State v. Paulson

Decision Date04 January 2022
Docket NumberDocket No. 46803
Citation501 P.3d 873
Parties STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Adam Bradley PAULSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant Adam Bradley Paulson. Eric D. Fredericksen argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent State of Idaho. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

STEGNER, Justice.

Adam Paulson struck and killed a pedestrian with his vehicle as the pedestrian was crossing a road late on the night of November 18, 2017. After law enforcement conducted field sobriety testing on him, Paulson was arrested for misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI) at the scene of the accident. He was later charged with vehicular manslaughter, and a jury trial was held in October and November 2018. The jury convicted Paulson of vehicular manslaughter.

Paulson appeals his vehicular manslaughter conviction, arguing that the district court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the causation element required by Idaho Code section 18-4006(3)(b). Paulson argues that the district court should have instructed the jury regarding proximate, intervening, and superseding causes because the pedestrian, who was intoxicated, crossed the road in an unlit area with no marked crosswalk. Paulson also maintains that his right to a fair trial was violated when the district court instructed the jury using Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (ICJI) 709, arguing that ICJI 709 does not set forth all the elements of Idaho Code section 18-4006(3)(b). For the reasons set forth below, Paulson's conviction of vehicular manslaughter is vacated.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At around midnight on November 18, 2017, Adam Paulson and his girlfriend were driving home from WilliB's Saloon in Boise, Idaho, after an evening out with friends. Paulson was driving his Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck northbound on Eagle Road in Eagle. As Paulson's truck approached the intersection of Eagle Road and Riverside Drive, the airbags in the vehicle suddenly deployed. Paulson told responding officers that he did not know what had caused the airbags to deploy. Paulson stopped his vehicle slightly up the road and turned his hazard lights on. Drivers passing by the intersection began to stop and gather around a woman who was lying face down in the road. The woman was later identified as 24-year-old Madeline Duskey. Shortly thereafter, paramedics arrived and began to render aid and transported her to a nearby hospital. Duskey was pronounced dead at the St. Alphonsus Emergency Department in Eagle at 12:56 a.m. on November 18, 2017. An autopsy was performed, and toxicology reports showed that Duskey had a blood alcohol content of .238 percent. The forensic pathologist characterized this level of intoxication as "acute alcohol intoxication." Duskey also had THC (marijuana) in her system.

As local law enforcement officers arrived at the scene of the collision, Paulson was identified as the driver of the vehicle which struck Duskey. Paulson told officers that he had been driving in his lane of traffic toward a green light when the airbags suddenly deployed. Paulson was distraught after realizing that he had struck a pedestrian but cooperated with law enforcement by answering questions about his whereabouts that evening. Eventually, an officer decided to conduct field sobriety tests of Paulson due to the officer's observations, including an odor of alcohol emanating from Paulson's breath, his "glassy" eyes, and his speaking with a "thick tongue."

Paulson failed three field sobriety tests, and the officer asked if Paulson would take a breathalyzer test, to which he agreed. Paulson's first attempt to give a breath sample was unsuccessful, but the second attempt showed a breath alcohol content of .197 percent. Three additional breath samples were given by Paulson, showing a breath alcohol content of .158 percent, .174 percent, and .164 percent, respectively. Based on these inconsistent readings, the officer determined that a blood draw should occur. Paulson agreed to undergo the blood draw. He was transported to the jail where a paramedic conducted the test, the results of which showed a blood alcohol content of .213 percent.

The State charged Paulson with vehicular manslaughter in violation of Idaho Code section 18-4006(3)(b).1 After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate court found probable cause to bind Paulson over to district court, and an information was filed charging Paulson with vehicular manslaughter. Paulson filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause on the causation element of Idaho Code section 18-4006(3) because the State's only witness at the preliminary hearing did not witness the collision. The district court denied this motion, and the case was set for a jury trial.

A five-day trial took place from October 29 through November 2, 2018. Paulson presented evidence that Duskey, the pedestrian, was wearing black clothing and crossing in an area that was not sufficiently lit by surrounding streetlights. Paulson also presented evidence of Duskey's intoxication. Whether Duskey crossed Eagle Road in a marked pedestrian crosswalk was disputed by the parties throughout the trial.

The jury found Paulson guilty of vehicular manslaughter. Paulson filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the vehicular manslaughter charge, arguing that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to prove that Paulson's intoxication was the cause of Duskey's death. The district court denied Paulson's motion and the case proceeded to sentencing. The district court imposed a sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, but suspended the sentence and gave Paulson credit for fourteen months of time served. The district court placed Paulson on supervised probation for fifteen years with several conditions, including requiring Paulson to wear an alcohol monitor, requiring that he attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings daily, and requiring that he pay child support and restitution to the victim's young children.2

Paulson timely appealed to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
" ‘Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.’ " State v. Draper , 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261 P.3d 853, 864 (2011) (quoting State v. Humpherys , 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000) ). This Court looks to jury instructions as a whole, rather than individually, to determine whether they adequately present the issues and state the applicable law. Id. at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 ; State v. Adamcik , 152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012). " ‘An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.’ " State v. Mann , 162 Idaho 36, 43, 394 P.3d 79, 86 (2017) (quoting State v. Zichko , 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996) ). If there is an omission of an essential element in a jury instruction this Court employs the harmless error test. State v. Hickman , 146 Idaho 178, 180, 191 P.3d 1098, 1100 (2008).

State v. Campbell , ––– Idaho ––––, ––––, 481 P.3d 118, 123 (2021).

"[T]he standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have been given is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction, and whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law." Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co. , 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 (2011) (quoting Clark v. Klein , 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002) ).

III. ANALYSIS
A. The district court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the required causal link between a defendant's unlawful conduct and the victim's death.

After both the State and Paulson rested, the district court discussed jury instructions with the parties. Paulson argued that additional instructions regarding causation should be given to the jury. Before trial, Paulson had submitted his proposed jury instructions. Paulson requested the following instruction on proximate cause:

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 PROXIMATE CAUSE BY PEDESTRIAN
Intoxication does not of itself constitute negligence, but an intoxicated person is held to the same degree of care as one not intoxicated. Therefore, i[f] you find the collision with the deceased, Madeline Duskey, was proximately caused by the fact that she suddenly stepped into the roadway and into the path of Adam Paulson's vehicle, without sufficient time for Mr. Paulson, in the exercise of due caution, to avoid hitting or colliding with Ms. Duskey then you should acquit Mr. Paulson, even though you may believe that he was to some extent under the influence of an intoxicating beverage at the time of the accident.

(Citing Washington Criminal Jury Instructions; Washington Civil Jury Instructions; State v. Thompson , No. 44542, 2018 WL944649 (Idaho Ct. App 2018), rev'd Thompson v. State , 164 Idaho 821, 436 P.3d 642 (2019) ; Idaho Code § 49-4006(3); State v. McGlochlin , 85 Idaho 459, 381 P.2d 435 (1963) ).

The district court rejected the proposed instructions, noting

the Washington state statute [cited by Paulson in his proposed instructions] is not similar to our statute. The Washington state statute [ ] expressly makes proximate cause a requirement. Our statute says significant cause. I also note that our legislature chose to use the term "significant cause" even though the concept of proximate cause in the tort law concept is something that is certainly very well established.... I think the legislature stayed out of the complexity of proximate cause analysis when it made a choice to use significant cause.

The district court declined to include an instruction regarding proximate cause. It did not instruct on any of Paulson's other requested instructions. Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction ...

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