State v. Patterson, 53201

• Decision Date: 12 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. 53201,53201
• Citation: 443 S.W.2d 104
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. J. C. PATTERSON, a/k/a Jesse Patterson, a/k/a Woodrow Anderson, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 104

443 S.W.2d 104

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. J. C. PATTERSON, a/k/a Jesse Patterson, a/k/a Woodrow Anderson, Appellant.

No. 53201.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

May 12, 1969.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1969.

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, James R. Robison, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Sikeston, for respondent.

Albert C. Lowes and Kenneth L. Waldron, Buerkle & Lowes, Jackson, for appellant.

DONNELLY, Judge.

Appellant, J.C. Patterson, was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm under § 559.190, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., by a jury in the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri, and his punishment was assessed at imprisonment in the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a term of five years. Following rendition of judgment and imposition of sentence a late appeal was perfected, by leave, to this Court. Appellant is represented in this Court by counsel appointed by the trial court to assist appellant on his appeal.

At the trial, Mary Renn testified that on the evening of October 4, 1966, she was at her home in South Cape Girardeau with her two children, Rosemary, age 9, and Larry Joe, age 2, her three grandchildren, and appellant; that her grandson was crying when they went to bed and Rosemary could not quiet him; that appellant stated, 'By God, she will get him quiet,' and that appellant grabbed a dog collar and 'went to beating on her.' Mary Renn testified that the dog collar had a big square buckle on it and that she heard appellant begin to strike Rosemary on the back and neck with the collar while in the bedroom and that he struck her once or twice while in her presence; that appellant 'kinda pulled the licks when he hit her'; that Rosemary had scars, marks and two or three cuts on her back and neck after appellant struck her.

Counsel for appellant then objected to the State's question whether appellant had 'beat' Rosemary prior to the occurrence in question. The objection was overruled. Mary Renn then testified that she had seen appellant 'beat her a lot of times'; that appellant had been in her home four or five months; that he 'beat' Rosemary with a belt and water hose once across the back that left marks and hit her with a pole a time or two and that appellant would 'beat' her with anything he could get in his hands. Mary Renn also testified that on the night in question she told appellant not to hit Rosemary any more and he went on to bed, and that she told Rosemary to report the incident to Mrs. Cook, the school nurse.

On cross-examination Mary Renn testified that appellant was Rosemary's father and had the right to discipline and reprimand Rosemary but not 'beat' her.

Mrs. Opal Cook testified that she was a registered nurse at May Greene School; that she saw Rosemary the morning of October 5, 1966; that Rosemary kept her coat on in class, took it off for Mrs. Cook and showed her where she had been 'beaten'; that Rosemary had several welts, eleven major lacerations and contusions on her legs, thighs, back, arms, and the back of her neck; that she administered first aid cream; that the skin was broken; that there had been some previous bleeding; and that after consulting with her mother and the Welfare Office, she made an appointment for Rosemary to see Dr. Parsons on October 6, 1966.

On cross-examination, Mrs. Cook testified that the lacerations were not deep and severe and did not require suturing; and that under normal conditions the contusions and lacerations would probably not have resulted in death.

Dr. D. L. Parsons of Cape Girardeau testified he saw Rosemary in his office on October 6, 1966, when Mrs. Cook, nurse at May Greene School, brought her in; that he examined Rosemary completely and found multiple wheals, deep contusions and lacerations over most of her body, none on the face, nainly on the trunk; that he made an attempt to examine her vaginally and the vagina would admit one finger and the hymen was intact. Counsel for appellant objected to this testimony as being irrelevant, immaterial and inflammatory and requested a mistrial. The objection and request were overruled by the trial court. Dr. Parsons then testified the wheals on Rosemary's trunk were square, as if made by some heavy square object, about two inches long and about twenty-five in number; that suturing was not required but there apparently had been some bleeding under the skin; that a belt or belt buckle could have inflicted the wheals; and that the injuries were not such that they had done great bodily injury to Rosemary.

