State v. Paul

Decision Date20 December 2017
Docket NumberA160190
Citation410 P.3d 378,289 Or.App. 408
Parties STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Eric Charles PAUL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

David O. Ferry, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Lindsey Burrows, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.

Nathan Riemersma, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and James, Judge.

JAMES, J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of burglary in the first degree, ORS 164.225, one count of burglary in the second degree, ORS 164.215, and one count of theft in the third degree, ORS 164.043. On appeal, defendant raises two related assignments of error, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to give his requested jury instructions on the choice-of-evils and duress defenses. Specifically, defendant argues that he presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that he participated in the crimes because his codefendant's brother threatened serious harm to defendant's daughter and, thus, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the defenses. We conclude that defendant presented sufficient evidence in support of the requested instructions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction for legal error and view the record in the light most favorable to the requesting party. State v. Oneill , 256 Or. App. 537, 538, 303 P.3d 944, rev. den. , 354 Or. 342, 313 P.3d 1126 (2013). "Whether the evidence [in the record] entitles a defendant to a jury instruction on a defense is governed by the statutory requirements for establishing the defense." State v. Boldt , 116 Or. App. 480, 483, 841 P.2d 1196 (1992). Therefore, "[i]f there is any evidence in the record from which the jury could infer the required elements of [the defense], the issue should be submitted to them." State v. Matthews , 30 Or. App. 1133, 1136, 569 P.2d 662 (1977). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.

Defendant was dropping off his girlfriend at her mother's house near Stayton and Lyons late in the evening. After the girlfriend exited defendant's car, but before he pulled away from the mother's house, the girlfriend's mother and the girlfriend's uncle (the mother's brother) approached defendant's car. The mother (defendant's codefendant) approached the passenger side of defendant's car and the uncle leaned into defendant's driver side window. The uncle asked defendant to give the mother a ride and defendant agreed, as long as the stop was on his way home. The uncle replied, "No, you will give [the mother] a ride if you don't want anything to happen to your daughter." Defendant's daughter lived with defendant at his home in Salem. Defendant's girlfriend had met his daughter and the mother knew where defendant lived.

The mother got into defendant's car and they left. Eventually, the mother instructed defendant to pull over and park along a rural highway; she then got out of the car and told defendant to wait for her in the car. After about 20 minutes, the mother returned to the car and told defendant to get out and follow her to a residence located off of the rural highway. Defendant did what he was told, following her to the residence and then waiting outside while she went inside. Defendant stood outside for about an hour when the mother ran out of the residence, shoved some jewelry into defendant's hands, and said, "Let's go." Defendant and the mother ran in different directions. Defendant ran out of one of his shoes and hid behind a pile of cut trees on the property.

Deputy Church was on patrol when he noticed defendant's car parked along the rural highway. Church was familiar with the property and knew that the resident was a woman in her nineties and who lived alone. Church decided to check on the resident. As he approached the residence, he noticed that the garage door had been forced open and that the doorjamb was broken. He also noticed shoe impressions in the frost that led away from the house. Church followed the shoe impressions and found a single athletic shoe. Soon after, defendant was found hiding behind a pile of cut trees, wearing a single athletic shoe that matched the shoe Church found near the house, and was taken into custody.

At trial, Church testified that defendant was cooperative while in custody, that defendant immediately started telling Church what had happened, and that defendant assisted Church in locating the mother. Church was asked, "Did [defendant] tell you that [defendant] had done this because somebody else had forced him to?" Church replied, "Coerced him, yes sir." Church also testified that defendant had asked Church to call defendant's father in Salem, because someone needed to check on defendant's daughter. Church's patrol car recording captured defendant saying, "Please, please find [daughter]" and "[i]f [daughter's] not at home, then that [uncle] has her."

Defendant testified at trial that he could not remember the exact wording of the uncle's statement but that he knew that "it was a clear message," that "it was clearly a threat," and that he was "scared for [his] daughter." Moreover, defendant testified that he had heard that the uncle "was a dangerous guy and [uncle] had been to prison and just not somebody you want to screw around with." When asked what the "clear threat" from the uncle was, defendant testified, "That if I didn't want anything to happen to my daughter that I would do what [the mother] told me to do" and "that my daughter is in danger if I don't do what they say." Defendant was asked why he did not leave and go for help and he testified to his fear "[t]hat something would happen to my daughter [and] I didn't know—I just had heard stories about this [uncle], I didn't know—you know, because I had no phone, no way to contact [daughter] to make sure she was okay."

At trial, defendant argued that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to consider the choice-of-evils and duress defenses. The state argued that the evidence defendant submitted was so vague that it did not support either instruction and asked the court to refuse the requested jury instructions. The trial court, agreeing with the state, refused to give the requested jury instructions on the choice-of-evils and duress defenses. The trial court ruled that it "did not find [defendant's] testimony credible regarding the purported threats" and that it did not believe that there was "sufficient evidence to support giving [the choice-of-evils and duress jury] instructions."

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the choice-of-evils and duress defenses because there was sufficient evidence in the record that supported the giving of the requested instructions. The state, however, argues that defendant failed to present evidence that his daughter faced a threat of harm that was imminent and, thus, the trial court did not err when it refused to give the jury instructions on the choice-of-evils and duress defenses. We agree with defendant.

ORS 161.200 sets out the elements of the statutory choice-of-evils defense. Pertinently, ORS 161.200(1) states:

"Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
"(a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury; and
"(b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly out-weigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue."
As we have previously explained,
"[t]o establish the choice of evils defense under ORS 161.200, defendant had to offer evidence that would be sufficient for the jury to find that: (1) his conduct was necessary to avoid a threatened injury; (2) the threatened injury was imminent; and (3) it was reasonable for him to believe that the
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1 cases
  • State v. Heaton
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • March 17, 2021
    ...legal error, viewing the record in the light most favorable to defendant, as the party requesting the instruction. State v. Paul , 289 Or. App. 408, 409, 410 P.3d 378 (2017). ORS 161.200 sets out the elements of the choice-of-evils defense. It states, in relevant part:"Unless inconsistent w......

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