State v. Patten

• Citation: 981 N.W.2d 126
• Decision Date: 21 October 2022
• Docket Number: 21-0101
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Mychael Richard PATTEN, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

981 N.W.2d 126

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Mychael Richard PATTEN, Appellant.

No. 21-0101

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted September 14, 2022

Filed October 21, 2022

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all participating justices joined. May, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

OXLEY, Justice.

The importance of plea bargaining to our system of justice, the principles which underlie the bargains themselves, and the significance of a bargain's breach have been litigated, contemplated, and explicated on a regular basis—in Iowa alone—for nearly the last half-century.¹ "Estimates suggest that ninety-five percent of criminal convictions are based on guilty pleas, most of which result from plea bargains. No less an authority than the United States Supreme Court has declared that plea-bargaining ‘is the criminal justice system.’ " Sothman v. State , 967 N.W.2d 512, 540 (Iowa 2021) (McDermott, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 144, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) ). Given the significant rights forfeited by a criminal defendant in entering a guilty plea agreement, we place a heightened expectation on prosecutors to meticulously carry out the promises they make as part of a plea deal.

We are once again tasked with reviewing a cold record to determine whether a prosecutor satisfied a promise to make a specific sentencing recommendation, here for suspended sentences on all counts. That inquiry cannot be reduced to a bright-line, one-size-fits-all rule, as this case illustrates. The context of the prosecutor's performance is the paramount consideration for assessing compliance with plea agreements. Perhaps even more important than what the prosecutor does in any given case is how she does it—what she says, in what way, and with what implication. The record before us reveals that the prosecutor asked the court to adopt the parties’ plea agreement but then, for the first time, qualified her request by explaining the "sole reason" and "sole driving force" behind agreeing to recommend suspended sentences was the victim's desire for the defendant to be part of their daughter's life. This qualification undermined—and therefore breached—the prosecutor's agreement to recommend suspended sentences, entitling the defendant to resentencing before a different district court judge.

I. Factual & Procedural History.

Mychael Richard Patten was charged with domestic abuse assault, child endangerment, assault with a dangerous weapon, and false imprisonment following an early morning fight with his wife on September 6, 2020. Patten was angry with his wife when he confronted her in the couple's bedroom at their home in Fort Madison, believing she had been cheating on him. During the ensuing argument, Patten prevented his wife from leaving, grabbed and held her by the throat tight enough to leave bruising and impede her airflow, and threatened her with a loaded gun. The encounter lasted several hours, during which at some point the couple's three-year-old daughter entered the bedroom. It is unclear whether the girl saw the gun, but she left the bedroom shortly after entering. Patten eventually cooled off and ended the encounter but not before threatening to kill his wife if she called the police. That afternoon, Patten's wife reported the incident to the Fort Madison Police Department, and police arrested Patten the same evening.

The prosecutor subsequently offered to recommend suspended sentences on all counts if Patten agreed to plead guilty, an offer Patten accepted. At Patten's sentencing hearing, the following exchange took place between the court and the prosecutor:

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the State is asking that the Court adopt the plea agreement that is outlined in the Presentence Investigation Report that was agreed to by the parties.

For the Court's information, the sole reason for this recommendation by the State is based on conversations with the victim herself. And ordinarily that doesn't necessarily drive the State's recommendation, but based on the conversations with her and her sincere desire for the Defendant to be able to have a relationship with his daughter, she felt that that was of utmost importance and priority to give him this opportunity for a suspended sentence on these matters, with the special provision that he obtain a mental health evaluation and successfully complete all recommended treatment; that that evaluation occur within ninety days of today's date, if that has not already been done, but as well issue a sentencing no contact order between herself and the Defendant.

THE COURT: So how do you intend for me to follow any previous district court order or fashion a new visitation schedule?

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the victim's mother is a designated third party that could be utilized to make arrangements for the child.

