State v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 14 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. CR–09–0342–AP.,CR–09–0342–AP.
• Citation: State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270, 283 P.3d 1, 641 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4 (Ariz. 2012)
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Isiah PATTERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

230 Ariz. 270

283 P.3d 1

641 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.Isiah PATTERSON, Appellant.

No. CR–09–0342–AP.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Aug. 14, 2012.

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General by Kent E. Cattani, Division ChiefCounsel, Jeffrey A. Zick, Section Chief Counsel, Julie A. Done, Assistant Attorney General, Capital Litigation Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona.

Stephen M. Johnson by Stephen M. Johnson, Phoenix, Attorney for Isiah Patterson.

OPINION

BRUTINEL, Justice.

¶ 1 In 2009, a jury found Isiah Patterson guilty of the first degree murder of Consquelo Barker, and he was sentenced to death.We have jurisdiction over this automatic appeal under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona ConstitutionandA.R.S. § 13–4031(2010).¹

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 At approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 17, 2006, Patterson and Consquelo, his girlfriend, were in his Mesa apartment with their three-year-old son when they began fighting.²A downstairs neighbor heard loud crashes and things rolling on the floor.After about ten minutes, the noises stopped.After another ten minutes or so had passed, Consquelo ran from the apartment, naked and screaming for help.

¶ 3 Patterson chased Consquelo through the outdoor common areas of the apartment complex.He caught her at a sand volleyball pit, sat over her, and stabbed her thirteen times in the face, torso, and arm.The wounds perforated her lungs, diaphragm and spleen, and fractured her arm.Patterson continued stabbing Consquelo until a neighbor, awakened by her screams, yelled for him to stop.Consquelo then stumbled from the volleyball pit, asking for help before collapsing beneath a bush, where she died.Patterson walked back toward his apartment, telling neighbors, “That's what happens when you try to turn a whore into a housewife.”

¶ 4 Patterson was arrested and indicted for Consquelo's murder.The State sought the death penalty.Finding Patterson guilty and that the crime was especially cruel, seeA.R.S.§ 13–751(F)(6), the jury determined he should be sentenced to death.

II.ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Voir Dire Questioning

¶ 5 Patterson contends the trial court restricted his questioning of prospective jurors contrary to Morgan v. Illinois,504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492(1992).Morgan held that due process requires a trial court to allow inquiry into whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty.Id. at 733, 112 S.Ct. 2222.³Patterson challenges the trial court's refusal to let him question potential jurors about specific aggravating and mitigating factors and its requirement that he mention the mitigation phase of the trial in a hypothetical question he asked jurors.We review a trial court's ruling on voir dire for an abuse of discretion.SeeState v. Glassel,211 Ariz. 33, 45 ¶ 36, 116 P.3d 1193, 1205(2005).Patterson is not entitled to relief on these claims.

1.Specific Aggravator and Mitigator Questions

¶ 6 Before trial, the State moved to preclude Patterson from asking prospective jurors what factors they would find aggravating or mitigating.Patterson did not oppose the motion.Accordingly, we review this issue only for fundamental error.SeeState v. Henderson,210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607(2005).

¶ 7 During voir dire, Patterson asked one juror what kind of circumstances she would find mitigating.The court sustained the State's objection.

¶ 8The trial court did not err by granting the State's motion or sustaining its objection.Defendants are not entitled to “ask potential jurors what types of evidence they will consider to be mitigating.”Glassel,211 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 44, 116 P.3d at 1207;see alsoState v. Johnson,212 Ariz. 425, 434 ¶ 31, 133 P.3d 735, 744(2006)(noting that “[e]xtant authority unanimously rejects” the argument that a defendant is entitled to voir dire jury panel about specific mitigating factors).Similarly, neither the state nor the defense is entitled to ask jurors about specific aggravators.SeeState v. Smith,215 Ariz. 221, 231 ¶ 42, 159 P.3d 531, 541(2007).

