State v. Penn-Kennedy

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
Citation862 N.W.2d 384
Docket NumberNo. 13–1615.,13–1615.
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. John PENN–KENNEDY, Appellant.
Decision Date17 April 2015

Robert D. Tiefenthaler of Tiefenthaler Law Office, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather R. Quick, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Jacklyn Fox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Opinion

CADY, Chief Justice.

In this appeal, we revisit the scope and application of the speedy indictment rule. The issue presented is whether this rule applies to require the dismissal of a prosecution for the crime of operating while intoxicated that arose from an arrest and prosecution for the crime of public intoxication when the defendant reasonably believed he had also been arrested for the crime of operating while intoxicated. The district court held that the speedy indictment rule did not require a dismissal of the subsequent prosecution for the crime of operating while intoxicated. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which reversed the decision of the district court. On further review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the district court. We hold that the speedy indictment rule is not triggered for a prosecution of a public offense by an arrest that resulted in an earlier prosecution of a separate public offense arising from the same incident.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

During the frigid early morning hours of January 19, 2012, Sioux City police officers responded to a report of an intoxicated man leaving a restaurant and preparing to operate his motor vehicle parked outside the restaurant. When officers arrived, they found John Penn-Kennedy, a Nebraska resident, sitting behind the steering wheel of his vehicle in the parking lot with the motor running. After questioning Penn-Kennedy, one of the officers entered the restaurant to interview the person who made the report. Two other officers remained outside with Penn-Kennedy. During this time, Penn-Kennedy told the officers he had driven to the restaurant from a bar and planned to drive home. An officer administered two field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test. Penn-Kennedy failed the tests.

Without informing Penn-Kennedy he was under arrest, the officers handcuffed him and transported him to the police station. As the arresting officer was walking him into the station, Penn-Kennedy fell and injured his foot. The injury was severe enough that the officer transported him from the station to the hospital. At the hospital, the officer read Penn-Kennedy his Miranda rights and invoked implied-consent procedures to obtain a body specimen for testing to determine his alcohol concentration level. The officer requested a blood test for this purpose. Penn-Kennedy refused the test, but consented to provide a urine sample. After obtaining the urine sample, the officer told Penn-Kennedy he was under arrest for public intoxication in violation of Iowa Code section 123.46 (2011). Penn-Kennedy was then transported back to the station and booked for public intoxication. A criminal complaint for public intoxication was filed, and a prosecution for the offense followed. Penn-Kennedy was released from custody following an initial appearance.

On February 17, the police received the toxicology report on the urine sample provided by Penn-Kennedy. The report showed Penn-Kennedy had an alcohol concentration level at the time of his arrest in excess of the legal limit to operate a motor vehicle.

On May 18, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Penn-Kennedy with the crime of operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2. The complaint arose from the same incident that resulted in the public intoxication arrest 120 days earlier. An arrest warrant was issued, followed by an initial appearance on the complaint before a magistrate on July 31.

On August 7, the State filed a trial information against Penn-Kennedy charging him with OWI. The public intoxication charge was still pending, and the parties agreed to consolidate it with the OWI charge for the purposes of trial. Penn-Kennedy then filed a motion to dismiss the trial information. He claimed the State was required to indict him under the speedy indictment rule for operating while intoxicated within forty-five days of his arrest on January 19 because he maintained a reasonable belief he had been arrested for OWI at the time. The district court denied the motion.

At a stipulated bench trial, Penn-Kennedy was found guilty of OWI, first offense. The public intoxication charge was dismissed.

Penn-Kennedy appealed from the judgment and sentence for OWI. The sole claim raised on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case under the speedy indictment rule. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. It found the speedy indictment rule for the prosecution of the crime of OWI was triggered by the arrest for public intoxication because the State did not have probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication, only OWI. It concluded the officers did not observe the essential facts to support the public intoxication charge and could only have arrested Penn-Kennedy for the crime of OWI. Consequently, it concluded the State was required to indict Penn-Kennedy for OWI within forty-five days of the arrest and held the district court erred in failing to dismiss the prosecution. We granted further review.

II. Standard and Scope of Review.

We review the district court's interpretation of the speedy indictment rule, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a ), for errors at law. State v. Dennison, 571 N.W.2d 492, 494 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam). We are bound by the findings of fact of the district court if they are supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Wing, 791 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 2010).

