State v. Perales

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: D. KENT SAVOIE, JUDGE
• Docket Number: 23-538
• Decision Date: 06 March 2024
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JULIEANNE PERALES A/K/A JULIANNE PERALES

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STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JULIEANNE PERALES A/K/A JULIANNE PERALES

No. 23-538

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Third Circuit

March 6, 2024

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CONCORDIA NO. 21-2450 HONORABLE KATHY A. JOHNSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

Austin L. Lipsey, Assistant District Attorney Bradley R. Burget COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana

Jacob Longman, Richard Sprinkle, Kathryn Jakuback Burke COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Julianne Perales

Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Guy E. Bradberry, and Wilbur L Stiles, Judges.

D KENT SAVOIE, JUDGE

On February 23, 2022, Defendant, Julianne Perales, was charged by bill of information with eleven counts of cruelty to juveniles, in violation of La.R.S. 14:93(A)(1). On June 22 2022, she pled guilty to six counts of cruelty to juveniles. On September 7, 2022, she was sentenced to serve three years at hard labor on each count. The trial court ordered three of the counts to run concurrently with one another, with the remaining three counts to run consecutively.

Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence on October 7, 2022, and a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Set Aside Sentencing on December 27, 2022. Both motions were denied following a hearing. The trial court granted Defendant's Notice of Intent to Appeal and Request to Lodge Record, and Defendant is now before this court asserting five assignments of error.

For the following reasons, Defendant's convictions are affirmed. However, due to an error patent, Defendant's sentences are hereby vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

FACTS

Before Defendant entered her pleas of guilty to six counts of cruelty to juveniles, the State set forth the following factual basis:

Your Honor, on or about those dates in question, and particularly in October of 2021, an investigation was opened on Noah's Ark Day Care as a result of a child that was a participant of the daycare coming home with marks on his back. Your Honor, . . . the State Police had removed that investigation from the Sheriff's Office given that the Sheriff's Office had a son that was an attendee of the daycare. Your Honor, after reviewing the -- the video footage, it was learned that Ms. Lysa Richardson, who was the owner of the daycare, Ms. Bridget Delaughter, who was a worker, and then Julie Perales, who was a worker, as well as a Taylor Ragonesi, who is not here, was a worker at the daycare, all had used excessive and corporal punishment on several of the children that were attendees of the daycare. And were arrested on the various counts of cruelty to a juvenile.

The record reveals that Lysa Richardson, Bridget Delaughter, and Taylor Ragonesi also entered guilty pleas to various counts of cruelty of juveniles.

ERRORS PATENT

Defendant pled guilty to six counts of cruelty to juveniles, violations of La.R.S. 14:93(A)(1). On each count, she was sentenced to three years at hard labor with three of the counts to run concurrently. When asked how the three remaining counts were to run, the trial judge stated, "[d]o not run concurrent." At the hearing on Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, defense counsel noted that Defendant had been ordered to serve either nine or twelve years, depending on the interpretation of the commitment order. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court stated:

The Court intended - - there were six counts, I intended to impose three years per count. I intended that three of the counts were to run concurrent. So, I intended to impose a nine-year sentence, and that's what I am continuing to impose, a nine-year sentence.

While the trial court's intent to impose a nine-year combined sentence was clear, running three three-year sentences concurrently and running the remaining three, three-year sentences consecutively results in a combined twelve-year sentence as reflected on the commitment order. Therefore, we find that Defendant's sentences are indeterminate.

Although not directly on point, the following case lends guidance to the issue before us:

Next, the Defendant received an indeterminate sentence because it is impossible to determine from the record whether the trial judge intended for the sentences for aggravated battery to be served concurrently or consecutively to the armed robbery sentences. La. C.Cr.P. art 879 provides, in part, that "the court shall impose a determinate sentence." In State v. Sebastien, 31,750 (La.App. 2nd Cir.3/31/99), 730 So.2d 1040, 1045, writ denied, 99-1426 (La.10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157, the court stated that "the district court . . . is required to express its intent concerning concurrent or consecutive sentences in accordance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 883."

When imposing sentence, the trial judge first sentenced the Defendant on the armed robbery counts and then sentenced the Defendant on the aggravated battery counts. In doing so, he stated that the ten-year aggravated battery sentences, imposed on each of the two counts, were to be served "consecutive to each other." The trial judge did not specify whether the aggravated battery sentences were to be served consecutively or concurrently with the armed robbery sentences. La.C.Cr.P. art.883 directs that in the case of the concurrent sentences, the judge shall specify, and the court minutes shall reflect, the date from which the sentences are to run concurrently. However, we find no such specified date in the sentencing transcript either. Further complicating the matter, the commitment states that all of the sentences are to [be] served consecutively and that the Defendant is to serve a total of 370 years (50 years for 7 armed robberies = 350 + 20 consecutive years for 2 aggravated batteries). While the sentencing transcript clearly does not support this interpretation of the imposed sentence, it is unclear from the transcript exactly what the trial judge intended in imposing sentence. Thus, we find that the Defendant's sentences are indeterminate and, as such, they must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

While we readily note the apparent futility in this ruling, because this Defendant will serve the remainder of his natural life in prison, whether defendant's sentence is considered as 370 years of imprisonment, 350 of which are without benefits (all the sentences served consecutively) or 200 years without benefits (consecutive sentences for the four separate armed robberies and concurrent sentences on the remaining related counts) it is a matter of law that the Defendant must have a determinate sentence.

State v. Peralta, 01-149, pp. 22-23 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/15/02), 807 So.2d 967, 978 (footnote omitted), writ denied, 02-541 (La. 1/24/03), 836 So.2d 41. Accordingly, Defendant's sentences are vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In Defendant's brief to this court, she sets forth five assignments of error, namely:

1. The trial [c]ourt's ruling was erroneous in its determination that Miss Perales' guilty plea was not entered in violation of her right to effective assistance of counsel, after the [c]ourt was presented with evidence that Miss Perales had been advised that trial counsel was both engaged in a concurrent conflict of interest and had rendered incorrect advice to Miss Perales to secure her guilty plea.

2. The trial [c]ourt erred in failing to reconsider Miss Perales' sentence after being presented with evidence that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing.

3. The trial court erred in failing to order Miss Perales' plea be withdrawn after being presented with evidence that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing.

4. The trial [c]ourt erred in failing to render a particularized sentence for Miss Perales that was based on a consideration of her individual culpability.

5. The trial [c]ourt erred in failing to reasonably tailor a sentence for Miss Perales that considered the mitigating information presented by her new counsel.

However, the argument section of Defendant's brief is not divided by the assignments of error. Rather, it is divided into two primary arguments: (1) that her guilty pleas were a result of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) that her sentences are constitutionally excessive as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Due to the interconnected nature of the arguments presented in Defendant's brief, we address the assignments of error together.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Guilty Pleas

We will first address Defendant's arguments pertaining to the withdrawal of her guilty pleas. The standard of reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is as follows:

The discretion to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea under La.C.Cr.P. art. 559(A) lies with the trial court and such discretion cannot be disturbed unless an abuse or arbitrary exercise of that discretion is shown. State v Martin, 48,045 (La.App. 2 Cir. 05/15/13), 115 So.3d 750. A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Id.

Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1, a valid guilty plea must be a voluntary choice by the defendant and not the result of force or threats. La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 also provides that prior to accepting a guilty plea, the court must personally inform the defendant of the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum possible penalty. When the record establishes that an accused was informed of and waived his right to a trial by jury, to confront his accusers, and against self-incrimination, the burden shifts to the accused to prove that despite this record, his guilty plea was involuntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v.

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