State v. Patten

• Decision Date: 08 October 1902
• Citation: 64 N.E. 850,159 Ind. 248
• Parties: STATE v. PATTEN.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

159 Ind. 248

64 N.E. 850

STATE

v.PATTEN.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 8, 1902.

Appeal from circuit court, Sullivan county; O. B. Harris, Judge.

Robert Patten was indicted for prize fighting, and from a judgment sustaining his motion to quash the indictment the state appeals. Reversed.

E. W. McIntosh, W. H. Bridewell, W. L. Taylor, Atty. Gen., Merrill Moores, and C. C. Hadley, for the State. John T. Hays and Will H. Hays, for appellee.

HADLEY, J.

Appellee was arraigned for trial upon the following charge: “That Robert Patten, late of said county, on the 25th day of June, 1901, at and in the county of Sullivan and state of Indiana, by and in pursuance of a previous arrangement and appointment with William Dickerson so to do, did then and there unlawfully engage as a principal with said William Dickerson in a fight between each other with their fists for and upon a certain wager, which wager is to the prosecuting attorney unknown.” Appellee's motion to quash was sustained, and the state appeals.

The charge is predicated on this statute: “Whoever engages as principal in any prize fight, or attends any such fight, as a backer, trainer, second, umpire, assistant, or reporter, shall be fined,” etc. No question is made us to the validity of the statute, but the sole contention is whether the facts set forth in the information constitute a prize fight within the meaning of the statute under a proper construction thereof. Appellee insists that the charge is insufficient for failure to describe the encounter in the language of the statute; that is, for failure to charge that the “defendant did unlawfully engage, as a principal, in a prize fight.” Whether the charge, if made as appellee insists it should have been, would be good or bad, we are not called upon to decide. Our only task is to determine whether the one before us sufficiently states the public offense of prize fighting. That which is essential to a criminal charge is that the indictment or information shall set forth with reasonable precision and certainty all the elements necessary to constitute the offense meant to be punished, and will advise the defendant of the things which he is called upon to answer. What is necessary to an indictment is thus defined by the statute: “The indictment or information must contain: First. The title of the action, specifying the name of the court to which the indictment or information is presented, and the names of the parties. Second. A statement of the facts constituting the offense, in plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition.” Section 1800, Burns' Rev. St. 1901. The language used in clause second is precisely the language employed in clause second of section 341, Burns' Rev. St. 1901, which declares the requisite of a complaint in a civil action. The whole purpose of the legislature, in the enactment of both the Civil and Criminal Code, was to do away with useless forms, repetition, and technicality, and thus bring the procedure in both classes of action to the “common understanding.” When a statute specifically, and with certainty to a common intent, defines what facts shall constitute an offense, it is usually sufficient to charge the crime in the language of the statute, but statutory language is usually insufficient where the offense is not defined by the statute. Ledgerwood v. State, 134 Ind. 81, 33 N. E. 631, and cases cited; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185, 38 Am. Rep. 117;Hopewell v. State, 22 Ind. App. 489, 492, 54 N. E. 127. It is proper, if not necessary, in all cases to set forth in the indictment or information the facts relied upon by the state in “plain and concise...