State v. Peoples

• Citation: 996 A.2d 660
• Decision Date: 21 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009-13-C.A.,2009-13-C.A.
• Parties: STATEv.Edward PEOPLES.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

996 A.2d 660

STATEv.Edward PEOPLES.

No. 2009-13-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 21, 2010.

Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General, for Plaintiff.

Catherine Gibran, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 6, 2010, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The defendant, Edward Peoples (defendant or Peoples), appeals from a conviction of one count of first-degree child molestation and two counts of second-degree child molestation. Peoples was sentenced to thirty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, ten years to serve and twenty years suspended, with probation on the first-degree sexual assault count and twenty years for each of the remaining counts, five years to serve and fifteen years suspended, with probation-all sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice improperly limited cross-examination of a witness and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and hearing counsel's arguments, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and, thus, the appeal may be decided at this time. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Facts and Travel

The facts in this case arise from an incident that occurred in 2002. At that time, Kenneth, then eight years old, was visiting the home of his aunt, Theresa.¹ The assaults occurred when defendant, Theresa's second cousin, sexually molested young Kenneth. He did not disclose the assaults until 2007. The defendant subsequently was arrested and indicted on the charges referred to above.

A jury trial was held in January 2008; Kenneth, who resides with his mother in Virginia, was the first witness called by the state. He testified that he visited his aunt in Rhode Island during summer vacation, from 2001 to 2004. Kenneth testified that he stayed with Theresa in 2001 and 2002, and that she lived in a third-floor apartment. When Kenneth stayed there, he slept on the couch in the living room or in the bedroom with his aunt.

Kenneth testified that one evening in 2002, defendant was watching movies in Theresa's living room with Theresa and Kenneth. Eventually, Theresa went into her bedroom to go to sleep. Kenneth fell asleep while watching the movie but was awakened when defendant placed his hand over his mouth. The defendant pulled down Kenneth's shorts and boxers, put his hand on Kenneth's penis, and moved his hand up and down. After this, defendant proceeded to place his mouth on Kenneth's penis for approximately ten seconds and then pulled out his own penis and began masturbating. Kenneth testified that defendant said to him, “Now do me” and placed Kenneth's hand on defendant's penis. The defendant then masturbated again and ejaculated on the couch. The entire incident took around four minutes. After the incident, defendant told him that, if he said anything about it, “he would come for me.” Shortly thereafter, defendant left the apartment. Although Kenneth was crying and frightened, he eventually went back to sleep.

Kenneth testified that although it was dark when defendant assaulted him the moonlight allowed him to see defendant's face and there was some light from the street lights outside the apartment. Kenneth initially testified that he did not see defendant again after this incident, but later stated that he saw him once or twice thereafter and that defendant gave him a look he discerned as threatening. On cross-examination, Kenneth added that he did not recall anyone else staying overnight at Theresa's apartment other than defendant. However, he was confronted with testimony from a prior hearing in which he recalled one other person staying over at Theresa's house but could not recall a name. Kenneth testified that he did not remember making that statement.

Theresa also testified at trial; she stated that defendant is her second cousin and visited her two or three times per week during the summer of 2002, when the incident occurred. She specifically recalled the night of the incident; when she went to bed, defendant and Kenneth still were in the living room. At about 4:50 a.m., defendant woke Theresa up to tell her to lock the door because he was leaving; however, when she rose to lock the door, he was gone. She went back to sleep and woke up again around 7 a.m. and noticed that Kenneth was crying; he told her that he had a headache.

Defense counsel's cross-examination of Theresa is relevant to the issues that confront us. A series of questions were posed to Theresa about the windows, locks, and blinds in her apartment. Theresa testified she had only one key to the apartment and that there were five windows in the living room. However, she always kept her blinds closed. Next, counsel asked Theresa whether other men spent the night at her apartment. The prosecution immediately objected, and defense counsel explained at a side-bar conference that he was attempting to explore a third-party perpetrator defense. The trial justice informed defense counsel that to do so, he needed to make an offer of proof, with specificity, demonstrating that another person, not defendant, could have committed the crimes. Defense counsel stated that he would be unable to do so; as a result, the trial justice sustained the state's objection to that question. Significantly, defendant made no offer of proof or further argument about this purported defense.

The final witness to testify for the state was Lucy, Kenneth's mother and Theresa's sister, who resides in Virginia. Lucy corroborated Kenneth's visits to Rhode Island during summer vacation and testified that he made such a visit in the summer of 2002. She testified that on January 29, 2007, while she and Kenneth were watching a television show on child molestation, Kenneth told her that defendant had molested him. Lucy called her sister and asked to speak with defendant about the incident, to no avail. Lucy testified that she contacted law enforcement in Rhode Island to report the incident.

The defendant testified and denied committing the alleged sexual acts on Kenneth. Although he admitted to being in Theresa's apartment on occasions when Kenneth was there, he did not recall being in Theresa's apartment when Kenneth fell asleep, nor did he recall any animosity between them. The defendant stated how he stopped by Theresa's apartment at lunchtime and after work, and he said that he visited sometimes as often as five times per week. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and a hearing was held on April 23, 2008.

At the hearing, defense counsel asserted that Kenneth's identification of defendant was suspect because of the dearth of light in the apartment, such that the child would have had difficulty seeing anyone in the room. In response, the prosecution contended that Kenneth was a credible witness, that Theresa's testimony confirmed that defendant and Kenneth were left alone, and that there was adequate light in the living room. The prosecution also argued that Kenneth was familiar with defendant's voice based on defendant's numerous visits to Theresa's apartment and that defendant spoke to Kenneth during the incident.

In ruling on the motion for a new trial, and specifically referring to defense counsel's attempt to argue a third-party perpetrator defense, the trial justice declared: “But [defense counsel's] protestations that some phantom molester somehow gained access to that room and perpetrated these crimes on [Kenneth] is without any foundation and evidence or fact in this case.” Further, the trial justice found that Kenneth's, Theresa's, and Lucy's testimony was consistent and credible. The trial justice also noted that it was the function of the jury to make a judgment on whether there was enough light for Kenneth to see defendant. When referencing what evidence the jurors had before them, the trial justice noted that the jury had many facts upon which it could rest its verdict, including the fact that Kenneth knew defendant and was familiar with his voice.

Accordingly, the trial justice declared that he agreed with the jury's verdict and denied defendant's motion for a new trial; he was sentenced on September 19, 2008, and filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2008; final judgment of conviction was entered on October 1, 2008.²

On appeal, defendant raises two issues; first, he contends that the trial justice erred in precluding cross-examination of Theresa concerning any male visitors when Kenneth was staying with her. Specifically, defendant asserts that “[w]hat was precluded here was quintessential cross-examination to probe all of the salient facts and afford the jury a true picture of life within [Theresa's] apartment.” The state, on the other hand, contends that defense counsel did not make an offer of proof sufficient to satisfy the trial justice as to these salient facts and that, therefore, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in precluding that part of the cross-examination. Next, defendant contends that the trial justice was clearly wrong when he denied the motion for a new trial because the jury verdict “was against the fair preponderance of the evidence and failed to do substantial justice.” The state responds that the trial justice properly applied the standard for passing on a motion for a new trial and, after doing so, found that he agreed with the jury's verdict.

Standard of Review

We review defendant's contentions that the trial justice erroneously limited his right of cross-examination under an abuse of discretion standard. As we recently declared in State v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I.2010), “the standard of review of a...