State v. Pearson
| Decision Date | 08 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 15461,15461 |
| Citation | 108 Idaho 889,702 P.2d 927 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lewis M. PEARSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Keith A. Zollinger, R. Ted Israel, and Douglas Balfour, argued, Office of the Public Defender, Pocatello, on brief for defendant-appellant.
Honorable Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and A. Rene Fitzpatrick, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of Idaho, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
Before DONALDSON, Acting C.J., and McFADDEN and TOWLES, Acting JJ.
McFADDEN, Acting Judge, Retired.
The criminal defendant Lewis M. Pearson was initially charged with robbery, a felony which carries a potential sentence of five years to life. I.C. §§ 18-6501, -6503. Following amendment of the charge to one of aggravated battery, Pearson waived a preliminary hearing. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Pearson pleaded guilty to aggravated battery. Punishments under the applicable statutes for that crime include a maximum fine of $500 and/or imprisonment of up to fifteen years. See I.C. §§ 18-907 and -908 (1979).
The criminal information charging aggravated battery originally alleged that Pearson "struck ... Devere Archibald about the head and body with a crowbar, resulting in injuries to the said Devere Archibald." At the arraignment, the trial judge at first refused to accept Pearson's plea of guilty, because Pearson denied that he had struck the victim with a crowbar and asserted instead that he had merely used his hands to defend himself from an attack by the victim. The prosecutor amended the information to allege Pearson's use of hands, rather than a crowbar, in committing the battery. The trial court questioned Pearson at length as to the occurrences leading to Pearson's arrest and as to whether the plea was validly and voluntarily given. The court then accepted the guilty plea.
Defense counsel moved, pursuant to I.C.R. 32(d), that the court order a psychological evaluation of Pearson, stating that Pearson had advised that he had spent time in five mental institutions. The court granted this motion and requested that such evaluation be made a part of the presentence investigation report.
After the presentence investigator's submission of the presentence investigation report and psychological evaluation, Pearson appeared before the court for sentencing. At this hearing, defendant Pearson requested to withdraw his guilty plea. The prosecutor objected to such withdrawal, contending that the plea had been knowingly and freely given and that Pearson should not now be allowed to take advantage of the fortuitous circumstances that the victim had become extremely ill and was therefore unable to testify. Pearson's position, on the other hand, was that he believed he had been acting in self-defense at the time the battery occurred and that therefore he was not guilty of any crime. The trial judge took testimony from Pearson and questioned him extensively. The judge then refused to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea. The court sentenced Pearson to an indeterminate term of 15 years, recommending that such sentence include a psychological evaluation and treatment in the prison medical facility. Pearson appeals.
Defendant Pearson raises the following alleged errors of the trial court for our consideration: 1) abuse of discretion in refusing to allow Pearson to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing; 2) abuse of discretion in sentencing Pearson without a full and complete psychological evaluation; and 3) abuse of discretion in sentencing Pearson to an indeterminate term not to exceed 15 years.
As to the first assignment of error relating to the trial judge's refusal to allow Pearson to withdraw his guilty plea, we do not find an abuse of discretion. The colloquy between the court and defendant, at the time the plea was taken, demonstrates that the defendant understood the charge against him, was aware of the potential sanction which it carried, and had not been promised leniency in return for the plea. We decline to overturn the court's ruling in this regard. See, as to trial court's discretion in allowing withdrawal of plea, State v. Howerton, 105 Idaho 1, 665 P.2d 700 (1983); State v. Howell, 104 Idaho 393, 659 P.2d 147 (Ct.App.1983).
The more crucial issue before the court, in our view, relates to the inadequacy of the psychological evaluation. We agree with defendant Pearson's assertion that the evaluation, as submitted in this case, failed to fulfill the intent and spirit of the statute authorizing such evaluations. We find that the evaluation, which is part of the exhibits herein, gives merely conclusory statements to the effect that defendant is an alcoholic with an anti-social personality and violent tendencies. The evaluation does not explain upon what tests or procedures these conclusions are based. It tends to reflect only a social interview with claimant, rather than a full-scale psychological evaluation.
Pearson contends that the psychological evaluation conducted and submitted pursuant to the court's order below failed to comply with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). That statute states, in pertinent part:
"19-2522. Examination of defendant for evidence of mental condition--Appointment of psychiatrists or licensed psychologists--Hospitalization--Reports.-- (1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant ...
* * *
* * *
(3) The report of the examination shall include the following:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of the defendant;
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the defendant's mental condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public if at large.
* * * "
In addition to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rinke v. State
...completed when defendant was suicidal did not supply in-depth analysis required by I.C. § 19-2522(3)); State v. Pearson, 108 Idaho 889, 891-92, 702 P.2d 927, 929-30 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding psychological report prepared pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522(3) was insufficient because it did not provi......
-
State v. Hanson
...730 (Ct.App.2008) ; Banbury, 145 Idaho at 270, 178 P.3d at 635; McFarland, 125 Idaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163; State v. Pearson, 108 Idaho 889, 891, 702 P.2d 927, 929 (Ct.App.1985). Additionally, the examination and report must be done by a "psychiatrist or licensed psychologist." I.C. § 19–......
-
State v. Rogers
...the sentencing judge. I.C.R. 32(d); State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189, 45 P.3d 844, 845 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Pearson, 108 Idaho 889, 892, 702 P.2d 927, 930 (Ct. App. 1985). When, as here, there has been no request for a psychological evaluation and no objection to the presentence inv......
-
State v. Hernandez
...Whether to order a psychological evaluation and its sufficiency is a matter left to the court's discretion. State v. Pearson, 108 Idaho 889, 891, 702 P.2d 927, 929 (Ct.App.1985). Hernandez does not challenge the sufficiency of the first evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 beyond characterizing ......