State v. Paul B.
| Decision Date | 23 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 19197.,19197. |
| Citation | 315 Conn. 19,105 A.3d 130 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. PAUL B. |
Glenn W. Falk, assigned counsel, Madison, for the appellant (defendant).
Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state's attorney, and Kevin J. Murphy, former supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.
The defendant, Paul B., was convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53–21(a)(2) for touching the intimate parts of two young boys “in a sexual and indecent manner....” The defendant appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, contending that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that: (1) the trial court properly admitted out-of-court statements of one of the victims through the testimony of a police officer to provide context for the defendant's admission to the conduct underlying the charges against him; (2) the trial court properly admitted out-of-court statements of the victims as examples of their age inappropriate knowledge through the testimony of the state's expert; and (3) the state did not engage in prosecutorial impropriety during closing argument by relying on this testimony.1 We conclude that the defendant's first claim was not properly preserved and that, even assuming the challenged statements used by the state's expert were improperly admitted, any impropriety was harmless. Finally, we are not persuaded that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by any purported prosecutorial impropriety. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following facts that the jury reasonably could have found. In 2005, DA and DE, half brothers who were then respectively eight and five years old, resided in close proximity to the defendant's home. The defendant met DA and DE when they were playing with another child, SA, whom the defendant occasionally babysat, outside of the defendant's home.
Several weeks after the defendant met DA and DE, he met their parents. DA and DE then began to sleep at the defendant's home when their parents needed a babysitter or when other friends, including SA, were staying overnight at the defendant's house. Shortly thereafter, the defendant injured his foot and was invited by the victims' parents to move into their home.
The defendant frequently shared a bed with DA and DE, both when they slept at the defendant's house and after the defendant had moved into the victims' home. On occasion, the defendant wore only underwear when the children slept with him. He also asked DA not to wear clothes to bed and would remove DE's clothes in his sleep. DA and DE both occasionally felt wetness in the bed or on themselves when they woke up. For example, after the defendant removed DE's clothing, DE would wake up feeling something wet “on [his] private.” Once, DE woke up and felt wetness on his penis and saw the defendant's face near his midsection. The defendant also touched and rubbed both DE's and DA's nipples, penises, and buttocks on multiple occasions when he shared a bed with them. There also were times when DE would feel the defendant suck on his nipples right before he would fall asleep and he once felt the defendant lick his neck. When the children took showers, the defendant occasionally stayed in the bathroom and, when they were finished in the shower, he would dry them off with a towel and help them put on their underwear. On at least one occasion, the defendant touched DA “in a private place” while drying him off. The defendant told both DA and DE that they could not tell their parents about the defendant touching them.
In June, 2008, DE disclosed to his grandmother that the defendant had touched him inappropriately. After the grandmother informed other family members about what DE had said, the defendant was asked to leave the victims' home. In August, 2008, Officer Kim Parrott of the Plymouth Police Department received a telephone call reporting the alleged sexual assault. Approximately one week later, Diane Edell, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted a forensic interview of DE, for which Parrott was present. Shortly thereafter, Parrott interviewed the defendant about the conduct alleged by DE. After Parrott's interview of the defendant, Edell conducted a forensic interview of DA, for which Parrott also was present.
At trial, the state called numerous witnesses to testify regarding the aforementioned facts, including DE and DA, who were then respectively ten and thirteen years old. SA, who was not a victim in this case, also testified to corroborate the victims' testimony regarding the assaults that were committed in the defendant's home and to offer propensity evidence of similar acts that the defendant had committed on him. Parrott testified regarding the defendant's response after being confronted with DE's allegations. Over the defendant's objection, Parrott was permitted to testify as to the specific statements of DE to which the defendant responded. Edell offered an expert opinion regarding the conduct of child abuse victims. Over the defendant's objection, Edell was permitted to testify regarding statements elicited in the forensic interviews with DA and DE that she viewed as evidencing age inappropriate language consistent with the conduct of such victims.
The defendant testified in his own defense and maintained that he had no recollection of touching the victims in a sexual manner. He acknowledged, however, drying the victims off with a towel after they would take showers and sleeping with them in their bed.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of two counts of risk of injury to a child, but acquitted the defendant of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–70 (a)(2). The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, challenging the admission of the statements of the victims introduced through Parrott and Edell as inadmissible hearsay, as well as the prosecutor's comments on that evidence in closing argument. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claims and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Paul B., 143 Conn.App. 691, 693, 70 A.3d 1123 (2013). This certified appeal followed.
We begin with the defendant's challenge to the Appellate Court's conclusion that the trial court properly admitted out-of-court statements made by DE attesting to certain acts by the defendant through Parrott's testimony. The defendant contends that, although Parrott properly could provide context for the defendant's response to Parrott when the defendant was confronted with those allegations, it was unnecessarily prejudicial for Parrott to testify that DE had made the inculpatory statements in the forensic interview. We conclude that, although the defendant objected at trial to the admission of Parrott's testimony with regard to DE's statements, that objection was based upon a different ground than the one raised in this certified appeal. Because the claim before us was not properly preserved, the defendant is not entitled to a review of the ruling on this basis.
The record reveals the following additional facts. At trial, the defendant objected on hearsay grounds to the state's questioning of Parrott regarding what Parrott had told the defendant when she interviewed him after DE's forensic interview. During an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, Parrott testified that, during her interview of the defendant, she “told him that DE and DA have disclosed—that only DE was interviewed, and it was disclosed that while [the defendant] was living at his house, that he would sleep in the same bed with the boys, and that he was touching their butt, their private area, licking the private area, licking and playing with the nipples, and DE explained peeing—that he was peeing on them.” Parrott then testified that in response, the defendant said: The defendant objected to the admission of this testimony on the grounds that DE's statements were hearsay and that admitting the details of the allegations was prejudicial.
The defendant suggested that “getting out the idea that [DA and DE] have made disclosures of a sexual nature that included touching by [the] defendant to the children ... is broad enough that it still allows the jury to make a determination of the ultimate facts, without submitting details in for the jury....” The court overruled the hearsay objection, concluding that the references to DE's allegations against the defendant were not being offered for their truth, but rather only to provide context for the defendant's response. The court explained that, in order to put the defendant's statement in context, “[Parrott] must testify accurately as to what specifically she asked him about.” The court further concluded that allowing Parrott to testify regarding the details of DE's allegations was not prejudicial because the out-of-court statements described conduct that DE and DA had already testified to at trial. Parrott then testified consistent with the offer of proof. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning. State v. Paul B., supra, 143 Conn.App. at 710–11, 70 A.3d 1123.
By contrast to his hearsay argument at trial, in his brief to this court, the defendant argues that, in order to give context to the defendant's statement, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Badaracco
...of evidence to the contrary, that the jury followed that instruction. State v. Reynolds, supra, 152 Conn. App. 326; see also State v. Paul B., 315 Conn. 19,32, A.3d (2014) (in absence of contrary evidence, appellate courts presume jury followed limiting instruction); State v. James G., 268 ......
-
State v. Felix R., 19278.
...intended to say, but rather the effect of those remarks on the manner in which the jury decides the case. See State v. Paul B.,315 Conn. 19, 36, 105 A.3d 130 (2014)(“[t]he fairness of the trial and not the culpability of the prosecutor is the standard for analyzing the constitutional due pr......
-
Moye v. Comm'r of Corr.
...We generally do not require such a procedure in order to preserve a claim of this nature for appellate review. See State v. Paul B., 315 Conn. 19, 34 n. 5, 105 A.3d 130 (2014) (defendant not required to file motion for reconsideration to preserve claim that appellate court in its written me......
-
State v. Jones
...enough to jeopardize seriously the defendant's right to a fair trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Paul B., 315 Conn. 19, 37, 105 A.3d 130 (2014). "[W]e emphasize that counsel's failure to object at trial, while not by itself fatal to a defendant's claim, frequently will in......