Charles Copen testified that Mary Renn was his mother and appellant was no relation to him; that his mother was baby-sitting for his children on the night in question and he arrived there about 11:15 p.m. to pick up the children; and that Rosemary was crying when he arrived. Over appellant's objection, he testified that he had been present on prior occasions when appellant had whipped Rosemary; that it seemed appellant did this because Rosemary would take longer to do something than appellant thought she should; that he had seen appellant whip Rosemary until she jumped up and down and screamed at the top of her voice and that he had seen welts on Rosemary.

Appellant took the stand and testified that he had spanked Rosemary with two belts but they did not have a buckle; that this was done because he bought clothes for her and she would leave her coat on the school playground; that he bought her another coat but she did the same thing and he spanked her; that he spanked Rosemary on several occasions and had used a dog collar that was smaller than described by other witnesses; and that he never intended to hurt Rosemary or inflict serious bodily injury upon her.

On cross-examination, appellant testified that he spanked Rosemary with a dog collar on the night in question for leaving her coat at school and did not try to hurt her; that he spanked her below the knees and did not see any marks on her; that he 'hit her two or three licks and that's all'; that the school children fought on the way home and that he felt that since he was taking care of Rosemary he should have a right to discipline her.

Appellant did not file a motion for new trial in the trial court. Therefore, the points raised by appellant on appeal are not preserved for review (State v. Kennebrew, Mo.Sup., 380 S.W.2d 293; State v. Gooch, Mo.Sup., 420 S.W.2d 283, 287) unless they constitute 'plain error' under S.Ct. Rule 27.20(c), V.A.M.R., which reads as follows: 'Plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on motion for new trial or on appeal, in the discretion of the court, though not raised in the trial court or preserved for review, or defectively raised or preserved, when the court deems that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.'

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that one 'standing in loco parentis may inflict upon a child in his charge, punishment which is reasonable under the facts and circumstances without incurring criminal liability for assault or a similar offense.'

We agree that the evidence supports a defense that the disciplinary action taken by appellant was reasonable and not excessive. State v. Black, 360 Mo. 261, 267--268, 227 S.W.2d 1006, 1009--1010. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury as to this defense. State v. Drane, Mo.Sup., 416 S.W.2d 105, 107; § 546.070(4) RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; S.Ct. Rule 26.02(6), V.A.M.R. The question then becomes whether 'manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.'

In State v. Haygood, Mo.Sup., 411 S.W.2d 230, a prosecution for murder in the second degree, Division Two of this Court held that under the circumstances of that case failure to instruct the jury on the defense of excusable homicide because of accident constituted 'plain error,' warranting a reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Haygood case should not be construed to hold or imply that failure to instruct on a defense supported by the evidence, and which is a part of the 'law arising in the case' under § 546.070, supra, and Rule 26.02, supra, is, of itself, such as to result in 'manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice' under Rule 27.20(c). We will continue to review the facts and circumstances in each case and to determine this question on a case-to-case basis.

We have reviewed the whole record in this case and do not believe, under the facts and circumstances therein disclosed, that the trial court's failure to instruct on the defense available to appellant resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. We decline to grant relief on this point under S.Ct. Rule 27.20(c).

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in giving its instruction on the issue of assault with intent to do great bodily harm, for the reason that 'there is no substantial evidence of record to show that the disciplinary actions taken by appellant were excessive or that appellant intended to do great bodily harm to Rosemary Renn.'

The evidence shows that appellant administered a severe beating to Rosemary Renn, using an 18 to 24-inch dog collar with a square metal buckle an inch and one-half to two inches square, with which he struck her on the back, neck, arms, legs and thighs, raising multiple wheals, deep contusions and lacerations over most of her body. The evidence also shows that appellant had beaten Rosemary on prior occasions. We believe the evidence is sufficient to show that the disciplinary actions of appellant were excessive and that appellant intended to do great bodily harm to Rosemary Renn. 'Intent may and generally must be established by circumstantial evidence, for as a rule it is not susceptible of direct proof.' State v. Chevlin, Mo.Sup., 284 S.W.2d 563, 566. The action of the trial court complained of does not constitute error. The point is without merit.

Appellant next...