State v. Payne, (SC 16554)
Decision Date | 11 June 2002 |
Docket Number | (SC 16554) |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LEOTIS PAYNE |
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js. Conrad Ost Seifert, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Michael A. Pepper, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The sole issue in this appeal is whether, in the exercise of our supervisory authority over the administration of justice, the defendant should be afforded a new trial because of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments of his trial. The defendant, Leotis Payne, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c,1 robbery in the first degree in violation General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2),2 robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-135 (a) (1),3 larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (3),4 carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-355 and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-217 (a).6State v. Payne, 63 Conn. App. 583, 777 A.2d 731 (2001). The defendant claims that during the trial the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct including: (1) stating that the defendant likely was involved in another crime after the one for which he was being tried; (2) appealing to and inflaming the jury's emotions; (3) vouching for the credibility of a prosecution witness and his own credibility as a prosecutor; and (4) stating that the defendant had a strong motive to lie to the jury because he was going to receive a substantial sentence if convicted in this case. The state counters that reversal would be inappropriate in this case because prejudice to the defendant was nonexistent or minimal, retrial would have practical problems and cause emotional trauma to victims, and there were other adequate sanctions available. We agree with the defendant and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court contains the following facts. "On October 24, 1994, Jose Marrero, his future wife, Amy Cobain, Devon McFarlane and the victim, Louis Hood (victim's group), were on Frank Street in New Haven. Marrero, Hood and Cobain entered a store for the purpose of getting change for Marrero's $100 bill. At the same time, the defendant, Eaker McClendon and Alexander Lacks (defendant's group) were outside the store, talking with Steven Thomas. The defendant's group also entered the store when Marrero attempted to change his $100 bill.
The defendant was convicted after a jury trial and subsequently appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly: (1) failed to dismiss a juror who appeared to have slept during the trial; (2) refused to grant a new trial because of allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor; (3) gave the jury instructions relative to the defendant's consciousness of guilt; and (4) instructed the jury that reasonable doubt is not doubt suggested by the "`ingenuity of counsel.'" Id., 585. After the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court; id.; we granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "In the exercise of our supervisory authority over the administration of justice, should the defendant be afforded a new trial due to pervasive prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument?" State v. Payne, 257 Conn. 904, 777 A.2d 195 (2001). We conclude that he should.
Although prosecutorial misconduct is often examined under the rubric of a defendant's due process protections, as in our recent decision in State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226 (2002), our review in the present case is limited to whether reversal is required under our supervisory authority. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 234 Conn. 324, 346-47, 662 A.2d 1199 (1995). (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pouncey, 241 Conn. 802, 813, 699 A.2d 901 (1997).
State v. Pouncey, supra, 241 Conn. 811-12. In Pouncey, we previously have recognized that reversal is appropriate when there has been a pattern of misconduct across trials, not just within an individual trial. Id., 815-16 ( ).
Accordingly, we exercise our supervisory authority in this context to redress repeated and deliberate misconduct by a prosecutor seeking to increase the likelihood of conviction even though that conduct does not necessarily require reversal as a due process violation. In accordance with the cases cited previously, we pay particular attention to the fact that the prosecutor knew or should have known that the conduct was improper and was part of a pattern of similar misconduct in other cases. We exercise our supervisory authority in order to protect the rights of defendants and to maintain standards among prosecutors throughout the judicial system rather than to redress the unfairness of a particular trial. We do so in order "to send a strong message that such conduct will not be tolerated." Id., 812.
The standards by which we evaluate claims of prosecutorial misconduct are shaped by the unique role prosecutors have in our judicial system. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Copas, 252 Conn. 318, 336, 746 A.2d 761 (2000).
Despite this special role, not all improper statements by a prosecutor amount to prosecutorial misconduct. "[I]n addressing the jury, [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andrews, 248 Conn. 1, 19, 726 A.2d 104 (1999). If a prosecutor does exceed these limits, we generally balance the seriousness of the infraction against the difficulties that might arise in a new trial, including ...
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