State v. Pease, 2-69

Decision Date09 December 1970
Docket NumberNo. 2-69,2-69
Citation271 A.2d 835,129 Vt. 70
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Vermont v. Leonard L. PEASE.

James M. Jeffords, Atty. Gen., H. Russell Morss, Jr., and Martin K. Miller, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

Peter P. Plante, White River Junction, for defendant.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.

BARNEY, Justice.

According to the evidence, shortly after shooting his wife, the respondent made an attempt to inform the authorities of his act. Mrs. Rydjeski, wife of a state police officer, was the startled recipient of telephoned word from the respondent of what he had done. This news she relayed to her husband and headquarters. The call came to her about 11:10 P.M. Her husband arrived at the scene of the homicide between 11:30 and 11:45 P.M. The respondent himself fixed the time of the crime at 10:45 P.M.

After investigation a presentment was made to the grand jury and an indictment for first degree murder returned. The respondent pleaded not guilty. During the course of preparation the respondent, on several occasions, through his counsel, availed himself of his right to depose witnesses for the state under 13 V.S.A. § 6721. There is some controversy about whether or not this right was at all restricted in its exercise by the court. The transcript of the hearing on the motion to take depositions clearly left it to the respondent to make further application if depositions of witnesses other than those listed in the order made at that hearing were needed. This was acceptable to respondent's counsel. It was acknowledged on oral argument that the exception argued presupposed a denial, and if the transcript later supplied showed otherwise, the respondent had no basis for complaint. As indicated, the transcript clearly shows the court was prepared to enlarge the order if, on further investigation counsel for the respondent was convinced additional depositions were necessary. With no subsequent request there is no error in this particular. The orders issued by the court, authorizing depositions to be taken by the respondent, did cover all witnesses who, in fact, testified at the trial.

Trial by jury was had and resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment. The respondent presented no witnesses and did not testify, resting his case at the close of the state's evidence.

The two principal points argued on this appeal both related to the claimed intoxicated state of the respondent at the time of the crime and the time of his interrogation. To pass upon these issues, the factual situation, as rendered by the record, is important. When the trooper had the news from his wife relayed to him, he was at a diner, and he called the Pease residence. The person who answered the phone identified himself as Leonard Pease. The trooper asked him what the trouble was and the respondent replied that he had killed his wife. The trooper immediately proceeded to the respondent's house and, on arrival, was admitted by him. The officer asked, 'Where is she,' and the respondent gestured toward the next room. When the officer found her slumped in her chair, he could discover no pulse, but the body was still warm. The respondent then stated that he had killed her, and that the gun was on the stairway. Thereupon the trooper told him not to say any more and advised him of his constitutional rights. The respondent insisted that as a former military policeman and as a reader of news magazines he knew his rights, and did not want a lawyer. He said that he knew he didn't have to talk about the shooting if he didn't want to, and he knew he souldn't have done it, but he did. He pointed out the revolver used, which was in its holster on the stairway in the room where the shooting took place.

The trooper arrived at the house about 11:30 P.M., March 10, 1967. The medical examiner, the state's attorney and various other law enforcement officials arrived on the scene from time to time until, at 4:50 A.M. on the 11th of March, the respondent was formally arrested, the warrant read to him, and he was taken to Woodstock to jail. These witnesses quite consistently reported that the respondent was very talkative, and, that there was some odor of intoxicants about him, but that he appeared quite rational and fully comprehended the proceedings going on, at times lending advice or assistance. He had no difficulty maneuvering, was not unsteady on his feet, but smoked and talked incessantly. At the time he admitted the trooper by unlocking the door he was dressed only in two-piece long winter underwear and socks and was unshaven. The house was extremely warm and he remained in that costume until he got dressed to go to Woodstock after arrest under a warrant about five o'clock in the morning.

The medical examiner took a blood sample from him and found a blood alcohol content of .187. The evidence of this doctor and of the state pathologist was that this represented being under the influence of intoxicants. The medical examiner, who observed him and talked with him, indicated that the respondent fully understood what had happened and what was going on, even though he was talkative.

The examiner indicated that the degree of the respondent's intoxication could not be determined from his blood alcohol level because 'some people have a much greater tolerance than other people * * *.' He did agree that the blood alcohol level was high enough to have an effect on the ability of the respondent to make a rational judgment.

The state pathologist, who was not at the scene of the crime, testified generally about the effect of the consumption of alcohol. He agreed that consumption of alcoholic beverages diminishes the ability to make a rational judgment, and that a person with a .187 blood count would not be able to think as clearly as he would in a normal state. The judgment functions would probably be impaired at that level. He also referred to the tolerance built up by persons used to taking alcohol. He said, 'A person with that level, if he were at all an experienced drinker, could do almost anything they normally would be able to do without drinking. It still doesn't alter the fact they would be impaired but it might not be noticed.' There were other statements to this same general effect.

The first officer on the scene found a beer bottle on the kitchen table and a partial bottle of vodka on the staircase in the living room. The respondent, at some point, told him that he was a heavy drinker and drank a lot. He also acknowledged that he had been drinking that day. He also said that he and Mrs. Pease on occasion got drunk together, and then she would ask him to shoot her. Apparently he did, on one occasion, shoot behind her 'to try to scare her.' He stated that this time, when he did shoot her, he was lying on a cot in the living room and she was sitting across from him in a chair. He had to go to the Veterans Administration hospital for treatment and he expressed concern about her...

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9 cases
  • State v. Kinney, 99-122.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 13 Octubre 2000
    ...it reaches the point where defendant fails "to achieve the state of mental responsibility" required by the charge. State v. Pease, 129 Vt. 70, 76, 271 A.2d 835, 839 (1970); see also McIntyre v. State, 717 N.E.2d 114, 124 (Ind.1999) (where record contains no evidence that defendant claimed t......
  • State v. Girouard, 135-76
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 14 Marzo 1977
    ...The State points out that first degree murder has been upheld in Vermont where the alcohol content was .187 percent. State v. Pease, 129 Vt. 70, 271 A.2d 835 (1970). The weight to be given to any testimony (whether expert or not) as well as the selection of testimony to be accepted are func......
  • State v. Duff
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 26 Agosto 1988
    ...of a defendant's diminished capacity. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 136 Vt. 520, 527-28, 396 A.2d 126, 130 (1978); State v. Pease, 129 Vt. 70, 76-77, 271 A.2d 835, 839-40 (1970); see also State v. Messier, 145 Vt. 622, 628-29, 497 A.2d 740, 743-44 (1985). The latter is predicated upon a findin......
  • State v. Keith
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 21 Mayo 1993
    ...vehicles is different in both kind and quantum from the concerns about mental condition as related to homicide." State v. Pease, 129 Vt. 70, 75, 271 A.2d 835, 839 (1970). The mere fact that defendant may have been too intoxicated to operate a vehicle legally does not indicate that he did no......
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