State v. Payne
| Decision Date | 02 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 573,Docket No. 38918 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TROY DWAYNE PAYNE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Troy Dwayne Payne appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Payne asserts that the court erred by preventing him from presenting his defense.
On April 6, 2009, without any prior notice, Payne went to the home of a law enforcement officer and handed the officer a small container filled with methamphetamine. According to Payne's subsequent trial testimony, the officer agreed to allow him to turn in the methamphetamine "without any repercussions" and "with no strings attached." However, the officer testified that he told Payne only that the officer would not pursue charges if Payne entered drug rehabilitation treatment and provided information to the police, presumably regarding the source of the drugs. Payne refused to cooperate with the police, however, and was eventuallycharged with possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), for possessing the methamphetamine that he gave to the officer.
Shortly after the jury was empaneled, the State notified the court that it anticipated that Payne would testify regarding his motive for possessing methamphetamine, and the State orally moved to preclude such testimony on grounds of irrelevance. Defense counsel confirmed that Payne planned to present a defense that he did not intend to possess the methamphetamine. Defense counsel said that Payne would testify about his motive and intent in order to demonstrate that he possessed the methamphetamine for the sole purpose of delivering it to the police. The district court repeatedly declined to rule on the State's motion regarding the admissibility of such testimony, preferring to wait until Payne testified. Payne ultimately was allowed to testify that an acquaintance tossed the container into his car, and that in an effort to "do the right thing" he took it to the police as soon as he realized that it contained drugs. The jury returned a guilty verdict and Payne appeals, contending that the district court erroneously prevented him from presenting a defense that he lacked the requisite intent for the offense.
Payne asserts that the district court erred by denying him the opportunity to give testimony regarding his intent, thereby preventing him from presenting his defense to the charge. We conclude that Payne has not shown error in this regard because the court did not preclude him from testifying about his motive or intent. During the initial hearing on the State's motion to exclude testimony about Payne's intent or motive, the court informed the parties:
The following morning, before the parties made opening statements, the State renewed its motion. The defense represented that Payne would testify that another individual had given him the methamphetamine "without his consent," that Payne took it immediately to the officer when he realized what it was, and that Payne "did not intend to possess" it, but merely "intended to do what citizens are supposed to do with contraband, which is to get it to law enforcement as soon as possible so it can be properly destroyed." The court again declined to rule on the State's motion, and stated, The State renewed the motion a third time after resting its case. Without citing any authority, defense counsel argued that a person is entitled to possess illegal substances if they do so in an effort to aid law enforcement. However, the court rejected such a defense, stating, "if that is your defense, you're going to have to convince a higher court than this one that it's a proper defense." In response to the State's request for clarification on the court's ruling as to whether Payne could testify about his motive or intent, the court stated,
Defense counsel appeared to believe that the State's motion had been granted. During the State's cross-examination of Payne, the prosecutor asked whether Payne's "intention was to possess the black container." Defense counsel objected, stating, The district court overruled the objection, but did not correct defense counsel's perception that the motion had been granted.
On appeal, Payne asserts that the district court erroneously rejected his testimony about his motive and thereby prevented him from presenting a defense "that he did not possess the requisite intent and that he was acting in a noncriminal way to turn in the methamphetamine to police." We disagree. The trial transcript shows that the district court never definitively ruledthat Payne's testimony about his intent or motive would be excluded. Even if the district court's statements that it was "inclined" to agree with the State could be deemed an implicit ruling that motive and intent were irrelevant, and thus inadmissible, Payne has not shown reversible error because motive is not typically relevant to a charge of possession of a controlled substance and because Payne ultimately was allowed to testify to his motive and intent.
Payne asserts that "intent" is relevant to a charge of possession in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1) because Idaho Code § 18-114 states, "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." Accordingly, Payne asserts, he should have been allowed to present "specific testimony about his intentions." In making this argument, Payne conflates motive, specific intent, and general intent. Motive is that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act, and is generally not considered an essential element of any crime, unless made so by statute. State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 53, 454 P.2d 945, 950 (1969). Motive is distinguishable from intent, which can refer either to general or specific intent. See id. "A general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a specific intent requirement refers to that state of mind which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof." State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 767-68, 554 P.2d 944, 945-46 (1976) (internal citation omitted). "In other words, specific intent requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of that act with the intent to cause the proscribed result." State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 691, 201 P.3d 657, 664 (Ct. App. 2008). See also State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 377, 64 P.3d 296, 303 (2002) (). The crime of possession is a general intent crime. State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993); State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 355, 145 P.3d 917, 920 (Ct. App. 2006). As such, the only mens rea requirement is that the person know that he or she is in possession of the substance.1 Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183. The intent required by Section 18-114 is "not the intent to commit a crime, but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure to perform the required act." Fox, 124 Idaho at 926,866 P.2d at 183; State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 78, 310 P.2d 1082, 1083 (1957); State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 738, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (1939). Therefore, in a possession case, Section 18-114 does not make relevant any mental state other than the defendant's knowledge that he or she possesses the substance, and a person's motives or intentions about what he or she will do with a controlled substance are typically not relevant.
We acknowledge that several other jurisdictions have recognized an affirmative defense of "innocent possession" or ...
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