State v. Patterson

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Thomas
• Citation: State v. Patterson, 20 S.W. 9 (Mo. 1892)
• Decision Date: 01 July 1892
• Parties: STATE v. PATTERSON.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

20 S.W. 9

STATE v. PATTERSON.¹

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

July 1, 1892.

FORGERY — EXTRADITION — SUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVIT.

1. Defendant was convicted of selling and delivering a forged check, with intent to have the same passed, he having been arrested in and brought back from another state by requisition based upon an affidavit charging that he feloniously forged a certain check, setting it out in full, with intent to cheat and defraud, and that he had the same in possession, and did feloniously sell, exchange, utter, pass, and deliver it, for a valuable consideration, knowing the same to be forged, with intent to pass the same.

Held, that the affidavit was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of defendant's person.

2. Rev. St. § 3634, which provides that every person who shall sell, exchange, or deliver, for any consideration, any forged instrument, knowing the same to be forged, "with intent to have the same altered or passed," shall be adjudged guilty of forgery in the second degree, applies to a case where the person to whom the forged instrument was sold was ignorant of the forgery, and merely intended to pass it believing it to be genuine.

Appeal from criminal court, Saline county; JOHN E. RYLAND, Judge.

Indictment of Don C. Patterson for forgery. Defendant was convicted, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Saml. Boyd, for appellant. The Attorney General, for the State.

THOMAS, J.

The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for 10 years by the criminal court of Saline county in October, 1889, for selling and delivering a forged check, knowing the same to have been forged, with intent to have the same passed, and he prosecutes this appeal.

1. Defendant's first contention is that the court had no jurisdiction over his person. After the alleged commission of the offense, defendant went to Montana, whence he was brought back on a requisition of the governor of Missouri upon the governor of Montana, which requisition was issued upon an affidavit made in due form by J. P. Huston, charging that defendant at the county of Saline and state of Missouri, on the 20th day of December, 1890, feloniously forged a check "purporting to have been drawn upon the Joplin National Bank, a bank duly incorporated under the laws of the United States, which said false, forged, and counterfeit check is of tenor following, that is to say: `Joplin, Mo., December 17th, 1890. No. ___. Joplin National Bank. Pay to A. R. Ruger, or bearer, $125.00-100 (one hundred and twenty-five) dollars, ac. M. C. T. Co. A. B. McINTIRE,' — with intent then and there to cheat and defraud; and did then and there have in his possession, and feloniously sell, exchange, utter, pass, and deliver, for a valuable consideration, to wit, one hundred and twenty-five dollars, said false, forged, and counterfeit check, knowing the same to be falsely made, forged, and counterfeited, with intent to pass the same, and to cheat and defraud, against the peace and dignity of the state."

Defendant claims that his affidavit makes but one charge against him, that of making a false, forged, and counterfeit check; and we have been cited to a long list of adjudged cases on the question whether a party extradited for one offense can be tried for another. There is much learning on this subject in the books, but we do not deem it necessary at this time to examine it. The offense for which defendant was tried and convicted is set out in the affidavit, not probably with that explicitness required in an indictment, but yet explicitly enough to fully inform defendant and the authorities of the two states what the offense was for which extradition was asked. The instrument is set out in full, and defendant is charged, first, with forging it, and then with having it in his possession, and selling it, and delivering it, knowing it to have been forged, with intent to pass the same. The omission to charge that defendant sold the check with the intent to have the same passed is, at most, a mere formal, and not a substantial, defect, and does not, in the slightest degree, affect the validity of the requisition. If it was ever available, it was before the governors of Missouri and Montana, and not before this court on this appeal.

2. The next error assigned by defendant arises out of the evidence and the instructions of the court. The evidence tends to show that about the 19th day of December, 1890, defendant went to the town of Marshall, in Saline county, representing that his name was A. R. Ruger, and that he was the chief engineer of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad, and desired to establish his headquarters there. He drove around the town that day with some of the citizens looking over the route of the proposed road, and spoke of hiring teams, etc. The next morning he hired a team to drive him towards Miami; but before leaving he went to the Huston & Wood Bank, and, presenting the check set out in the affidavit of J. P. Huston, given above, obtained $125 in cash for it. The check turned out to be a forgery, there being no such person as A. B. McIntire. After driving around a while, defendant left. He was next seen in Washington, D. C., and next in Montana. The defendant was charged in the indictment in three several counts: (1) With forging the check; (2) with uttering it with intent to defraud; and (3) with selling it with intent to have the same passed. The state entered a nolle pros. as to the second count, and the jury convicted defendant of the charge contained in the third count. As to the third count, the court instructed the jury, in substance, that if they found that defendant did feloniously sell, exchange, and deliver to the Huston & Wood Bank, for the consideration of $125, the check above set out, and that at the time he did so he knew it was falsely made, forged, or counterfeited, with the intent to have the same passed, then they would find him guilty. This instruction, defendant insists, was not warranted by the evidence. In order to understand his position, it becomes necessary to state his argument....