State v. Patefield, 950736-CA

Decision Date07 November 1996
Docket NumberNo. 950736-CA,950736-CA
Parties303 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michael PATEFIELD, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for Defendant and Appellant.

Jan Graham, Todd A. Utzinger, and Craig Halls, Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff and Appellee.

Before ORME, DAVIS, and GREENWOOD, JJ.

OPINION

DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:

Michael Patefield appeals his convictions of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1995); possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1995); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1) (1994). We reverse.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the transcript of the September 5, 1995, hearing on Patefield's Motion to Suppress. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion, we consider the facts "in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings." State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App.1994).

On the night of April 28, 1995, Utah Highway Patrol Officer Rick Eldredge stopped an older model Volkswagen bus on SR-191, north of Monticello, Utah, for "an equipment problem." Namely, the vehicle's rear license plate light was burned out, a violation of Utah state motor vehicle regulations. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1993). Eldredge had followed the vehicle for about one mile before making the stop. Eldredge approached the vehicle and identified the driver by his driver's license as Patefield. Eldredge advised Patefield that he was stopped because his license plate light was out. Hence, Eldredge merely issued a verbal warning to Patefield. However, at that point, having acknowledged that "he had just recently fixed [the light], and it was out again," Patefield "asked if he could fix it." No testimony was given to clarify whether Eldredge returned Patefield's driver's license or told Patefield that he was free to leave before Patefield offered to repair the light.

Patefield's passenger, William Wiley, handed him a replacement light bulb from the glove box and Patefield, followed by Eldredge, went to the rear of his van to fix the light. While Patefield struggled with the burned out bulb, Eldredge held his flashlight to light the area for Patefield. Unable to remove the old bulb, Patefield went to the passenger side of the van and opened the sliding door to get his tool box. Having followed Patefield to the side of the vehicle, Eldredge saw that the van was packed with food, clothing, backpacks, coolers, and several twelve-packs of beer. One of the twelve packs had been opened and half of its contents was gone. Patefield gathered the tools required to fix the light and the two men went back to the rear license plate.

While Patefield continued working on the light, Eldredge "could smell the odor of alcohol coming from [Patefield's] breath" as Patefield described the Lake Powell camping trip on which he and Wiley were embarking. Patefield demonstrated no physical signs of intoxication and Eldredge determined that Patefield was not under the influence of alcohol. Yet, based on his observing the half empty twelve-pack of beer in the van, coupled with the scent of beer emanating from Patefield's breath, Eldredge asked Patefield if he had been drinking. Patefield acknowledged that he had earlier consumed a beer with his dinner. After explaining his concern over the half empty twelve-pack and the smell of beer on Patefield's breath, Eldredge decided to search the vehicle for open beer containers. In a colloquy with the trial court, counsel for the State acknowledged that the search was without Patefield's consent and that probable cause and exigent circumstances were necessary to justify the search.

The two men then went back to the open sliding door on the passenger side of the van where Patefield asked Wiley to exit the vehicle. Wiley complied, taking with him the dog that was also in the van. Eldredge, then standing in front of the open sliding door,

leaned across to the other side of the vehicle, across the coolers and the clothes, [and] the food that they had there, to look directly behind the driver's seat.... [Eldredge then lifted up the clothes and blankets] to make sure that there w[ere] no open containers of alcohol that had been placed back there. At that time, [Eldredge] could smell the odor of burnt marijuana coming from within one or two fanny packs that w[ere] laying [sic] right there to the center of the van.

The fanny packs did, indeed, contain marijuana, and the State charged Patefield with the aforementioned possession offenses. 1 Patefield filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence obtained during, and as a result of, the search of his van. At the suppression hearing, Eldredge testified on behalf of the State; Patefield presented no evidence. The trial court found that the initial stop was justified, that Patefield had voluntarily extended the duration of the stop, and that Eldredge had probable cause to search Patefield's van. In light of the court's findings, Patefield entered conditional pleas of guilty to all the charges against him, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's decision. This appeal followed.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Patefield raises three issues: (1) Whether Eldredge exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop once he gave Patefield a verbal warning and then remained at the site of the stop to assist Patefield after Patefield asked to repair his burned-out license plate bulb; (2) whether Eldredge's warrantless search of Patefield's van was supported by probable cause; and (3) whether exigent circumstances necessitated Eldredge's warrantless search of Patefield's van.

We review the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995); State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah App.1992). Clear error will be found only when the trial court's factual findings run against the clear weight of the evidence. Castner, 825 P.2d at 702; see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (discussing appellate standards of review). Though we consider the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination, we review the trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts "for correctness according no deference to the trial court's conclusions." State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App.1996).

"We review a trial court's determination of whether a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of discretion to the trial court." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App.1995). Lastly, whether exigent circumstances existed is a question of fact which we will not disturb on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah App.1991).

ANALYSIS
A. Scope of the Traffic Stop

In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop, we consider two questions: "[W]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); accord State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994).

Clearly, Eldredge's stop of Patefield was justified at its inception: Eldredge stopped Patefield for having a burned-out license plate bulb, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1993). Patefield concedes that Eldredge's decision to stop him and issue a verbal warning was well within his legal authority. Nonetheless, Patefield argues that an "unlawful detention in this case began, most conservatively, at the point when the trooper gave the verbal warning and did not allow the occupants to proceed on their way." (Emphasis added.) Patefield contends the entire encounter between him and Eldredge was a level two police-citizen encounter during which Eldredge exceeded the scope of the traffic stop.

In Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996), this court categorized the three levels of police-citizen encounters as follows:

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny, there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each requiring a different degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15 n. 1 (Utah App.1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). The first level occurs when an officer approaches and questions a suspect. An officer may stop and question a person at any time so long as that person "is not detained against his [or her] will." Id. The next level is reached when an officer temporarily seizes a person. In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the officer must have "articulable suspicion" that the suspect has or is about to commit a crime, and the detention must be limited in scope. Id. The third level is arrest, which requires probable cause for the officer to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Id.

Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1006 (alteration in original). At the suppression hearing, the following colloquy took place between the trial court and Patefield's attorney:

Counsel: The officer had a right to give [Patefield] a verbal warning; he had the right to give him a citation. And, he gave him a verbal warning to fix it. Mr. Patefield responded to that.

Court: But, you're telling me at the same time that the officer said, "Just get it fixed" whenever you want to, and in the same breath, you're telling me that Mr. Patefield felt compelled to fix it right then. So, which is it? Did the officer say, "You have to fix it right now" and is that the message that came across to Mr. Patefield?...

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