¶ 9 This restriction did not prevent Patterson from sufficiently investigating the beliefs of potential jurors.Although precluding him from questioning on specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial judge allowed Patterson to probe jurors “on their basic beliefs, views, biases and prejudices concerning the death penalty, as well as their general views concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances that must be considered in determining whether to impose a sentence of life or death.”As the trial court suggested, a defendant may legitimately ask what mitigation means to that juror.He could also ask whether the juror can imagine a situation where the totality of a defendant's character, including things he has endured or accomplished, could warrant mercy despite his crimes.See, e.g., State v. Velazquez,216 Ariz. 300, 307 ¶ 20, 166 P.3d 91, 98(2007);Glassel,211 Ariz. at 46 ¶ 41, 116 P.3d at 1206(allowing defendant to ask potential jurors what “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” meant to them).And the record here shows that Patterson did, in fact, ask these types of questions.

2.Hypothetical Question

¶ 10The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by requiring Patterson to mention mitigation in a hypothetical question he asked.During the first voir dire session, Patterson's counsel asked four jurors whether they thought death is an appropriate sentence if the jury finds a defendant guilty of premeditated first degree murder and also finds at least one aggravator.They agreed that it is.The trial court interjected to clarify that a fair and impartial juror is one who, even after finding guilt and aggravation, would be able to begin the sentencing phase without leaning toward or against the death penalty.

¶ 11 When questioning concluded, Patterson moved to strike three of the jurors who had been questioned before the trial court's clarification.⁴The State objected, arguing that Patterson's counsel had intentionally “bait[ed]” them into suggesting they would not consider mitigation.It then requested that, prospectively, if counsel used this hypothetical, she be required to mention mitigation.The trial court agreed.

¶ 12 On appeal, Patterson notes that defendants are entitled to impartial juries, but he has not explained how the trial court erred in its ruling.Error does not result from the court's correctly instructing prospective jurors on the law.SeeState v. Kreutzer,928 S.W.2d 854, 864–65(Mo.1996)(finding no error when court required counsel to conform questions “to the dictates of existing law” and “allowed sufficient latitude in determining whether each venireperson could fairly and impartially follow the court's instructions”);see alsoState v. Riggins,111 Ariz. 281, 285, 528 P.2d 625, 629(1974)(noting that, under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, trial court has discretion to forbid confusing voir dire questions).

¶ 13 Here, the trial court clarified that the appropriate inquiry was whether a juror could be impartial at the beginning of the penalty phase.It did not curtail questions tending to reveal a prospective juror's predisposition to vote for death after finding guilt and an aggravator, but before hearing mitigation.Because the court interfered only minimally with Patterson's voir dire questioning in order to avoid juror confusion and allowed him wide latitude to discover death-biased jurors, it did not abuse its discretion.SeeKreutzer,928 S.W.2d at 864–65.

B.Juror Strike

¶ 14 Patterson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by striking for cause a juror who worked for the Maricopa County Public Defender's Office and had expressed strong opposition to the death penalty.We review for an abuse of discretion, giving great deference to the trial court, which was in the best position to personally observe the juror.Glassel,211 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 46, 116 P.3d at 1207.

¶ 15 Juror Twelve stated in her juror questionnaire that she was an “Initial Services Specialist” for the Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, who “conduct[ed] initial interviews” and “jail visits.”She knew that Patterson's lead attorney had once worked for the Public Defender's Office and also knew two other members of Patterson's defense team.Juror Twelve further reported that “it would be hard for [her]” to participate in a capital case because she had “worked close to death penalty cases in [her] office,”she did not believe in the death penalty, and she has always held anti-death penalty views.She marked a box stating that her “position against the death penalty [was] so strong that [she] could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances” and added that she did not believe she has “the right to be part of taking someone's life.”

¶ 16 During voir dire, Juror Twelve initially reiterated these positions, but on further questioning by the State, she responded that she was able to be fair and impartial and that she thought she would be able to serve on this jury.She further stated that she would be able to sentence someone to death if she felt that it was the appropriate sentence.

¶ 17The State moved to strike Juror Twelve, pointing out that in her questionnaire, she had “repeatedly and clearly pointed out her absolute objection” to the death penalty and “indicated she cannot follow the law.”Yet, the State noted, during questioning she provided answers “completely different and contrary” to those in her questionnaire.Over Patterson's objection, the trial court struck Juror Twelve, explaining:

I have concerns, as I said before, over that juror's veracity.I have the ability to observe her here, to review the question[naire].This is not a situation where this juror was wishy-washy in her questionnaire as to what she could or could not do, nor is this a situation where she was rehabilitated.This...