State v. Patel
Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
Docket Number | SC 20446 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Hiral M. PATEL |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Richard Emanuel, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).
Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Dawn Gallo, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Hiral M. Patel, was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1), burglary in the first degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-101 (a) (1) and 53a-8 (a), robbery in the first degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (2) and 53a-8 (a), conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of § 53a-101 (a) (1) and General Statutes § 53a-48, and tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a-155 (a) (1).1 The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction; State v. Patel , 194 Conn. App. 245, 250, 301, 221 A.3d 45 (2019) ; and we thereafter granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal. See State v. Patel , 334 Conn. 921, 223 A.3d 60 (2020). The defendant's principal challenge relates to the admission into evidence of a codefendant's recorded dual inculpatory statement2 to a fellow inmate acting at the behest of the state police. The defendant contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the statement was nontestimonial and, therefore, did not implicate the defendant's confrontation rights under either the United States constitution or the Connecticut constitution, and that the trial court properly admitted it under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. We disagree with the defendant's claims and affirm the Appellate Court's judgment.
The Appellate Court's decision sets forth the following facts that the jury reasonably could have found. "On June 12, 2012, [the] police arrested Niraj Patel (Niraj), the defendant's cousin, after a motor vehicle stop .... [Niraj] was charged with criminal attempt to possess more than four ounces of marijuana, interfering with an officer, tampering with evidence, possession of drug paraphernalia, and motor vehicle charges. Following his arrest, Niraj unsuccessfully attempted to borrow money ... to pay his attorney.
(Footnote omitted.) State v. Patel , supra, 194 Conn. App. at 250–51, 221 A.3d 45.
The record reveals the following additional undisputed facts and procedural history. While the police were investigating the Sharon home invasion, Calabrese was arrested and detained on an unrelated charge. While in custody, Calabrese recounted the events that had occurred during the home invasion, including the defendant's role, to a jailhouse informant who was surreptitiously recording the conversation. At trial, the state established that Calabrese had invoked his fifth amendment privilege not to testify and introduced, over defense counsel's objection, the recording of Calabrese's dual inculpatory statement as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. The state also introduced cell phone site location information, testimony from Calabrese's former girlfriend, and other evidence that tended to corroborate the defendant's presence at, and involvement in, the Sharon home invasion, as well as evidence establishing that friends and family of the defendant had been unable to make contact with the defendant immediately before, during, and after the period during which the Sharon home invasion occurred. See id., at 251–52, 262, 284–89, 221 A.3d 45.
The defense advanced theories of alibi and third-party culpability. The defendant's older sister, Salony Majmudar, testified that the defendant was visiting her in Boston, Massachusetts, to celebrate an important Hindu holiday when the Sharon home invasion occurred.3 Defense counsel also sought to have Majmudar testify about a purported confession that had been made to her by Niraj's brother, Shyam Patel (Shyam), in which Shyam admitted that it was he, and not the defendant, who had accompanied Calabrese to Vitalis’ home. Defense counsel offered Shyam's statement as a statement against penal interest under § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the admission of the statement, ruling that the statement was insufficiently trustworthy to satisfy § 8-6 (4).
The jury returned a verdict, finding the defendant guilty of murder, home invasion, burglary in the first degree as an accessory, robbery in the first degree as an accessory, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, and tampering with physical evidence, among other charges, and the trial court thereafter rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-five years of imprisonment, execution suspended after thirty-five years and one day, and five years of probation.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction, claiming that constitutional and evidentiary errors entitled him to a new trial. See id., at 249–50, 221 A.3d 45. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Id., at 250, 301, 221 A.3d 45. We thereafter granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the admission of Calabrese's dual inculpatory statement (a) did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights under the United States constitution, (b) did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights under the Connecticut constitution, and (c) was proper under our code of evidence as a statement against penal interest; and (2) whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had properly excluded Shyam's confession. See State v. Patel , supra, 334 Conn. 921 n.22, 223 A.3d 60. The defendant's constitutional claims are subject to plenary review; see, e.g., State v. Smith , 289 Conn. 598, 618–19, 960 A.2d 993 (2008) ; whereas his evidentiary claims, which challenge the application, rather than the interpretation, of our code of evidence, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Pierre , 277 Conn. 42, 68, 890 A.2d 474, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1197, 126 S. Ct. 2873, 165 L. Ed. 2d 904 (2006) ; see also State v. Saucier , 283 Conn. 207, 218–21, 926 A.2d 633 (2007) ( ).
The defendant challenges the admission of Calabrese's dual inculpatory statement on both constitutional and evidentiary grounds. We agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court properly admitted this statement.
The following additional undisputed facts provide context for our resolution of this issue. Calabrese was arrested on August 29, 2013, on drug charges unrelated to the August 6, 2012 Sharon home invasion. He was initially held in custody at the same correctional facility where Wayne Early was being held following his convictions of attempted burglary in the first degree with a deadly weapon and criminal possession of a firearm.
On September 3, 2013, Early was summoned to the facility's intelligence office. Department of Correction officials there informed Early that Calabrese, whom Early did not know, was going to be moved into Early's cell and asked Early whether he would be willing to wear a recording device. Early previously had made confidential recordings of other cellmates. Early said that he would be willing to record Calabrese, if Calabrese seemed inclined to talk. Late that evening, Calabrese was moved into Early's cell. The two men shared information about the charges for which they were in custody. Early disclosed that he had originally been charged with home invasion, but that charge later was reduced to burglary. Calabrese responded that the police were "looking" at him for the same...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Graham
...not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true.’ " Id., at 361, 844 A.2d 191 ; see also, e.g., State v. Patel , 342 Conn. 445, 477, 270 A.3d 627 (2022), petition for cert. filed (U.S. August 18, 2022) (No. 22-155). Section 8-6 (4) further instructs that, "[i]n determin......