State v. Pearson
| Decision Date | 23 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 10–0148.,DA 10–0148. |
| Citation | 2011 MT 55,251 P.3d 152,359 Mont. 427 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.Thomas Gail PEARSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
For Appellant: Robin A. Meguire, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana.For Appellee: Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Ingrid A. Rosenquist, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana.Justice BRIAN MORRIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
[359 Mont. 428] ¶ 1 Appellant Thomas Gail Pearson (Pearson) appeals from an order of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denying his motion to suppress and dismiss evidence. We affirm.
¶ 2 We review the following issues on appeal:
¶ 3 Whether the officers' conduct exceeded the scope of Pearson's traffic stop.
¶ 4 Whether the officers inevitably would have discovered the evidence obtained in the officers' unwarranted second search of Pearson's fanny pack.
¶ 5 The State of Montana (State) charged Pearson with criminal possession of dangerous drugs, criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a motor vehicle without proof of insurance. The charges stem from a routine traffic stop that led to a search of Pearson's fanny pack and car. Officer LaMantia (LaMantia) and his field training officer, Officer Kristjanson (Kristjanson), stopped Pearson after they had observed Pearson driving with a broken tail light.
¶ 6 Pearson pulled into a parking lot and parked his car instead of pulling to the side of the road. The officers watched Pearson make furtive movements in the car as LaMantia approached. The officers testified that Pearson had appeared to stretch across the passenger seat. Kristjanson feared that Pearson may have been reaching for a weapon. Kristjanson also saw a “meth watch” sticker in the car window. Kristjanson testified that he knew that users of methamphetamine often put “meth watch” stickers on their cars.
¶ 7 When LaMantia approached the car he saw Pearson clutching a large wad of cash in his hands. LaMantia also discovered that Pearson did not have any insurance for the car and that his registration had expired. LaMantia returned to his patrol car and explained Pearson's odd behavior to Kristjanson. Officer Kristjanson ran a search on Pearson's license that revealed that Pearson was on probation and had a drug history.
¶ 8 Kristjanson approached the car and asked Pearson to put down the wad of money and step out of the car. Pearson stepped out of the car and the officers removed his fanny pack. Kristjanson patted down Pearson and searched his fanny pack for weapons. Kristjanson did not find any weapons or contraband. Shortly after searching the fanny pack Kristjanson looked into Pearson's car and saw a can of pepper spray in plain view near the driver's seat by the center console. Kristjanson knew that probationers lawfully cannot possess a weapon, including pepper spray. Kristjanson handcuffed and detained Pearson for the probation violation and placed him in the patrol car. Kristjanson attempted to contact Pearson's probation officer, Officer Pinnick (Pinnick).
¶ 9 Pearson gave the officers written consent to search his car. Officer Vickery (Vickery) assisted Kristjanson and LaMantia with the search. The officers found drug paraphernalia in Pearson's car. Vickery also found a bindle of methamphetamine during a second search of Pearson's fanny pack. Kristjanson reached Pinnick by telephone while still at the scene, but after the officers already had searched Pearson's car and fanny pack. Pinnick authorized a probation violation hold on Pearson. The officers transported Pearson to the Yellowstone County Detention Facility.
¶ 10 Pearson moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the searches. The District Court denied Pearson's motion to suppress. The court concluded that officer safety concerns justified the first search of Pearson's fanny pack. The court similarly determined that Pearson's written consent justified the officers' search of his car. The court also held that the officers' second search of the fanny pack constituted an unlawful search. The court declined, however, to suppress the methamphetamine found during the second search of Pearson's fanny pack. The court determined that either a subsequent probation search authorized by Pinnick or a routine inventory search at the detention center would have led officers to discover the methamphetamine. Pearson appeals.
¶ 11 We review a district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness to determine whether the district court correctly ruled on a motion to suppress evidence. State v. Hurlbert, 2009 MT 221, ¶ 16, 351 Mont. 316, 211 P.3d 869. This Court conducts plenary review of the district court's application of the law. Id.
¶ 12 Whether the officers' conduct exceeded the scope of Pearson's traffic stop.
