State v. Patten

• Decision Date: 21 June 1937
• Docket Number: No. 4152.,4152.
• Parties: STATEv.PATTEN et al.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

41 N.M. 395

69 P.2d 931

STATE

v.PATTEN et al.

No. 4152.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 21, 1937.

Appeal from District Court, Lea County; James B. McGhee, Judge.

Contempt proceeding by State of New Mexico against W. H. Patten and others. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the information for contempt, the State appeals.

Cause remanded, with directions.

Where court has jurisdiction, it has right to decide every question occurring in cause and whether its decisions be correct or not, its judgment, until reversed, is binding on every other court.

G. L. Reese, Jr., of Carlsbad, and O. O. Askren and Neil B. Watson, both of Roswell, for the State.

W. H. Patten, of Hobbs, and Tom W. Neal, of Lovington, for appellees.

ZINN, Justice.

From an order of the district court of the Fifth judicial district for the county of Lea, sustaining a demurrer to an information for contempt, this appeal is prosecuted.

On March 22, 1935, the district court of Lea county entered a final decree in cause No. 2212 enjoining the holding of an election in the town of Hobbs, N. M., called for the purpose of determining whether the citizens desired to change the existing town form of municipal government to the so-called commission form of municipal government in the manner provided by Comp.St.1929, c. 90, art. 38. The plaintiffs in cause No. 2212 were residents, taxpayers, and voters within the corporate limits of the municipality of Hobbs.

The injunction suit was predicated on the theory that all of the proceedings preliminary to the election and the proposed election itself would be void. Many reasons were set forth by the plaintiffs in cause No. 2212 which they claimed would make the proposed election void. The plaintiffs therein also alleged that the election was called to deprive the trustees of the town of Hobbs of their offices as such trustees.

The information in the instant case charges that immediately after the rendition of said injunction decree, the defendants in this cause (appellees here) entered into a plan to defeat the terms of the final decree by various means, though having full knowledge of the terms and conditions of the final decree, and proceeded to execute the plan and conducted a purported election. The information for contempt concludes with the allegations that each and all of the acts of the appellees were done in flagrant disrespect of the court and constituted an unwarrantable interference with the orderly and effective administration of justice and prayed that each of the appellees should be adjudged in contempt of court by reason thereof.

To this information for contempt the appellees demurred. The demurrer is based on the theory that the information in contempt does not state any cause of action against appellees for the reason that a court of equity is without jurisdiction to enjoin an election which does not involve any property rights but pertains solely to the political administration of government. It is the appellees' theory that the whole proceeding in cause No. 2212, out of which the information for contempt was issued, was void and of no force and effect. In other words, it is the claim of the appellees that if the district court had no jurisdiction to enter the original decree enjoining the conducting of the election, such decree was void, and being void-that is that there was an absolute lack of power to issue such decree-then there is no contempt in disobeying the order of the court, because the order and process of the court was void. In re Sloan, 5 N.M. 590, 25 P. 930; Ex parte Barrett, 120 Tex. 311, 37 S.W.(2d) 741; 6 R.C.L. 505.

On the general proposition of the power of a court of chancery to enjoin the holding of an election, much has been written and said by the text-writers and by courts of other jurisdictions. Notes, 33 A.L.R. 1376, 70 A.L.R. 733, and cases therein cited. (See, also, later cases 1936 Revision of A.L.R. Blue Book of Supplemental Decisions, p. 472, under 70 A.L.R. 733.) From a reading of many cases, we find that the authorities are divided on the proposition of whether courts of chancery ought to interfere by injunction to prevent the calling or holding of an election.

We believe that in New Mexico a court of equity ought to interfere if property or personal rights are affected when the suit is brought by a proper party. R.C.L. 988; City of Murray et al. v. Irvan et al., 170 Ky. 290, 185 S.W. 859; Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609, 25 L.Ed. 1070. We believe such a rule in this jurisdiction is sound. It may be that in jurisdictions where the distinction still exists between courts of equity and law it is a sound theory, that in the organization of courts of equity and the machinery for the exercise of the powers of such courts, that the chancellor is better circumstanced to try and determine questions of property and maintenance of civil rights and that law courts are better circumstanced for the determination of questions which might involve political or quasi political rights. We do not question the historical logic of such a rule.

However, N.M.Comp.St.1929, § 105-101, provides: “There shall be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights, and the redress or prevention of private wrongs.” We are aware that we have said that this Code has not assumed to abolish the distinctions between law and equity considered as two complementary departments of our system of jurisprudence, nor to substitute any primary rights, duties, or liabilities for those imposed in either department of the law. Yet, where the same judge is to be both chancellor and also the presiding judge in the law court and the judge having the power under the Code to administer both legal and equitable relief, it seems rather absurd to say that there may not be a case so plain that where election officials are about to hold an election which when held would be absolutely void and carrying in its wake such results as waste of public funds, inconvenience to public officials and the citizenry in general, and yet say that the chancellor, being convinced that something futile, accompanied by waste of funds, could not stop such futility. It seems absurd to say that he as chancellor would have to wait until after the event, and then as the presiding judge of the law court undo the results of the evil as far as he could. It is apparent that he could not completely undo the results of the futile election because the money would have been spent and the inconvenience have been incurred and no way to get the money back or to restore the status quo of those who had been inconvenienced and possibly damaged.

[1] Viewing the subject-matter as we do, we arrive at the conclusion that our courts in certain cases have the power to issue injunctions to restrain the conducting of an election wherein the personal or property rights of the complainant are involved. Upon a proper showing by proper parties plaintiff (Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074, 58 A.L.R. 573) the court does not have to wait until after the election, and then undo that evil which it could have prevented by its injunction. The proper showing, however, must be determined from the facts in each individual case. It necessarily follows that the district courts of New Mexico have jurisdiction over the subject matter, to wit, the enjoining of illegal elections.

This being true, it becomes totally unnecessary to decide whether the trial court in cause No. 2212 decided the proposition presented to it erroneously. We are confronted with an entirely different question of law. The proposition is whether or not the court in cause No. 2212, having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter generally, was so devoid of jurisdiction of the particular subject-matter to an extent that its judgment was totally void.

[2] We stated in In re Field's Estate, 40 N.M. 423, 60 P.(2d) 945, 947: “There are three jurisdictional essentials necessary to the validity of every judgment, to wit, jurisdiction of parties, jurisdiction of the subject matter, and power or authority to decide the particular matters presented, Protest of Gulf Pipe Line Company, 168 Okl. 136, 32 P.(2d) 42; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L.Ed. 914, and the lack of either is fatal to the judgment, Reynolds et al. v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 11 S.Ct. 773, 35 L.Ed. 464.” (Italics ours.)

Each of three elements necessary to confer jurisdiction, that is, subject-matter generally, parties, and power or authority to decide must be present to make a decree or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction valid and binding so that such judgment or decree cannot be subject to collateral attack.

[3] The test of the jurisdiction of a court is whether or not it had power to enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion in the course of it was right or wrong. Board of Com'rs of Lake County v. Platt, 79 F. 567, 25 C.C.A. 87.

“*** the right to adjudicate concerning the subject-matter in the given case. To constitute this there are three essentials: First, the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and, third, the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.” Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 268, 11 S.Ct. 773, 777, 35 L.Ed. 464.

[4] A clear distinction must be made between “Jurisdiction” and “Exercise of Jurisdiction.” The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction; and when there is jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. In order that jurisdiction may be exercised, there must be a case legally before the court, and a hearing, as well as a determination. 15 C.J. 729.

[5] Every presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in...