State v. Pearson
| Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
| Citation | 250 Or. 54,440 P.2d 229 |
| Parties | The STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Leon Clarence PEARSON, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 01 May 1968 |
Page 229
v.
Leon Clarence PEARSON, Respondent.
Decided May 1, 1968.
[250 Or. 55]
Page 230
Jacob B. Tanzer, Asst. Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was George Van Hoomissen, Dist. Atty.Lester L. Rawls, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Pullen & Rawls, Portland.
Before PERRY, C.J., and SLOAN, GOODWIN, DENECKE and LUSK, JJ.
LUSK, Justice.
The state has appealed from a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer to the indictment.
The charging part of the indictment reads:
'The said LEON CLARENCE PEARSON on or about the 5th day of June, A.D. 1967, in the County of Multnomah and State of Oregon, did unlawfully and feloniously receive and conceal certain stolen property, to-wit, a Seattle First National Bank credit card, the personal property of Walter J. Koehler, the said LEON CLARENCE PEARSON having good reason to believe that the said personal property had theretofore been stolen, contrary to the Statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon.'
The indictment charges violation of ORS 165.045, which denounces the crime of receiving or concealing stolen property. Defendant asserts that to prosecute him for violation of this statute--punishable either as [250 Or. 56] a felony or a misdemeanor 1--would deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, because he could be prosecuted for the same act under another statute which makes possession of stolen credit card, under certain circumstances, a misdemeanor. That statute is ORS 165.295(2) and reads in part:
'Any person who:
* * *
* * *
'(2) Has in his possession or under his control or who receives from another person any * * * stolen credit card with the intent to use, deliver, circulate or sell the same, or to permit or cause or procure the same to be used, delivered, circulated or sold, knowing the same to be * * * stolen, * * * shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.'
Alternatively, defendant contends that, as stated in the brief, 'ORS 165.295(2) in a sense preempts the field, 'that is, the legislature has taken stolen credit cards out of the receiving stolen property statute and made an offense involving stolen credit cards punishable only under the section just referred to.
In State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 281 P.2d 698, relied on by the defendant, we held unconstitutional a...
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State v. Ramoz, CC 15CR47950 (SC S067290)
...Thus, that rule of construction only applies when there is a conflict or inconsistency in statutory provisions. See State v. Pearson , 250 Or. 54, 58, 440 P.2d 229 (1968) (declining to apply rule that specific statute controls over general because "[t]he two statutes [could] be harmonized")......
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State v. Guzek, CR-0373-TM
...way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, while giving effect to a consistent legislative policy. State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 58, 440 P.2d 229 (1968). However, if the two statutes cannot be harmonized, "the specific statute is considered an exception to the general......
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State v. Gledhill
...178 Colo. 401, 497 P.2d 1256 (Sup.Ct.1972); People [342 A.2d 167] v. Couch, 179 Colo. 324, 500 P.2d 967 (Sup.Ct.1972); State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 440 P.2d 229 (Sup.Ct.1968); State v. Dumont, 3 Or.App. 189, 471 P.2d 847 (Ct.App.1970); McDuffy v. State, 6 Md.App. 537, 252 A.2d 270 (Ct.Spec......
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State v. Boyenger, No. 11021
...252 A.2d 270 (1969); McCrory v. Mississippi, 210 So.2d 877 (Miss.1968); Shriver v. Graham, Okl.Cr., 366 P.2d 774 (1961); State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 440 P.2d 229 (1968); State v. Dumont, 3 Or.App. 189, 471 P.2d 847 (1970); Vannerson v. State, 403 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1960); Hutchins v. ......
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State v. Guzek, CR-0373-TM
...way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, while giving effect to a consistent legislative policy. State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 58, 440 P.2d 229 (1968). However, if the two statutes cannot be harmonized, "the specific statute is considered an exception to the general......
-
State v. Gledhill
...178 Colo. 401, 497 P.2d 1256 (Sup.Ct.1972); People [342 A.2d 167] v. Couch, 179 Colo. 324, 500 P.2d 967 (Sup.Ct.1972); State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 440 P.2d 229 (Sup.Ct.1968); State v. Dumont, 3 Or.App. 189, 471 P.2d 847 (Ct.App.1970); McDuffy v. State, 6 Md.App. 537, 252 A.2d 270 (Ct.Spec......
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State v. Ramoz, CC 15CR47950 (SC S067290)
...Thus, that rule of construction only applies when there is a conflict or inconsistency in statutory provisions. See State v. Pearson , 250 Or. 54, 58, 440 P.2d 229 (1968) (declining to apply rule that specific statute controls over general because "[t]he two statutes [could] be harmonized")......
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State v. Boyenger, 11021
...252 A.2d 270 (1969); McCrory v. Mississippi, 210 So.2d 877 (Miss.1968); Shriver v. Graham, Okl.Cr., 366 P.2d 774 (1961); State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 440 P.2d 229 (1968); State v. Dumont, 3 Or.App. 189, 471 P.2d 847 (1970); Vannerson v. State, 403 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1960); Hutchins v. ......