State v. Patel

• Decision Date: 04 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. CR-19-0366-PR,CR-19-0366-PR
• Citation: 486 P.3d 188,251 Ariz. 131
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Vivek A. PATEL, Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

251 Ariz. 131

486 P.3d 188

STATE of Arizona, Appellant,

v.Vivek A. PATEL, Appellee.

No. CR-19-0366-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

May 4, 2021

Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office, Jennifer Booth, Amy Offenberg(argued), Assistant Phoenix City Prosecutors, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Michael J. Dew(argued), Michael J. Dew, Attorney at Law, Phoenix, Attorney for Vivek A. Patel

Sabrina Ayers Fisher, Maricopa County Public Advocate, Phoenix; Sherri McGuire Lawson, Maricopa County Legal Defender, Jennifer A. Ceppetelli(argued), Deputy Legal Defender, Phoenix; and David J. Euchner, Pima County Public Defender's Office, Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Maricopa County Public Advocate, Maricopa County Legal Defender, and Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Brunn (Beau)W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, Michael T. O'Toole, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Linley Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General, Katherine Jessen, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General's Office

Randall Udelman, Arizona Crime Victim Rights Law Group, Scottsdale, Attorney for Amici Curiae Arizona Crime Victim Rights Law Group and National Crime Victim Law Institute

JUSTICE MONTGOMERYauthored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, and BEENE joined.^*

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, opinion of the Court:

¶1 This matter involves a conflict between constitutional and statutory provisions concerning a crime victim's right to restitution.The Victims’ Bill of Rights ("VBR") guarantees a victim's right to receive prompt restitution for loss or injury caused by a defendant's criminal conduct.Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(8).The VBR also authorizes the legislature to enact laws "to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims."Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (D).We must determine whether A.R.S. § 28-672(G), which limits the amount of restitution that can be awarded to a victim for loss resulting from a violation of specified traffic offenses, is either an unconstitutional limitation on the right to receive restitution or a valid legislative enactment.

¶2We hold today that the constitutional right to receive restitution guaranteed by the VBR is a right to receive the full amount of economic loss or injury caused by a defendant's criminal conduct.Accordingly, § 28-672(G) ’s limitation on a restitution award is unconstitutional and void.

I.

¶3 A driver who violated § 28-672 before 2006 was only responsible for a civil penalty.§ 28-672(2005).As such, rights guaranteed by the VBR did not apply.Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (C)(" ‘Victim’ means a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed ...."(emphasis added)).But the legislature amended § 28-672 in 2006 and reclassified a violation of the statute as a criminal offense.H.B. 2208, 47th Leg., 2nd Reg Sess. (Ariz. 2006).Specifically, a driver commits a misdemeanor if they violate any of the enumerated traffic statutes that then results in death or serious physical injury.¹Additionally, the amendment added § 28-672(G), which provided that "[r]estitution awarded pursuant to section 13–603 as a result of a violation of this section shall not exceed [$10,000]."²Id.

¶4 In June 2017, the Phoenix Municipal Court found Vivek Patel guilty of violating § 28-672 for causing serious physical injuries to the victim resulting from a failure to yield while turning left.§ 28-672(A)(4).The victim established that his injuries and expenses amounted to $161,191.99.Because Patel's insurer had already paid $100,000, the amount of restitution for the court to consider was $61,191.99.

¶5 Patel argued that the court could order no more than $10,000 in restitution due to § 28-672(G).The State countered that the limitation was facially unconstitutional because it conflicted with a victim's right to receive restitution under § 2.1(A)(8) of the Arizona Constitution.The municipal court agreed with the State and ordered Patel to pay $61,191.99.

¶6The superior court reversed the municipal court's order.The court reasoned that, absent the words "full,""complete,""for all losses," or "with no limit" in the text of the VBR, the constitution did not guarantee the right to "full and complete restitution."Therefore, limiting an award of restitution was a valid policy decision by the legislature.The court also addressed the conflict between A.R.S. § 13-603(C), which requires a court to award restitution in the full amount of a victim's economic loss, and the limitation on restitution in § 28-672(G).The court concluded that the specific language addressing restitution in § 28-672, the statute Patel was convicted of violating, controlled over the more general language regarding restitution in § 13-603.

