State v. Patterson
| Citation | 812 N.W.2d 106 |
| Decision Date | 25 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A10–0563.,A10–0563. |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Adrian Lamont PATTERSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified the nonindigent criminal defendant's counsel of choice based on a serious potential conflict of interest arising from the defense attorney's previous representation of a witness for the State to be called at trial.Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Theodora Gaïtas, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
Appellant Adrian Patterson and his codefendant Leroy Paul were indicted in Hennepin County on two counts of first-degree murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1), (3) (2010), and two counts of attempted first-degree murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1), (3), 609.17 (2010). For his defense, Patterson retained Eric Newmark as his counsel of choice. Patterson was scheduled to be tried in a joint trial with codefendant Leroy Paul.1 The State moved to disqualify Newmark as Patterson's counsel based on alleged actual and potential conflicts of interest arising out of Newmark's past representation of Paul and three of the State's prospective witnesses. Even though Patterson waived his right to conflict-free counsel with respect to Newmark, the trial court granted the State's motion on the basis of potential conflicts with two of the State's prospective witnesses.
After retaining another attorney and, following a jury trial, Patterson was found guilty and convicted of second-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(2) (2010), and drive-by shooting, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2010). On appeal to the court of appeals, Patterson claimed that: (1) his right to counsel of choice was violated when the trial court disqualified Newmark; (2) his right to conflict-free counsel was violated because the attorney who ultimately represented him at trial had a conflict with one of the State's witnesses; (3) the trial court improperly admitted gang evidence; and (4) he was improperly sentenced. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects. We granted review on the sole issue of whether Patterson was deprived of his right to counsel of choice. We affirm.
The trial court record indicates that shortly after 2 a.m. on November 23, 2003, a three-car chase was in progress in downtown Minneapolis. Patterson and Paul were traveling together in one car: Paul was driving and Patterson was sitting in the front passenger seat. They were chasing a car driven by Rashante Artison, who was accompanied by a passenger. Antonio Wilson was driving a third car somewhere behind the other two cars. Leaning out of the passenger window, Patterson began to shoot a gun at Artison's car. Patterson continued to shoot as Paul maneuvered their car so that it was parallel to Artison's car. Upon seeing Patterson shooting, Wilson tried to stop Patterson by shooting a gun towards Patterson, but Wilson's gun jammed after firing one shot. Wilson then drove into the back of the car Paul was driving, causing an accident. After the accident, Patterson got out of the car and walked away. Artison, who had been hit by one of Patterson's shots, managed to drive to the hospital, but eventually died from the gunshot wound.
The subsequent police investigation stalled until December 2008, when the Minneapolis Police Department was contacted by two individuals who provided new information. Following further investigation as a result of this information, Paul and Patterson were indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder.
At Patterson's 2009 trial, the State's theory of the case was that Artison's murder was caused by an intra-gang conflict that arose following the November 2002 murder of Fred Williamson. On the morning of November 7, 2002, Williamson and Paul had a confrontation outside a café, based on Paul's belief that Williamson had stolen money and drugs from him. Bryan Herron, who was present along with Wilson, broke up the confrontation; then Herron, Wilson, and Williamson left in a car. At some point, Paul pulled up next to their car and shot Williamson, killing him. In retaliation for Paul killing Williamson, Artison attempted to shoot Paul in early November of 2003. Paul responded on November 13, 2003—just one week before Artison was killed—by shooting at Artison. Paul was later convicted of killing Williamson and was sentenced to life in prison.
Believing that there was a connection between the Williamson and Artison murders and that they were gang related, the State planned to call witnesses who would testify at Patterson's trial about events surrounding the Williamson murder, the subsequent intra-gang conflict that developed, and Artison's murder. Those witnesses included Herron, Wilson, and Jermaine Richardson, each of whom had been previously represented by Newmark. Newmark had also previously represented Paul. As a result, the State moved to disqualify Newmark from representing Patterson. Patterson objected and a number of hearings were held on the State's motion. While the motion was pending, Patterson consulted extensively with independent counsel about the potential for conflicts of interest based on Newmark's past representation of Herron, Wilson, Richardson, and Paul. After consulting with the independent attorney, Patterson was satisfied that there were no actual or potential conflicts of interest, but nevertheless waived his right to conflict-free counsel. But Patterson did not waive his right to move for a mistrial in the event an actual conflict arose during trial.
