State v. Pelletier
| Decision Date | 15 November 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 276,276 |
| Citation | 123 Vt. 271,185 A.2d 456 |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Raymond E. PELLETIER. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Robert D. Rachlin, State's Atty., St. Johnsbury, for plaintiff.
Lee E. Emerson, Barton, for defendant.
Before HULBURD, C. J., and HOLDEN, SHANGRAW, BARNEY and SMITH, JJ.
The State's attorney for Caledonia County filed a complaint in Caledonia Municipal Court charging that the respondent 'at Lyndonville in said County of Caledonia, on to wit, the 8th day of March, 1961 did then and there operate a motor vehicle, to wit, an M.G.A. automobile, on the public highway, to wit, U. S. route #5, in excess of the posted speed limit of 35 M.P.H., to wit, at a speed of 50 M.P.H., contrary to the form of the statute, in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.' On the morning of the trial, counsel for the respondent stated to the court that--'We feel that under the circumstances we should not be required to proceed with this until the matter of where the offense is supposed to have taken place, and whether the village ordinance is being claimed to being violated, is clarified.' Whereupon the State's attorney moved to amend the complaint by inserting after 'route #5', 'also known as Main Street in the Village of Lyndonville', and by inserting after '50 M.P.H.' 'in violation of the village ordinance of said Lyndonville.' To this proposed amendment, counsel for the respondent stated he had no objection and the amendment was allowed. Thereafter, after the empanelling of the jury but before evidence was introduced, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss and the State's attorney made a further motion to amend the complaint by inserting after the words, 'ordinance of the said Village of Lyndonville', the following: 'to wit, specifically Section 2 of chapter 2 of the aforesaid ordinance.' The amendment, as proposed, was allowed and on the basis of the complaint, as amended, the motion to dismiss was denied. The respondent was allowed an exception to the court's overruling of his motion to dismiss on all the grounds stated therein. Thereafter, upon inquiry by the court, the respondent informed it that he was ready to proceed with the trial. Trial followed.
The respondent's motion to dismiss was based on eight different grounds. We turn directly to the last of these which reads: 'The complaint as drawn and amended fails to appraise the respondent of any specific ordinance he is charged with the violation of.'
In considering the sufficiency of the complaint in this regard, we must have in mind that the court cannot take judicial notice of local ordinances. They are not public laws of which the court can take judicial notice. They are facts and must be pleaded as such. State v. Soragan, 40 Vt. 450, 454. It follows that a complaint upon a village ordinance must set it forth. A reference to it by chapter and section is not sufficient. State v. Cruickshank, 71 Vt. 94, 42 A. 983. Moreover, the complaint should allege that the ordinance was duly adopted and was in force at the time of the act which is the subject of the complaint. State v. Bosworth, 74 Vt. 315, 318, 52 A. 423.
Measured against these requirements, it is at once apparent that the complaint is not sufficient. When the court below ruled against the respondent on his motion to dismiss, the respondent went to trial, and in the course of it, the ordinance was duly proved in conformity with 12 V.S.A. § 1694. By so doing, had this been a civil action, a defendant would have waived the benefit of his demurrer. German v....
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State v. Baril
...applicable speed limit as regulated by the traffic committee. State v. Snyder, 123 Vt. 367, 368, 189 A.2d 535. See also State v. Pelletier, 123 Vt. 271, 272, 185 A.2d 456. Section 1010 of the motor vehicle law provides that the same traffic committee named in section 1141, upon proper notic......
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DeCelle, In re, 1948
...to both form and substance. In re Greenough, supra at 281, 75 A.2d 569, and is, in this state, liberally construed. State v. Pelletier, 123 Vt. 271, 273, 185 A.2d 456. As long as the complaint charges the essential substance of a crime within the jurisdiction of the court concerned, the suf......
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State v. Page, 386-81
...may not take judicial notice of a local ordinance. State v. Atwood, 140 Vt. 301, 302, 438 A.2d 387, 388 (1981); State v. Pelletier, 123 Vt. 271, 272, 185 A.2d 456, 457 (1962); Hambley v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 130 Vt. 204, 208, 290 A.2d 18, 20 (1972). Thus, in order to prevail in a case inv......
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Eno v. City of Burlington, 337
...action taken? The ordinances in question are not a part of the record so the court cannot take judicial notice of them. State v. Pelletier, 123 Vt. 271, 272, 185 A.2d 456. However, we are permitted to do so by agreement of the parties made at the time of argument, a copy of the city's 'Revi......