State v. Perez
| Decision Date | 14 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 13944,13944 |
| Citation | 591 A.2d 119,218 Conn. 714 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Paul PEREZ. |
Carol R. Goldberg, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Kent Drager, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Linda Howe, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).
Before SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO, HULL and BORDEN, JJ.
The principal issue of this appeal is whether a fourteen year old juvenile who has been arrested for murder, and whose case therefore must be transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 46b-127(1), 1 may validly waive his Miranda 2 rights without a specific warning of the possibility of such a transfer. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 3 rendered upon his conditional plea of nolo contendere pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, 4 following the denial by the trial court of his motion to suppress his confession.
The defendant claims that the trial court should have suppressed his confession because: (1) it was impossible for him to make an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights absent a specific warning that he would be exposed to more than juvenile treatment of the charges against him; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, his waiver was not knowing and intelligent. We affirm.
On May 30, 1988, the defendant, who was then fourteen years of age, was arrested by the Bridgeport police department for a murder that had occurred on May 27, 1988, in Father Panik Village. Thereafter, the state filed a delinquency petition against the defendant in the Superior Court for juvenile matters based upon an allegation of intentional murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. The case was transferred to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-127. After the court found probable cause pursuant to General Statutes § 54-46a, 5 the defendant moved to suppress a written confession that he had given on the evening of his arrest. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant thereafter entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere. The court accepted the plea, and sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment. The defendant appealed directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b). 6
The state's evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress was as follows. 7 On May 30, 1988, at approximately 2 p.m., the Bridgeport police arrested the fourteen year old defendant for the crime of murder in connection with a shooting death in Father Panik Village on May 27, 1988. Uniformed police officers took the defendant to the detective bureau of the police department. The detective bureau is in the main office of the police department, and the youth bureau, where juvenile cases are ordinarily processed, is in a different location. The defendant was calm, passive and quiet at the time of the arrest and while he was being transported to the police station.
At the detective bureau, Detective Robert Kwett, who was in charge of the investigation, told the defendant that he was under arrest for murder and that they could not discuss the matter without the presence of his mother, Jeanette Perez. The police eventually located Jeanette Perez in New London, where she was visiting relatives, and awaited her arrival at the police station. While they waited, the defendant was detained without questioning in an interrogation room, was supplied with food and water, and was permitted to use the bathroom. Kwett entered the interrogation room several times to make sure that the defendant was all right.
Jeanette Perez arrived at the police station at approximately 8 p.m. and spoke to Detective Michael Kozlowsky, who informed her that her presence was necessary while the defendant was advised of his rights and questioned about the shooting. Jeanette Perez spoke English very well.
After leaving Jeanette Perez and the defendant alone in the interrogation room for approximately ten minutes, Kozlowsky entered the room and began the interrogation by determining from the defendant and Jeanette Perez that they each could read and write English. Kozlowsky had the defendant read aloud the first two lines of a "rights form" document and Kozlowsky read aloud a copy of the form to them while they read the form. While Jeanette Perez looked on, the defendant filled in the identifying and background information at the top of the form by writing the date, his name, his age and birth date, the name of the last school he had attended, the last grade he had completed, and writing "yes" to the questions, "Can you read?" and "Can you write?"
Kozlowsky asked the defendant and Jeanette Perez to read each of the individual rights while he read the rights aloud to them. He asked them if they understood them, and told them that if they did so, to initial the form. The defendant initialed each of the five printed warnings of rights, 8 and at 8:35 p.m. he signed and dated the form directly underneath the waiver of these rights. 9 Jeanette Perez and Kozlowsky signed the form as witnesses to his signature.
Kozlowsky then questioned the defendant in the presence of Jeanette Perez, and the defendant's confession to the shooting was reduced to a four page typewritten statement in question and answer form. In the statement, the defendant acknowledged that it was taken in the presence of Jeanette Perez, that he could read and write English, and that he had completed the fifth grade in school. He also acknowledged that he had been advised of his rights, both orally and in writing, that he understood them, that there had been no threats, promises or rewards, and that he gave the statement of his own free will. The statement indicated that it began at 9 p.m. and ended at 10 p.m.
Before the defendant signed the statement, Kozlowsky asked Kwett to review the statement in order to determine whether he "had covered all the bases." While Kozlowsky was out of the room, Kwett told the defendant and Jeanette Perez that if someone had put him up to the shooting, or if there were other extenuating circumstances, he should tell the police. Kwett also told them that the case would not remain in the juvenile system but would be "referred to the adult court system." He told the defendant to discuss with his mother whether anyone else was responsible for his participation in the shooting, and left the two of them alone in the room for that purpose. When Kwett returned to the room, the defendant told him that he had nothing to add to the statement.
Kozlowsky returned to the room and told the defendant to read the statement and to sign each page if he agreed to what had been typed thereon. The defendant read the statement, signed the margins of the first three pages, and signed at the end of the fourth page. Jeanette Perez and Kozlowsky signed as witnesses to his signature, and another police officer took the defendant's oath to the statement.
Throughout the entire procedure the defendant was calm and collected. At no time did he indicate that he wanted the questioning to stop or that he wanted an attorney. There were no threats or promises made to him.
There was also testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress from James Fulton, who had been the defendant's juvenile probation officer since 1985, when the defendant's extensive involvement with the juvenile authorities began. On several prior occasions, Fulton had advised the defendant, in the presence of Jeanette Perez, of his right to remain silent, of the fact that anything he said could be used in court, and of his right to an attorney and to have an attorney appointed if he could not afford one. Further, he also had been with Jeanette Perez and the defendant when the defendant had been similarly advised by a judge in the juvenile courtroom. The defendant and Jeanette Perez had understood those rights on those occasions. Although the defendant had never before had a case referred from the juvenile court to the regular criminal docket, he had been committed to the custody of the commissioner of children and youth services with a placement at Long Lane. Fulton had advised the defendant on several occasions that if he continued to engage in serious delinquent conduct he would end up in the adult court with "more serious consequences."
The trial court specifically found that Fulton had previously advised the defendant that, "because of his continued ... course of conduct, he could end up in adult court." The court also found that he had been fully advised of his Miranda rights, and that his waiver of those rights had been intelligent, knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress. This appeal followed.
The defendant's principal claim is that, under the self-incrimination clauses of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution 10 and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, 11 "it was not possible for him to make an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver of his [Miranda ] rights because he was not adequately informed of the potential consequences of such waiver." Those potential consequences were that, notwithstanding his age, the murder to which he confessed would be prosecuted on the regular criminal docket, rather than in the juvenile part of the Superior Court, and that he would thereby be exposed to criminal, rather than juvenile, sanctions. The defendant argues that, notwithstanding the totality of the circumstances surrounding his waiver, his confession was rendered inadmissible by the absence of any such warnings by the police. We disagree.
We first consider the constitutional basis for the defendant's claim. Although he...
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