State v. Patrick
| Citation | 2009 UT App 226,217 P.3d 1150 |
| Decision Date | 20 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 20050761-CA.,20050761-CA. |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Darrell PATRICK, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
David O. Drake, Midvale, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and McHUGH.
¶ 1 Darrell Patrick appeals from his conviction of one count of murder, a first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. 76-5-203 (2008).1 We affirm.
¶ 2 This case arises out of the September 3, 2004 shooting death of Shawn Scott. It is undisputed that Scott was shot by Patrick, his step-father, and that the shooting occurred in the home shared by Patrick and Evelyn Kay Patrick (Kay), who is Patrick's wife and Scott's mother. After a five-day trial, a jury rejected Patrick's claims of self-defense, defense of others, and defense of habitation, and convicted Patrick of murder.
¶ 3 Scott's death was the culmination of a dispute over paintings that Kay had previously given to Scott and his wife, Cindy. Scott and Cindy had separated, and Kay had gone to Cindy's residence and retrieved the paintings. Kay then located Scott at a local bar and told him what she had done. Scott told Kay to return the paintings within the hour or he would hurt her and Patrick. Kay returned home, told Patrick about the dispute and Scott's threat, and reported the threat with a call to 911.
¶ 4 Shortly thereafter, an unarmed Scott arrived at the Patrick and Kay's home, entered through the front door, and was involved in a verbal altercation with Kay. Kay told Scott to get out of the house, and a shoving match ensued. The exact details of the ensuing physical altercation between Scott, Kay, and Patrick are disputed, but it is undisputed that Patrick ultimately fired one shot from a handgun that struck Scott in the chest. Patrick then called 911 to report the shooting. Police arrived on the scene while Scott was still alive. Scott died a short time later.
¶ 5 Patrick was charged with murder and bound over for trial. Both sides filed pretrial motions regarding character evidence, with the State seeking to admit prior acts by Patrick and Patrick seeking to admit prior acts by Scott. In a written ruling issued on May 26, 2005, the district court allowed the State to present evidence of Patrick's prior acts involving Kay, Scott, and Cindy, ruling that "the issue is not whether these facts are to show a propensity to commit the offense, but relate to [Patrick's] self defense issue which by its nature raises the issue of peacefulness and reasonableness of [his] conduct." The district court denied Patrick's request to admit evidence of Scott's two prior felony sex offenses but allowed Patrick to present evidence of Scott's prior acts to the extent those acts might relate to Patrick's state of mind at the time of the shooting.
¶ 6 At the close of the State's case-in-chief, which relied primarily on Kay's testimony about the shooting, Patrick moved for a directed verdict on his claim of self-defense. Patrick's motion asserted that the State had failed in its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Patrick had not acted in self-defense. The district court denied Patrick's motion.
¶ 7 At the close of all of the evidence, Patrick again made a motion for a directed verdict asserting a failure by the State to disprove self-defense. Patrick's motion also asserted that the undisputed facts of the case gave rise to a presumption of the reasonableness of his actions under the defense of habitation statute and that the State had failed to rebut that presumption. The district court again denied Patrick's motion, stating that "it would be improper for the court to take this out of the jury's hands because there is some evidence [of guilt]" and that the amount of evidence required to defeat a directed verdict motion "is very minimal."
¶ 8 Both sides proceeded to make their closing arguments, each of which addressed the factors that, if established, would give rise to a presumption of the reasonableness of Patrick's actions under the defense of habitation statute. In addressing whether Scott's entry into Patrick's home was unlawful—one of the presumption factors—the State asserted that Scott's entry could not be deemed unlawful if his initial entry was permissive even if Scott subsequently ignored Kay and Patrick's demands that he leave. As characterized by the State, "[a]n unlawful entry is unlawful at the time he crosses the threshold." At this point in the State's closing, Patrick objected, stating as the grounds for his objection merely that the State had made a "misstatement of the law." Patrick did not offer any argument as to what the misstatement of law might be, nor did he raise any objection that the State was misrepresenting the facts in evidence. The district court overruled the objection, noting that the jury had been instructed on the law pertaining to the issue.
