemic notwithstanding, Defendant's trial would not have proceeded before May 12, 2020. Generally, "delay initiated by defense counsel . . . weighs against the defendant." State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031 ¶ 18, 406 P.3d 505. Defendant, however, maintains that he did not consent to the request for...
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