¶7The court of appeals reversed the superior court and reinstated the restitution order of $61,191.99.It held that the common understanding of "restitution," along with the plain language of the VBR and related jurisprudence, necessarily guaranteed victims an award of restitution for the full amount of their economic loss.The court further concluded that § 28-672(G) ’s limitation on restitution does not "in any way advance victims’ rights to restitution" and thus is not a permissible exercise of the legislature's authority under § 2.1(D) of the VBR.

¶8We accepted review because whether the legislature can limit a restitution award subject to the VBR is a recurring issue of statewide importance.We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona ConstitutionandA.R.S. § 12-2103.

II.

¶9 Patel argues that the plain language of § 2.1 (A)(8) does not require "full" restitution, and that the legislature has authority pursuant to § 2.1 (D) to limit the amount of restitution that can be awarded.The State counters that the plain language of the VBR guarantees a right to full restitution and is what the voters who approved it intended.

¶10We review matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo.Johnson Utilities, L.L.C. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 249 Ariz. 215, 219 ¶ 11, 468 P.3d 1176(2020).When interpreting the VBR, we"follow and apply the plain language of this ... amendment to our constitution."Knapp v. Martone , 170 Ariz. 237, 239, 823 P.2d 685(1992).

A.

¶11 The VBR "preserve[s] and protect[s] victims’ rights to justice and due process."Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.This includes guaranteeing the "right ... [t]o receive prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim's loss or injury."Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1 (A)(8).

¶12 Patel, focusing on "prompt" in the phrase "prompt restitution," argues that § 2.1 (A)(8) does not require "full" restitution because "[n]o torture of the English language could possibly transform the word ‘prompt’ into that of ‘full’ or ‘unlimited.’ "We agree that "prompt" does not mean "full.""Prompt" means "[b]eing on time; punctual; [c]arried out or performed without delay: a prompt reply."Prompt , The American Heritage Dictionary, https://www.ahdictionary.com (last visited May 3, 2021)."Prompt" in § 2.1 (A)(8) is thus an attributive adjective that modifies restitution temporally.SeeBryan A. Garner, The Chicago Guide to Grammar, Usage, and Punctuation , § 94, at 58(2016).Any conclusion that the amount of restitution a victim may receive based on what "prompt" means is a non sequitur.Whether § 2.1 (A)(8) guarantees full restitution depends on the meaning of "restitution."

¶13 The VBR does not define "restitution."State v. Patel , 247 Ariz. 482, 483 ¶ 7, 452 P.3d 712(App.2019).Nonetheless, by "follow[ing] and apply[ing] the plain language of [the VBR],"Knapp , 170 Ariz. at 239, 823 P.2d 685, we agree with the court of appeals that "the ordinary meaning of ‘restitution’ is restoring someone to a position he[or she] occupied before a particular event."Patel, 247 Ariz. at 484 ¶ 11, 452 P.3d 712(first quoting Hughey v. United States , 495 U.S. 411, 416, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408(1990)(first citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986); and then citing Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)); and then quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ 1 cmt. e(2)(2011)("Another context in which the word ‘restitution’ means something closer to damages is a product of statutes authorizing compensation to victims as a part of criminal sentencing.")).

¶14 The right to restitution is thus a right to the full amount required to restore victims to the position they were in before the loss or injury caused by the criminal conduct.As the court of appeals further noted, id.at ¶ 9, this conclusion comports with our caselaw as exemplified by Town of Gilbert Prosecutor's Office v. Downie ex rel. County of Maricopa : "[t]he [VBR] gives victims the right to prompt restitution for any loss they incur as a result of a crime," and "Arizona's criminal code implements this constitutional guarantee by requiring ‘the convicted person to make restitution to ... the victim of the crime ... in the full amount of the [victim's] economic loss.’ "218 Ariz. 466, 468 ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 393(2008)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).

¶15 The scope of restitution afforded to victims when the VBR was considered supports this conclusion.At the time voters approved the VBR, victims were clearly entitled to full restitution.A.R.S. § 13-603(C)(providing that "the court shall require the convicted person to make restitution ... in the full amount of the economic loss as determined by the court").And just as we presume that the legislature is aware of the law when it enacts a statute, Daou v. Harris , 139 Ariz. 353, 357, 678 P.2d 934(1984), we presume voters are as well.Cf. State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein , 214 Ariz. 205, 208 ¶ 10, 150 P.3d 778(App.2007)(noting statutory definitions of criminal offenses at...