State v. Paye, 14–0183.

Citation865 N.W.2d 1
Decision Date12 June 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–0183.,14–0183.
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Patience PAYE, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

865 N.W.2d 1

STATE of Iowa, Appellant
v.
Patience PAYE, Appellee.

No. 14–0183.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 12, 2015.


865 N.W.2d 2

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and Jeremy Westendorf and Kimberly Griffith, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Opinion

HECHT, Justice.

Twelve years ago, we concluded the front steps and common hallway of an apartment house are public places under Iowa's public intoxication statute. State v. Booth, 670 N.W.2d 209, 215–16 (Iowa 2003) ; see Iowa Code § 123.46(2) (2013) (“A person shall not be intoxicated in a public place.”). However, in Booth, we concluded “the front steps of a single-family home are clearly distinguishable from the front steps of [an] apartment house,” and left “for another day any other questions related to the character of the front steps of a single-family home.” Booth, 670 N.W.2d at 212 n. 1. Today we answer the question we left open in Booth : The front steps of a single-family home are not a public place under section 123.46(2) unless the home's residents make them public by extending a general invitation to the public at large to come upon the property. Because the State failed to prove the defendant in this case extended such an invitation to the public, we reverse her conviction and remand the case for the district court to dismiss the public intoxication charge.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On June 22, 2013, just before midnight, Waterloo police responded to a 911 call from Patience Paye. Paye reported she was the victim of domestic violence and requested police assistance. Upon arrival at the residence, Officer John Heuer proceeded inside and located the alleged aggressor, Kendrall Murray, while Officer Melissa Lippert spoke with Paye on the front stairs of the home. Paye did not exit the home until the officers arrived. She chose to step outside and speak with Officer Lippert on the front stairs because she did not want to upset her children, who were inside the house.

Murray provided Officer Heuer with his account of the evening's events. According to Murray, he and Paye began arguing over car keys. Murray had refused to let Paye leave the home with the car because she did not have a driver's license and, according to Murray, she was intoxicated. Paye became irate at Murray's refusal and punched him in the eye. Murray grabbed Paye's arm to prevent further punches or slaps and scratched Paye's arm in the process. Murray told Officer Heuer he and Paye frequently got into arguments when Paye was intoxicated and averred the evening's events were simply the latest episode.

Seeking to verify Murray's statement that Paye was intoxicated, Officer Heuer returned to the front steps and asked Paye if she had consumed any alcohol that day. Paye initially denied she had been drinking, but then admitted she had “one shot earlier in the day.” Paye agreed to provide a breath sample. The sample yielded a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of

865 N.W.2d 3

0.267. A second sample several minutes later yielded a BAC of 0.264. After additional discussion with Officer Lippert, Officer Heuer determined Paye was the aggressor in the dispute with Murray. The officers arrested Paye for public intoxication1 and transported her to the Waterloo police station.

The State charged Paye by trial information with public intoxication in violation of Iowa Code section 123.46. Paye had a previous public intoxication conviction, so the State charged a serious misdemeanor rather than a simple misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 123.46(2) (providing public intoxication is a simple misdemeanor), .91(1) (providing a second conviction is a serious misdemeanor). Paye waived her right to a jury trial.

During the ensuing bench trial, the district court received in evidence a photograph of Paye's residence. The photograph depicts the front entrance to the residence consisting of several stairs approaching a small rectangular area that can fairly be characterized as an enclosed entryway. Metal hand railings are situated on either side of the stairs, and the stairs are neither enclosed nor covered by a roof or awning. The front yard of the residence is not fenced. On the night in question, there were no signs posted indicating that access to the property was restricted, but there also was no indication Paye had extended a general invitation for access to the public.

At trial, Paye asserted the front steps of her residence were not a public place, and therefore, she could not be convicted of public intoxication. Paye distinguished between businesses and parks, where any member of the public may go at almost any time, and a private property not open to unlimited public access. She further contended the purpose of the public intoxication statute—to prevent nuisance and annoyance to the public—was not implicated, because she had not exited her house until the officers arrived and there was no indication any member of the public considered her presence or conduct outside her home to be a nuisance or annoyance.

The district court rejected Paye's assertions. It concluded Paye's porch was public because it was plainly accessible and visible to any passersby. The court further concluded Paye's porch was “public” within the meaning of chapter 123 because it was a place to which the public is permitted access. See Iowa Code § 123.3(36) (defining “public place” as “any place, building, or conveyance to which the public has or is permitted access”); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415, 185 L.Ed.2d 495, 502 (2013) (stating an implied invitation to approach a home's front entrance “is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters”). The court noted any member of the public had an implied invitation to use the front stairs to communicate with Paye. Accordingly, because it concluded Paye's front stairs were a public place, the court found Paye guilty of public intoxication. Paye appealed, and we retained the appeal.

II. Scope of Review.

The issue before us is narrow, but important: Are the front steps of a single-family residence a public place? Our answer to this question turns on the interpretation of the phrase “public place” in section 123.46(2). “Questions of statutory

865 N.W.2d 4

interpretation ... are reviewed for correction of errors at law.” State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2013) ; accord State v. Snyder, 634 N.W.2d 613, 614–15 (Iowa 2001) (applying the errors-at-law standard to the question whether a snowmobile is a motor vehicle); State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 2000) (applying the errors-at-law standard to the question whether a sword cane is a closed and fastened container). The trial court's interpretation of the law is not binding on us. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d at 325; see also State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 2011).

III. Analysis.

Paye asserts the front stairs of her residence were not a public place because she had not extended a general invitation to the public and could impede any person's access to them. The State contends any modicum of public access, even if partially circumscribed, suffices to make a place public under all circumstances for purposes of section 123.46(2). We agree with Paye.

We begin our analysis with the language of chapter 123. “In interpreting statutes, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.” Snyder, 634 N.W.2d at 615. Section 123.46(2) plainly prohibits intoxication “in a public place.” Iowa Code § 123.46(2). The Code defines “public place” as “any place ... to which the public has or is permitted access.” Id. § 123.3(36).2

The legislature enacted chapter 123 “for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the state.” Id. § 123.1. The legislature has further declared that the provisions of chapter 123 “shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of that purpose.” Id. With specific regard to public intoxication, we have said

“statutes proscribing public intoxication serve two general purposes. First, they are designed to prevent nuisance and annoyance to members of the general public. Second, they also serve as a protection against offenders who endanger the well-being of themselves or others.”

Booth, 670 N.W.2d at 213 (quoting State v. Runner, 172 W.Va. 720, 310 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1983) ).3

865 N.W.2d 5

We now turn to our caselaw. In Booth, we focused on the dual purposes of public intoxication statutes and determined the front stairs and common hallway of an apartment house are a public place under section 123.46(2). Id. at 215–16. We noted neighbors in an apartment house are “entitled to be free from nuisance and annoyance and to be protected from the actions of a fellow tenant.” Id. at 214. We concluded “the statutory requirement of public access does not require all members of the...

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