State v. Pearson, 94-1891

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Citation: 547 N.W.2d 236
• Docket Number: No. 94-1891,94-1891
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Rebecca Lynn PEARSON, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 28 February 1996

Page 236

547 N.W.2d 236

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Rebecca Lynn PEARSON, Appellant.

No. 94-1891.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Feb. 28, 1996.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Sarah E. Hennesy, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Julie Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Heard by SACKETT, P.J., and CADY and HUITINK, JJ.

HUITINK, Judge.

Rebecca Lynn Pearson appeals the judgment and sentences, following jury trial, entered upon her convictions of two counts of assault resulting in bodily injury and one court of going armed with intent. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Rebecca Pearson was drinking at Zeke's Birdland tavern in Davenport, Iowa, on April 28, 1994. When she first arrived, she was accompanied by Vincent Harland. Harland ordered a pizza for Pearson and then left. Sometime after Harland left, Earl "Zeke" Cunningham, the owner of the tavern, asked to see Pearson's identification, before allowing her to order another drink. Pearson refused to show her identification and the two argued for several minutes, exchanging obscenities. Pearson then left the bar but told Zeke she would be back.

About ten minutes later, Harland returned to the bar, followed by Pearson. He approached Zeke and asked, "You Zeke?" Zeke responded affirmatively, and Harland proceeded to hit Zeke in the face with a wooden stick, causing severe injuries. Matt Baughman was sitting at the bar at the time of the assault and attempted to intervene. When Baughman told Harland to stop hitting Zeke, Harland struck Baughman in the face with the same stick, inflicting severe injuries. Pearson and Harland then left the bar together.

Pearson was charged with willful injury of Baughman (Count I), assault resulting in bodily injury of Zeke (Count II), and going armed with intent (Count III). The State prosecuted Pearson based on a theory that she aided and abetted Harland in the commission of these offenses. The State did not claim Pearson was vicariously responsible for Harland's actions based on a joint criminal conduct theory. The jury was instructed as follows:

INSTRUCTION NO. 16

Under Count I, the State must prove all of the following elements of Willful Injury:

1. On or about the 28th day of April, 1994, the defendant by aiding and abetting, assaulted Matt Baughman.

2. The defendant by aiding and abetting specifically intended to cause a serious injury to Matt Baughman.

3. Matt Baughman sustained a serious injury as defined in Instruction 18.

INSTRUCTION NO. 20

Under Count I, the State must prove all of the following elements of Assault Without Intent Resulting in Bodily Injury:

1. On or about the 28th day of April, 1994, the defendant by aiding and abetting did an act which was meant to cause pain or injury to Matt Baughman.

2. The defendant had the apparent ability to do the act.

3. That defendant's act was committed without the intent to inflict a serious injury.

4. The defendant's act caused a bodily injury as defined in Instruction No. 21.

INSTRUCTION NO. 24

Under Count II, the State must prove all of the following elements of Assault Resulting in Bodily Injury:

1. On or about the 28th day of April, 1994, the defendant by aiding and abetting did an act which was meant to cause pain or injury to Zeke Cunningham.

2. The defendant had the apparent ability to do the act.

3. That defendant's act was committed without the intent to inflict a serious injury.

4. The defendant's act caused a bodily injury to Zeke Cunningham as defined in Instruction No. 21.

INSTRUCTION NO. 26

Under Count III, the State must prove all of the following elements of Going Armed With Intent:

1. On or about the 28th day of April, 1994, the defendant did aid and abet another who was armed with an object.

2. The object was a dangerous weapon as defined in Instruction No. 28.

3. The defendant was armed with the specific intent to use the object against another person.

INSTRUCTION NO. 28

A "dangerous weapon" is any device or instrument designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury, and when used in its designed manner is capable of inflicting death. It is also any sort of instrument or device which is actually used in such a way as to indicate the user intended to inflict death or serious injury, and when so used is capable of inflicting death.

The jury found Pearson guilty of assault causing bodily injury to Baughman, a lesser-included offense of willful injury under Count I. The jury also found Pearson guilty of assault causing Zeke's bodily injury under Count II and going armed with intent under Count III.

On appeal Pearson contends the jury's guilty verdict as to Count III, going armed with intent, is reversibly inconsistent with its guilty verdicts as to Counts I and II, assault resulting in bodily injury. She claims her trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the verdicts in district court. She also argues her conviction of assault causing bodily injury to Baughman lacks sufficient evidentiary support.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

When an appellant asserts a violation of constitutional safeguards--such as ineffective assistance of counsel--we make our own evaluation based on the totality of the circumstances. Hinkle v. State, 290 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1980). This is the equivalent of de novo review. Id.

To prevail on her ineffective assistance of counsel claim Pearson must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987); Edman v. State, 444 N.W.2d 99, 101 (Iowa App.1989). In evaluating counsel's performance, we presume counsel acted competently. See Risdal, 404 N.W.2d at 131. Prejudice requires proof that but for counsel's unprofessional errors there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

As stated earlier, Pearson was charged with aiding and abetting Harland in these offenses. An aider and abettor is charged, tried, and punished as a principal. See Iowa Code § 703.1.

Under this theory the State was required to prove Pearson assented to or lent countenance and approval to Harland's criminal acts either by active participation in them or by some manner encouraging them prior to or at the time of their commission. State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa 1977). Proof of aiding and abetting may be either direct or circumstantial. State v. Buttolph, 204 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Iowa 1972).

Although Pearson's knowledge of these offenses prior to or at the time of their commission is essential, neither knowledge nor proximity to the scene is standing alone enough to prove aiding and abetting. State v. Vesey, 241 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1976). Proof of these facts, however, in addition to circumstantial evidence such as presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed, may be sufficient to support an inference Pearson participated in these offenses. Id. The "[g]uilt or innocence of a person charged with aiding and abetting must be determined upon facts which show [the person's] part in the crime and does not depend upon another's degree of guilt." State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Iowa 1972). If specific intent is an element of the crime charged, "a person may be convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting if the person participates either with the requisite intent ... or with the knowledge that the principal possess the required intent." Lott, 255 N.W.2d at 109. With these principals in mind we turn to the record to evaluate the merits of Pearson's claims.

We first consider Pearson's claim that the jury's multiple guilty verdicts are rationally inconsistent. If her convictions of going armed with intent and assault causing bodily injury are not inconsistent, her ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See State v. Spurgeon, 533 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 1995).

Multiple offenses which arise out of the same transaction and occurrence may be charged and prosecuted as separate counts of the same trial information. Iowa R.Crim.P. 6(1). Multiple verdicts as to separate counts are inconsistent if the factual and legal conclusions implicit in one verdict are rationally incompatible with those implicit in the jury's findings as to the other counts. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different Counts of Indictment or Information, 18 A.L.R.3d 259 (1968); see also State v. Spurgeon, 533 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 1995); State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1992); Cf. State v. Delap, 466 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Iowa 1990) (defendant could be found guilty of assault with intent to inflict serious injury and assault without intent to inflict serious injury where convictions arose from a series of assaults rather than a single incident).

Pearson argues that the jury, by finding the wooden stick was a dangerous weapon under Count III, implicitly determined Harland, the principal, actually used it in such a way as to indicate Harland intended to inflict serious injury. This implicit finding, she argues, is rationally incompatible with the jury's implicit findings that the assaults charged in Counts I and II were committed without the intent to commit serious injury. The State argues that Harland's actual use of the wooden stick is relevant only to the dangerous weapon element of going armed with intent. According to the State, we need only consider whether there is substantial evidence indicating Pearson shared Harland's specific intent to use the object against another person or that she knew of his intent to do so (element No. 3 of...