State v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1952
• Docket Number: No. A--97,A--97
• Citation: 9 N.J. 194,87 A.2d 709
• Parties: STATE v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 194

9 N.J. 194

87 A.2d 709

STATE v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

No. A--97.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 10, 1952.

Decided March 31, 1952.

John B. Molineux, New Brunswick, argued the cause for appellant (Alex Eber, Prosecutor, Middlesex County, New Brunswick, attorney).

John E. Toolan, Perth Amboy, argued the cause for respondent (Toolan, Haney & Romond, Perth Amboy, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

Eighty-four lives were lost in an unusually disastrous accident when a railroad train operated by the defendant was hurled from a trestle over which it was traveling in Middlesex County. The grand jury investigation resulted in 84 separate indictments being returned against the defendant, each for the crime of manslaughter, each charging the defendant 'did feloniously kill and slay' one of the persons killed in the accident.

The State, through the prosecutor, in the County Court moved to consolidate all the indictments, asking they be tried together and at one time, relying on Rule 2:5--4. The defendant railroad objected to the relief so sought on the ground, amongst others, that there was but a single offense, if any, committed by the defendant and there could be a trial only on one charge of involuntary manslaughter.

The 84 indictments, it is conceded, arose out of the same transaction and the same facts would be submitted as evidence to prove each offense. The motion for consolidation was granted.

The defendant appealed under Rule 4:2--2(a)(4) and petitioned for leave to appeal under Rules 4:2--3 and 4:5. Consent was given by the State and the Appellate Division granted the application for permission to appeal.

The order of consolidation was reversed by the Appellate Division, 16 N.J.Super. 360, 84 A.2d 650, 651 (1951), holding Rule 2:5--4, under which the order was made, 'applies only when 'offenses' are charged in separate indictments, and the only indictments which may be consolidated for trial under this rule are those which charge distinct and separate offenses which could have been joined in a single indictment. Since the indictments which were consolidated under the order under appeal really charge only a single criminal offense, the trial court lacked power to grant the motion of the State.'

This appeal is taken from the judgment of reversal, the State claiming it is in the public interest to secure a final determination as to the number of offenses involved in the Woodbridge wreck before proceeding further.

The question presented is: where a single act of the defendant results in the death of two or more persons under circumstances which would justify a conviction for manslaughter, has the offense of manslaughter been committed as many times as the number of persons killed?

Basically the inquiry also involves the principle and applicability of the plea of Autrefois acquit and Autrefois convict.

The railroad asserts unless the Appellate Division is upheld, it 'will be deprived of a vital constitutional and basic right--because the multiple indictments in this case do not really charge multiple offenses of manslaughter but merely multiple consequences of a single such offense.'

The State, on the contrary, argues where a single act of the defendant results in the death of two or more persons under circumstances which would justify a conviction for manslaughter, the offense of manslaughter has been committed as many times as the number of persons so killed. It is said the Constitution and the common law have in view criminal offenses and not the act itself which resulted in the offenses. The insistment is that 84 crimes were committed in the doing of one act and that these are distinct criminal offenses which may be prosecuted and punished severally.

Article I, par. 11, of the 1947 Constitution of our State provides in part: 'No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense. * * *'

Our Supreme Court, referring to this doctrine in State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (Sup.Ct.1833), said: 'Our courts of justice would have recognized it, and acted upon it, as one of the most valuable principles of the common law, without any constitutional provision. But the framers of our Constitution have thought it worthy of especial notice. And all who are conversant with courts of justice, and the proceedings in them, must be satisfied that this great principle forms one of the strong bulwarks of liberty; and that if it be prostrated, every citizen would become liable, if guilty of an offence, to the unnecessary costs and vexations of repeated prosecutions, and if innocent, not only to those, but to the danger of an erroneous conviction from repeated trials.'

Recently in State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617, 620 (1951), we expressed ourselves on this topic thusly: 'It is an ancient principle of the common law that one may not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. This is one of the limitations upon arbitrary power confirmed by King John's Magna Charta of 1215, in the provision (c. 29) ensuring the essentials of individual right and justice and the ancient liberties of the free man against interference 'but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.' Immunity from repeated jeopardy was one of the cherished basic liberties of the early common law comprehended in this guaranty of the Great Charter. State v. Di Giosia, 3 N.J. 413, 70 A.2d 756 (1950). The constitutional and common-law protection is not only against the peril of a second punishment, but also against a second prosecution and trial for the same offense.'

The principle so enunciated is strongly entrenched in the very foundation of our legal structure both by the Constitution and the common law. The complete identity of the evidence is covered by the stipulation admitting 'that the same facts would be put in evidence to prove each offense.' It is apparent, we think, that if the 84 indictments were to be moved and tried together, the defendant would be deprived of its right to enter a plea of Autrefois acquit or convict, whichever was apropos.

The rule in the various states differs sharply as to whether a single act resulting in the death of two or more persons may constitute one crime or offense or a number of crimes or offenses equal to the number of deaths. There are many decisions, among them People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (Sup.Ct.1938), and State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (Sup.Ct.1951), holding the number of crimes or offenses in manslaughter is equal to the number of deaths. Similar rulings exist in other states.

The contrary view is firmly held in State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428, 250 N.W. 617 (Sup.Ct.1933); People ex rel. Lalley v. Barr, 259 N.Y. 104, 181 N.E. 64 (Ct.App.1932); Commonwealth v. Ernesto, 93 Pa.Super. 339 (Super.Ct.1928), and other jurisdictions.

The reasoning between these two schools of thought clashes almost as violently as the conflicting results, and the basic theories relied upon seem irreconcilable. Which school prevails in quantum or in logic is difficult of ascertainment. It is conceded, however, that the number of crimes or offenses in this jurisdiction is not decided by the number of deaths. So it has been determined in State v. Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412, 135 A. 871 (E.&A.1927), and the...