III. Application of Speedy Indictment Rule.

The right to a speedy trial in Iowa is derived from both our State and Federal Constitutions and is more specifically defined under the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id. It is aligned with the venerable public policy of this state that “criminal prosecutions be concluded at the earliest possible time consistent with a fair trial to both parties.” Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.33(2).

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2) divides a criminal prosecution into three segments and imposes a time limitation for each. The first segment pertains to the filing of an indictment and is also known as the speedy indictment rule. [T]he court must order the prosecution to be dismissed” if “an indictment is not found against the defendant within 45 days” of an arrest. Id. r. 2.33(2)(a ). The second segment pertains to the trial. [T]he court must order the indictment to be dismissed” if the defendant is not “brought to trial within 90 days after indictment.” Id. r. 2.33(2)(b ). The prosecution must be dismissed if these time limitations are not observed unless good cause is shown or the right has been waived. Id. r. 2.33(2)(a )-(b ). The third segment pertains to the entire case. “All criminal cases must be brought to trial within one year after the defendant's initial arraignment ... unless an extension is granted by the court, upon a showing of good cause.” Id. r. 2.33(2)(c ).

As with all three segments of the speedy trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the ‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of evidence, and maintain a fair process. Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246–47 (quoting State v. Delockroy, 559 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa Ct.App.1996) ). In particular, the speedy indictment rule protects these objectives during the time period provided to file an indictment in a criminal case. Yet, an indictment is not normally the initial charging instrument brought against an accused that commences the criminal prosecution. Instead, a criminal prosecution is commenced upon the filing of the first charging instrument, including the filing of a “complaint.” Iowa Code § 804.1 (“A criminal proceeding may be commenced by the filing of a complaint before a magistrate.”); see id. § 801.4(7) (defining a “criminal proceeding” as “a proceeding in which a person is accused of a public offense”); id. § 801.4(13) (defining a prosecution as “the commencement, including the filing of a complaint, and continuance of a criminal proceeding”). The speedy indictment time period, however, does not begin with the commencement of the prosecution but with an arrest. Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 247. An arrest is the triggering event to commence the forty-five-day time period to file an indictment under the rule, supplanting the previous version of the rule's use of the date of prosecution as the trigger. Id.; see also id. at 255 (Cady, J., dissenting) (explaining the “held to answer” language from the previous version of the rule related to the initial court appearance).

Normally, the date of an arrest and the date of prosecution follow hand in hand. Thus, even though the date of arrest triggers the requirement to file an indictment, the arrest date is usually very close in time to the date that commences the prosecution. This approach is largely due to the procedure and protocol police are required to follow in making an arrest. See generally Iowa Code ch. 804. An arresting officer “must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest,” the reason for the arrest, and his or her identity as a police officer. Id. § 804.14. The officer must also require the person to submit to the officer's custody. Id. The officer is then required to take the arrested person before a committing magistrate for an initial appearance without unnecessary delay. Id. §§ 804.21(1), .22; Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.2(1). The period of time between the arrest and the initial appearance normally must not exceed twenty-four hours. Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.1(2)(d ). This narrow...

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12 cases
  • State v. Williams, 14-0793
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 25 Mayo 2017
    ...Standard of Review. We review interpretations of the speedy indictment rule for errors at law. See State v. Penn-Kennedy , 862 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Iowa 2015). "We are bound by the findings of fact of the district court if they are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Wing , 791 N.W......
  • State v. Watson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 18 Febrero 2022
    ...an arrest and the date of prosecution follow hand in hand,’ but they can ‘become detached.’ " Id. at 866 (quoting State v. Penn-Kennedy , 862 N.W.2d 384, 387–88 (Iowa 2015) ). Our holding avoided inconsistent applications of the speedy indictment rule by applying a common measuring point: t......
  • State v. Bartlett, 17-1170
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Iowa
    • 5 Julio 2018
    ...challenges for correction of errors at law. State v. Williams , 895 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Iowa 2017) (citing State v. Penn-Kennedy , 862 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Iowa 2015) ). "We will uphold the district court’s finding of guilt so long as there is substantial supporting evidence in the record." State ......
  • State v. Dixon, 14-1211
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Iowa
    • 10 Junio 2015
    ...in Wing is narrow and limited to those cases in which an arrest is not promptly followed by any prosecution." See State v. Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015) (citing State v. Wing, 791 N.W.2d 243, 252-53 (Iowa 2010)). The reasonable-person test is not applicable here, and the spe......
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