I'm not certain, but at one point the Department of Human Services was involved. I'm not certain if that is still the case, but that could be orchestrated or allowed for communication solely for the purpose of their daughter.

But for the Court's information, that is the sole driving force and the reason for the State's recommendation in this matter.

(Emphasis added.)

The district court declined to impose suspended sentences and instead sentenced Patten to an indeterminate combined seven-years’ imprisonment, with a one-year suspended sentence to follow. In fashioning its order, the court considered Patten's age (twenty-nine at the time of the offense), his level of education, and the seriousness of the offenses. It also "weigh[ed] heavily" Patten's prior criminal history—in particular, the fact that he was on probation² at the time of the instant offense. The court did not explicitly address the prosecutor's statements other than to note that it "t[ook them] into account," although it did express concern over the fact "that everybody wants [Patten] to stay out of prison just because [he] can then see [his] daughter who [he] endangered."

Patten appealed, alleging the prosecutor's comments at sentencing breached her obligation under the plea agreement to recommend suspended sentences. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which rejected Patten's argument that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement. The court of appeals did not directly address the breach issue, however, reasoning instead that the prosecutor's statements did not affect the sentencing court's decision. In reaching that conclusion, it highlighted that "[t]he [sentencing] court's thorough explanation makes clear the court considered the big picture in sentencing Patten to incarceration, regardless of how forcefully the prosecutor emphasized the State's recommendation of a suspended sentence. Furthermore, the prosecutor never referred to the sentencing factors the court cited," nor did she ever mention the presentence investigation report's recommendation of incarceration.

As explained below, the court of appeals erred in focusing on the apparent effect of the prosecutor's statements, rather than on whether those statements breached the plea agreement. On the merits of that issue, we hold the prosecutor's statements did constitute a breach.

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

To appeal a sentence following a guilty plea—unless the plea is to a class "A" felony—the Iowa Code requires a defendant to establish good cause. Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a )(3) (2020). Patten claims that the State breached its plea agreement to recommend suspended sentences. Because Patten raises a challenge to the sentence rather than to the guilty plea itself, good cause has been established. See State v. Davis , 971 N.W.2d 546, 554 (Iowa 2022) (holding that an appeal claiming the prosecutor breached the plea agreement with respect to a sentencing recommendation is a challenge to the sentence imposed, rather than to the plea itself, and constitutes good cause under section 814.6(1)(a )(3) ); State v. Boldon , 954 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Iowa 2021) (same).

We review criminal sentences for correction of errors at law. See Davis , 971 N.W.2d at 553. To warrant reversal of a sentence, the record must show some "abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure." Id. (quoting State v. Damme , 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020) ). Breach of a plea agreement is such a defect. See, e.g. , State v. Lopez , 872 N.W.2d 159, 181 (Iowa 2015) (vacating defendant's sentence and remanding for new sentencing before a different district judge after prosecutor breached plea agreement); State v. Bearse , 748 N.W.2d 211, 217–18 (Iowa 2008) (same); State v. King , 576 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Iowa 1998) (en banc) (per curiam) (same). "[O]nce the State has violated the plea agreement ... the violation cannot be cured either by the prosecutor's offer to withdraw the [offending] comments or by the trial court's statement that it will not be influenced by" them. State v. Fannon , 799 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Birge , 263 Neb. 77, 638 N.W.2d 529, 536–37 (2002) ). But see Boldon , 954 N.W.2d at 70 (stating that when defense counsel makes a contemporaneous objection to a plea breach, "[t]here may be some circumstances where a breach can be cured at that time").

III. Analysis.

The court of appeals focused its analysis on whether any potential breach of the plea agreement by the prosecutor affected the sentencing proceedings. As our caselaw makes clear, however, that issue is wholly divorced from the question of whether a breach occurred in the first instance. In State v. King , the state made this type of "no harm, no foul" argument that no breach occurred because "the court ignored or was not influenced by the [improper] statements" made by the prosecutor. 576 N.W.2d at 371. Regardless of the...