Despite Patterson's waiver of conflict-free counsel, the trial court granted the State's motion to disqualify Newmark, finding that Newmark's previous representation of Wilson and Herron presented potential conflicts of interest. Patterson eventually retained another attorney as trial counsel. As noted, the jury found Patterson guilty of second-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting and of drive-by shooting.
In affirming Newmark's disqualification on appeal, the court of appeals held that “the district court thoroughly analyzed Newmark's purported conflicts of interest,” State v. Patterson, 796 N.W.2d 516, 524 (Minn.App.2011), and “any prejudice to Patterson was outweighed by the state's interest in the finality of any judgment of conviction, the court's interest in preserving the ethical standards of the legal profession, and the public's interest in having a criminal justice system that is perceived as fair,” id. at 527. We review a district court's disqualification of a defendant's counsel of choice for an abuse of discretion. See Moose v. Vesey, 225 Minn. 64, 69, 29 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1947).
We begin with the trial court's disqualification of Newmark based on Newmark's previous representation of Wilson. The State planned to call Wilson at trial as a witness to the Williamson and Artison murders and as a witness to Paul shooting at Artison days before Artison was killed. Between 1999 and 2005, Newmark represented Wilson in approximately four felony drug cases. While one of those cases, which arose in December 2002, was pending, Wilson told police that he was present when Williamson was murdered and told police to talk to Newmark regarding whether Wilson would cooperate in the investigation into Williamson's murder. Two weeks later, Newmark told police that he would talk to Wilson about whether Wilson wanted to cooperate. Although it is not clear from the record, it appears that nothing resulted from any discussion Newmark may have had with Wilson in 2002 regarding cooperating with police on the Williamson murder.
In August or September 2008, Wilson was arrested on federal drug charges and retained Newmark following his arrest. Together, Wilson and Newmark reviewed police reports and had privileged communications about the facts underlying Wilson's arrest. Wilson was later indicted on the federal drug charges in connection with the arrest and was appointed different counsel for the case. Wilson's new attorney negotiated a plea agreement with the federal government in which Wilson agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of Patterson and Paul for Artison's murder. Wilson testified before the grand jury that indicted Patterson and Paul, and later testified at Patterson's trial. Wilson objected to being cross-examined by Newmark in the Patterson matter.
Based on these facts, the State argued that Newmark's previous representation of Wilson created a potential conflict of interest because Newmark would have to discredit his former client, Wilson, by cross-examining him at trial, which might jeopardize Wilson's interests and Patterson's interests. The State further argued that Patterson's waiver of conflict-free counsel was not sufficient to eliminate the potential conflict because Patterson could not waive Newmark's ethical obligations to Wilson. Finally, the State argued that employing an independent attorney to cross-examine Wilson would risk Patterson losing the effective assistance of counsel and unnecessarily prolong the trial proceedings.
In response, Patterson argued that, because the State failed to demonstrate that Wilson's interests were adverse to Patterson's, no actual conflict or serious potential for conflict would arise from Newmark's representation of Patterson. Moreover, Patterson argued that disqualifying his counsel of choice was an “extraordinary” remedy, which was not necessary because a less extraordinary remedy was available—namely, Patterson's waiver of conflict-free counsel. Finally, Patterson argued that an independent attorney...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- State v. Sahr, No. A10–0074.
-
Pearson v. State
...determine whether a lawyer has a conflict of interest, we turn to the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. See State v. Patterson , 812 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Minn. 2012) (applying the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct to determine whether an attorney had a conflict of interest in a cri......
-
State v. 3M Co., s. A12–1856
...1.9(a). We review the district court's decision regarding disqualification of counsel for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Patterson, 812 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn.2012). A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or when it renders a d......
-
State v. A. B.
...... of counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment can be used to. analyze Fourteenth Amendment ineffective assistance of. counsel claims because the governing principles and policies. are coextensive."); State v. Patterson , 796. N.W.2d 516, 523 (Minn.Ct.App. 2011), aff'd , 812. N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2012) (even where defendant waives a. conflict of interest, "in cases involving successive. representation, disqualification may be required if the. defense lawyer previously represented a ......