State v. Patterson

• Citation: 116 Mo. 505,22 S.W. 696
• Parties: STATE v. PATTERSON.
• Decision Date: 06 June 1893
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

22 S.W. 696

116 Mo. 505

STATE v. PATTERSON.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June 6, 1893.

INDICTMENT — CONVICTION ON ONE OF SEVERAL COUNTS — DISMISSAL — SELLING FORGED CHECK — EXTRADITION — TRIAL ON DIFFERENT CHARGE.

1. A conviction on one of several counts in an indictment amounts to an acquittal as to the others.

2. Where defendant is placed on trial on the second count in an indictment, and thus placed in jeopardy, a dismissal by the prosecuting attorney as to such count operates as an acquittal of the charge contained in it.

3. On a trial under Rev. St. 1889, § 3634, for selling a forged check "with intent to have the same passed," there was evidence that defendant falsely represented himself as being another man, drew a check on the J. Bank, signing a fictitious name as drawer, and sold it to the W. bank. Held, that the evidence showed guilty intent, and justified a conviction.

4. A fugitive from one of the states of the Union, when extradited from a sister state, can be tried for crimes other than the one for which he was extradited.

In banc. Appeal from circuit court, Saline county; John E. Ryland, Judge.

Don C. Patterson was convicted of selling a forged check with intent to have the same passed, and appeals. Affirmed.

Saml. Boyd, for appellant. R. F. Walker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SHERWOOD, J.

There were three counts in the indictment on which the defendant was put upon his trial. All of the counts were properly drawn. The third count is the following: "And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present and charge that said Don Cameron Patterson, alias A. R. Ruger, on the 20th day of December, 1890, at the said county of Saline, unlawfully and feloniously did sell, exchange, and deliver to the Wood & Huston Bank, a bank then and there duly incorporated under the laws of the state of Missouri, for the consideration of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, a certain falsely made, forged, and counterfeited check, purporting to be made and drawn by one A. B. McIntire, in favor of A. R. Ruger, on the Joplin National Bank, a bank then and there duly incorporated under the laws of the United States, which said falsely made, forged, and counterfeited check is of the tenor following, that is to say: `Joplin, Mo., December 17th, 1890. No. ___. Joplin National Bank. Pay to A. R. Ruger, ___ or bearer, $125 00-100, (one hundred and twenty-five dollars.) a-c M. C. T. Co. A. B. McIntire,' — knowing said check to have been falsely made, forged, and counterfeited, with felonious intent then and there to have the same passed, against the peace and dignity of the state. Thomas H. Harvey, Prosecuting Attorney." This count is based on section 3634, Rev. St. 1889, which declares that "every person who shall sell, exchange, or deliver, or offer to sell, exchange, or deliver, or receive upon a sale, exchange, or delivery, for any consideration, any falsely made, altered, forged, or counterfeit note, check, bill, draft, or other instrument, the falsely making, altering, forging, or counterfeiting of which is by the last section declared to be an offense, knowing the same to be falsely made, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to have the same altered or passed, shall be adjudged guilty of forgery in the second degree."

1. As the defendant was tried and convicted on this count it is unnecessary to notice the other counts, further than to say that, the jury having found the defendant guilty as charged in the third count, this amounted to an acquittal of the charge in the first count, (State v. Whitton, 68 Mo. 91; State v. Hays, 78 Mo. 600,) and that as the defendant was put on his trial on the second count, and thus placed in jeopardy, the dismissal by the prosecuting officer as to such count operated an acquittal of that count, (Whart. Crim. Pl. § 383, and cases cited.)

2. The defendant brings in question the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under the third count. That evidence, in substance, shows that defendant came to Marshall, Saline Co., Mo., December 19, 1890, representing himself to be A. R. Ruger, the chief engineer of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad, and that he desired to establish his headquarters there; drove around town that day with some of the citizens, over the route of the proposed road, and spoke of hiring teams, etc. That next morning he hired a team to take him to Miami, but, before leaving, saw J. P. Huston, cashier of the Wood & Huston Bank, to whom, it seems, he had been introduced, and told him that he wished to leave town, but wanted to have a check cashed before starting, and on Huston asking him the amount of the check, and whom it was on, said $125, and on A. B. McIntire, — showing Huston the check, — and, on the latter asking him who McIntire was, stated he was a wealthy tie contractor, for whom he had been doing some work, and this check was in payment therefor. Thereupon, Huston cashed the check, which was already indorsed, "A. R. Ruger," which defendant acknowledged to be his signature, and the defendant, getting into the buggy already engaged, started northward. He was next seen in Washington, D.C., whither he was pursued, but escaped to Montana, where he was finally captured, and brought back to Saline county on requisition. On his way back to Marshall he was asked by one of his captors, M. H. Alexander, how he came to work such a scheme on the Marshall people, and "he said he thought they were ripe for that kind of a thing; the railroad interest was pretty warm there, and he had heard of it, had read of it in the paper, and he thought he would come up here, and represent himself as being this engineer, and propose to run the line. Said he had run out of money, and thought that would be a good way to get some. He said that he had written this check that he passed on Huston, himself. I asked him what made him make it to A. R. Ruger, and he said that was the first name that he thought of." Other evidence also shows that the check was false and forged, and that there was no such person as A. B. McIntire. Evidence on behalf of the defendant, testifying in his own behalf, shows that the check had been filled in and indorsed, and was in his possession at Kansas City, before he went to Marshall. He did not deny any of the other statements of the state's witnesses, so that they virtually stand unchallenged on the record, (State v. Musick, 101 Mo. 260, 14 S. W. Rep. 212;) and it is this undisputed testimony which the defendant's counsel denies is sufficient to establish the guilty intent of defendant to have the check passed. From that evidence no reasonable doubt can be entertained that defendant knew that the check was false and forged, and that he sold the same to the Wood & Huston Bank "with intent to have the same passed." The words just quoted seem to be peculiar to the statutes of this state, not having been found in those of any other state; but the same character of evidence which would be sufficient in other cases of forgery to show a guilty intent would, if applicable to the facts of the present one, show such guilty intent as the statute requires. Intent, being an operation of the mind, cannot be discovered or revealed, in the great majority of cases, except by acts, and from acts alone, unaccompanied by a single word, guilty intent is inferred in the prosecution of crimes of the highest grade. Every one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own act, and the natural and probable consequences of the act of defendant were that the bank to which he sold the forged check would pass the same, in regular course of exchange, to the bank on which it was drawn, in order to be reimbursed for the amount which its cashier paid to defendant. 1 Bish. Crim. Law, (2d Ed.) § 735; State v. Musick, 101 Mo. 260, 14 S. W. Rep. 212; Whart. Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) § 734; Babcock v. Eckler, 24 N. Y. 623; Snyder v. Free, (Mo. Sup.) 21 S. W. Rep. 849. The principal element in forgery consists in the fraudulent purpose, and evidence of all circumstances which bear on the question of fraud are pertinent, and proofs of ...