¶ 13 Pearson does not challenge the lawfulness of the officers' initial investigatory stop of his car for the broken tail light. Pearson argues instead that the officers exceeded the scope of an otherwise lawful investigatory stop. An investigative traffic stop may not last longer than necessary for the officer to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Section 46–5–403, MCA; Hurlbert, ¶ 21. Additional objective data of wrongdoing that gives rise to further suspicions may enlarge the scope of a routine traffic stop. Hurlbert, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Case, 2007 MT 161, ¶ 34, 338 Mont. 87, 162 P.3d 849).
¶ 14 An officer stopped the defendant in Hurlbert for speeding. The officer observed that Hurlbert appeared uneasy and exhibited nervous behavior such as shaking, sweating, rapidly smoking a cigarette, and constantly moving. Hurlbert told the officer that he had been visiting his parents, but could not remember their address. The officer asked Hurlbert whether he had any illegal drugs in the car. The officer eventually obtained consent to search the car. Hurlbert argued that the officer's questioning after the stop unlawfully had expanded the scope of the traffic stop to the point that any evidence obtained thereafter should have been suppressed. We concluded that the officer had observed sufficient additional evidence that served to enlarge the scope of the investigation and that the officer properly had questioned Hurlbert about the contents of the car. Hurlbert, ¶¶ 22–23.
¶ 15 Kristjanson and LaMantia testified that they had observed unusual behavior after they had stopped Pearson for a broken tail light. This unusual behavior had raised the officers' suspicions. Pearson pulled off the road and into a parking spot instead of pulling over on the side of the road. Pearson jerked about nervously in the car and appeared to reach to the passenger seat for what Kristjanson feared might have been a weapon. Both officers saw Pearson tightly gripping a wad of cash in his hand. Kristjanson saw a “meth watch” sticker in the rear window of the car, and suspected illegal drug use. A check on Pearson's driver license revealed that he was on probation and had a drug history.
¶ 16 These articulable facts obtained after the initial stop for a broken tail light supported the officers' suspicion that Pearson might have weapons or contraband in his car. Id. at ¶ 21. This suspicion properly served to enlarge the scope of Pearson's traffic stop and justified the officers' additional questioning. Id. at ¶ 23.
¶ 17 Whether the officers inevitably would have discovered the evidence obtained in the officers' unwarranted second search of Pearson's fanny pack.
[359 Mont. 431] ¶ 18 The Montana and U.S. Constitutions deem warrantless searches per se unreasonable unless a warrant exception applies. Hurlbert, ¶ 19. Officers do not need a warrant for an investigative stop and frisk, for an administrative post-arrest inventory search, or for a search authorized by consent. Section 46–5–401, MCA; State v. Hilgendorf, 2009 MT 158, ¶ 26, 350 Mont. 412, 208 P.3d 401; State v. Snell, 2004 MT 269, ¶ 9, 323 Mont. 157, 99 P.3d 191.
¶ 19 An officer may frisk a person whose car lawfully has been stopped and may take other reasonably necessary steps for protection if the officer reasonably believes that the person is armed and dangerous. Section 46–5–401(2)(b), MCA; State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 194, 631 P.2d 293, 296 (1981). Kristjanson testified that he saw Pearson reach across the passenger seat after he had stopped Pearson's car. Kristjanson also testified that he thought that Pearson might have been reaching for a weapon. Kristjanson frisked Pearson and searched his fanny pack for weapons for officer safety reasons. Kristjanson's initial search of Pearson's fanny pack constituted a lawful investigative stop and frisk. Section 46–5–401, MCA.
¶ 20 Kristjanson saw Pearson's pepper spray in the front seat of his car in plain view shortly after he had conducted the investigative stop and frisk. Kristjanson knew from his check of Pearson's license that Pearson was on probation. Kristjanson placed Pearson in handcuffs and escorted him to the patrol car. Kristjanson informed Pearson that he needed to contact Pearson's probation officer and asked the operator for Pinnick's phone number. Pearson then gave the officers written consent to search his car.
¶ 21 Pearson does not challenge whether he voluntarily consented to the search. Pearson also does not argue that the officers' failure to Mirandize him violated his rights. Pearson argues instead that he consented only to a search of his car, and, therefore, the second search of his fanny pack constituted an unlawful search. He argues that the Court should suppress any evidence obtained from the unlawful second search.
¶ 22 Pearson's written consent gave the officers permission to search only his car. Vickery...
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