¶ 9 The jury convicted Patrick of murder. Patrick filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of improper closing argument, newly discovered evidence, and surprise and faulty evidence submitted by the State. While this motion was pending, Patrick filed a notice of appeal from his conviction. The district court eventually denied Patrick's new trial motion, at which time Patrick's notice of appeal was deemed timely filed. See generally Utah R.App. P. 4(b).
¶ 10 On appeal, Patrick first argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict under Utah's defense of habitation statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (2008), and that the district court erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict. Patrick also argues that under the defense of habitation statute, his conviction is not supported by the evidence. In criminal cases, our review of a district court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict and of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict involves "basically the same analysis." See State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ¶¶ 15-16, 167 P.3d 503. As to both issues, we review the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it to ensure that there was some basis upon which a reasonable jury could reach a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. ¶¶ 15-16 & n. 7.
¶ 11 Patrick next argues that the district court erred in making evidentiary rulings pertaining to prior acts committed by Patrick and Scott. "We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts for an abuse of discretion." State v. Northcutt, 2008 UT App 357, ¶ 4, 195 P.3d 499 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 18, 993 P.2d 837. However, we do not address arguments that are not preserved below. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65 ¶ 22, 147 P.3d 448 (addressing unbriefed arguments); State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, ¶ 10, 189 P.3d 85 (addressing preservation), cert. denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008).
¶ 12 Finally,2 Patrick argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct committed during the State's closing argument. We review inadequately preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct only for plain error. See Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 2007 UT App 254, ¶ 17, 167 P.3d 496.
¶ 13 Patrick's first set of arguments on appeal involves Utah's defense of habitation statute, Utah Code section 76-2-405. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405. Section 76-2-405 governs the use of force to defend a dwelling against unlawful entry or attack. See id. § 76-2-405(1). Section 76-2-405 further establishes, under certain circumstances, a presumption that a person who uses force to defend a dwelling has "acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury." See id. § 76-2-405(2).3 Patrick raises several arguments on appeal in an attempt to establish that, as a matter of law, his shooting of Scott was justified as a defense of habitation.
¶ 14 Each of Patrick's arguments invoking section 76-2-405 presumes that the evidence presented to the jury gave rise to the presumption of reasonableness enunciated in section 76-2-405(2) and that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. Patrick argues that the unrebutted presumption of reasonableness establishes his innocence of Scott's murder as a lawful defense of habitation. Thus, argues Patrick, the district court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict made at the close of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of all evidence. Patrick also argues that the lack of evidence rebutting the presumption renders the jury verdict against him unsupported by the evidence.
¶ 15 We decline to review the district court's denial of Patrick's first motion for directed verdict, made at the close of the State's case-in-chief, because any error now asserted by Patrick was not preserved in the district court. Patrick's arguments on appeal rely solely on the presumption created by the defense of habitation statute, see id., while his first motion for directed verdict in the district court asserted only that the State had not met its burden on Patrick's separate claim of self-defense, see id. § 76-2-402. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue before the district court in such a way that the court is placed on notice of potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or avoid the error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, ¶ 10, 189 P.3d 85, cert. denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008).
¶ 16 Patrick's first motion for directed verdict did not invoke the defense of habitation statute at all, much less assert his present argument that the statute's presumption of reasonableness had been established and not rebutted by the State's evidence. Nor does Patrick argue on appeal that the district...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Pedersen
...basis upon which a reasonable jury could reach a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, ¶ 10, 217 P.3d 1150 (citation and internal quotation marks ANALYSIS I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶ 13 Our analysis of a claim of ineffective assistance of ......
- State v. Featherhat
- State v. Gallegos
-
State v. Bosquez
...raised on appeal, the directed verdict motion itself is insufficient to preserve the more specific argument for appeal. See State v. Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, ¶¶ 15–16, 217 P.3d 1150 (holding that an issue was not preserved because the defendant's general motion in the court below was only ......
-
Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Third Edition
...2009 UT App 345, ¶8, 222 P3d 768 (quotingState v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)); State v.Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, ¶17 n.4, 217 P.3d 1150 (quotingState v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ff 15-16, 167 P.3d 503). As a general matter, appellate courts will not weigh conflictingevidence,......