State v. Peightal

Decision Date01 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 18855,18855
Citation830 P.2d 516,122 Idaho 5
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael PEIGHTAL, Defendant-Appellant. Boise, March 1992 Term
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Daniel P. Featherston, Sandpoint, for defendant-appellant.

Larry J. EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Myrna, A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McDEVITT, Justice.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction for the manufacture of marijuana in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a), entered pursuant to a conditional plea of guilty in accordance with I.C.R. 11. The defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant's motion to suppress evidence--including 482 growing marijuana plants seized pursuant to a search warrant. The only issue raised on this appeal is whether the trial court correctly ruled that the defendant failed to show that the police supplied false information knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth in order to obtain the search warrant. We hold that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's findings and conclusions, and affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

An anonymous informant telephoned state drug enforcement officer Dean Roland on January 16, 1990, stating that the defendant, Michael Peightal, was growing marijuana inside his residence in Boundary County. While the informant admitted that he/she had never seen the marijuana plants, the informant said the plants were in defendant's attic, and referred to them as the "mother lode." The informant also stated that the defendant was unemployed but paid cash for everything, and that the defendant smoked marijuana "from the time he gets up until the time he goes to bed."

Officer Roland performed a criminal records check which indicated no criminal history. A check of drivers' license records indicated that a Michael Peightal did reside at the mailing address supplied by the informant. An inquiry to the Idaho State Tax Commission indicated that the defendant had never filed an Idaho income tax return.

Officer Roland and Officer George Gow then investigated the defendant's electricity records, finding that the defendant's low monthly electricity use for 1989 was 2416 KW in July, with a high use of 4663 KW in March. A residential property record from 1986 indicated that the house was heated completely by wood, and that while the house had electric baseboard heaters, they were unhooked. The officers reasoned from this information that the defendant used an unusually high amount of electricity, even in the summer, which would be inconsistent for a home heated by burning wood. The high energy consumption would, their experience indicated, be consistent with growing marijuana with haloid lamps.

Officer Roland, Officer Gow, and Deputy Sheriff Lonnie Ekstrom then observed the defendant's residence, noting that the house was unfinished with the defendant occupying the basement. The officers saw a hand pump watering sprayer and potting soil on the front porch, but did not see any plants around the house. They saw smoke coming from the chimney. There also appeared to them to be black polyurethane plastic covering the windows of the house, a fact consistent with marijuana being grown inside.

On January 18, 1990, a magistrate issued the officers a search warrant based on this information. A subsequent search revealed 482 growing marijuana plants, a "baggie" of processed marijuana, a jar of marijuana "bud," a marijuana cigarette, and a triple beam scale. The defendant was arrested and charged with manufacturing marijuana and failing to purchase a drug tax stamp.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress this evidence, claiming that the officers had either knowingly and intentionally supplied false information to obtain the warrant, or had supplied false information with reckless disregard for whether the information was true. Specifically, the defendant contended that the statements that his residence was heated totally with wood heat and that his windows were covered with black plastic were false.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The prosecutor conceded that the statement regarding the black plastic covering the windows was false, but the trial court found that the defendant had not shown that his residence was not heated totally with wood. The trial court also found that the officers did not knowingly and intentionally or recklessly supply false information to obtain the warrant. The defendant entered into an I.C.R. 11 conditional guilty plea to manufacturing marijuana. The defendant now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court set forth the procedure under the fourth amendment for a defendant to challenge a warrant based on allegedly false information. This Court adopted the Franks approach for art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution in State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41, 592 P.2d 852, 856 (1979). According to Franks and Lindner, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence not only that an affiant made a false statement to obtain a warrant, but also that the affiant either provided the false statement to the magistrate knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, S.Ct. at 2684; Lindner, 100 Idaho at 41, 592 P.2d at 856; see also State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 962, 783 P.2d 298, 301 (1989).

In reviewing the trial court's decision denying the defendant's motion to suppress constitutionally challenged evidence, we will overturn the trial court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-52, 776 P.2d 458, 460-61 (1989) ("[w]hile we agree that we should freely review whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous"); State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) ("findings of the trial court ... should be overturned only if not supported by substantial evidence").

Thus, the defendant had the burden of convincing the trial court that the information challenged in the affidavit was false and that the officers supplied the information either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Unless the trial court committed clear error in reaching its findings as to these issues, we will affirm the motion to suppress.

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

For each challenged piece of information in the affidavit, we must determine whether the trial court committed clear error regarding: (1) the falsity of the information; and (2) whether the officers supplied false information knowingly and intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684; Lindner, 100 Idaho at 41, 592 P.2d at 856.

The defendant first challenges the officers' assertion at the probable cause hearing that the defendant's residence was heated 100% by wood. As to this statement the trial court found:

It's not been established that Officer Gow had knowledge of the application or records indicating the electrical heat appliances that were in this house.

I am not so much concerned about whether the electricity was being used at the time. The real question is what the officers knew at the time they went to the Magistrate, not what they learned afterwards or what can be shown afterwards.

I do find it noteworthy--well, I don't think its noteworthy, I think it is to be noted, but it really doesn't matter, but the Defendant doesn't deny in his Affidavit that he doesn't claim to be using great electric heat on a regular basis in significant amounts. It doesn't say that in the affidavit.

In addition, there are some of the photos that would tend to indicate that because of the materials on and near...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • State v. Glenn
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 7 Diciembre 1999
    ...(7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1986); Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105 (Del. 1984); State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 830 P.2d 516 (1992); State v. Mosley, 412 So. 2d 527 (La. 1982); State v. Hamel, 634 A.2d 1272 (Me. 1993); State v. Stickelman, 207 Neb. 429, 2......
  • State v. Mathews
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 15 Junio 1999
    ...to suppress, this Court will overturn a trial court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992). However, this Court exercises free review over questions of law, including whether the trial court correctly applied th......
  • State v. Kay
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 30 Octubre 1996
    ...reckless disregard for the truth are factual determinations that we review under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992); State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 270-71, 846 P.2d 918, 921-22 (Ct.App.1992). Whether a misrepresentation or omission i......
  • State v. Charpentier
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 17 Julio 1998
    ...in dispute. This Court engages in a free review of whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts. State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992); State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-52, 776 P.2d 458, 460-61 THE EVIDENCE WAS VALIDLY SEIZED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH IN......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT