State v. Perry
| Decision Date | 17 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 12611,12611 |
| Citation | 27 Utah 2d 48,492 P.2d 1349 |
| Parties | d 48 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Thomas Chester PERRY, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Herschel Bullen, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., David S. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant, Thomas Chester Perry, appeals from his conviction by a jury of robbery, contending (1) variance between the complaint and the information; and (2) error in pretrial identification procedures.
The evening of December 12, 1968, two men forced their way at gunpoint into the home of David Harness in Orem, Utah. In the presence of Mr. Harness and his wife, the two men explained their plan to take money from the Allen Super Save Market there in Orem, of which Mr. Harness was the manager. One of the men would stay with Mrs. Harness and her two children to keep them hostage; if any difficulty developed at the store, a signal by walkie- talkie would be given, whereupon Mrs. Harness and the children were to be killed. Under this threat, Mr. Harness went with one of the men to the store. The robber explained the situation to the other employees. These employees, Clark Naylor, Floyd and Ruth Hallsey, and Dean Olsen, offered no resistance but looked on while Mr. Harness took the money from the safe, handed it over to the robber and left with him. The latter forced Mr. Harness to take him back to Harness's home and the two men fled with the money.
Various pictures of persons, including persons suspected of the robbery, were shown at separate times to five of the witnesses to the events described above. It does not appear that there was anything about the pictures to suggest that any particular person was to be identified. Nor were pictures of any one individual repeated. Each one of those witnesses identified the defendant Perry from his picture as the perpetrator of the robbery. We have some difficulty in seeing why this further thing was done, and do not commend its propriety, but after the identification, the witnesses were told that the man so identified had been convicted of a similar crime in California.
At the preliminary hearing the defendant, wearing handcuffs, was taken by police officers into the courtroom, where the handcuffs were removed. The witnesses, who had recognized the defendant from the pictures, identified him at the preliminary hearing. At the trial the defendant made appropriate motions to suppress testimony as to identification, and to dismiss the complaint.
Defendant's contention of fatal variance between the original complaint filed in the city court, and the information filed in the district court after he was bound over, is based upon the difference in the emphasized portions of those documents. The complaint stated:
The said Thomas Chester Perry, at the time and place aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously and with force of arms, take from the presence of David Harness, and from the safe of Allen's Super Save Market . . . the sum of approximately $5000.00 in cash and $5000.00 in stamped checks. . . .
The information, in contrast, stated:
The said Thomas Chester Perry did, with force of arms, take personal property from the possession of David Harness, against his will.
Defendant's argument is that he was bound over on a charge of having robbed Allen's Super Save Market, whereas the information charged that he committed the offense against David Harness. The fallacy in his contention is shown by an examination of the so-called variance in the light of the statute, Sec. 76--51--1, U.C.A.1953, which defines robbery as:
. . . the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
The essential aspect of both the complaint and the information in the particular complained of is that the defendant took the money from the presence or possession of David Harness. The validity of that essential allegation was not impaired by the addition of the further fact that it was taken 'from the safe of Allen's Super Save Market.' The information upon which the defendant was tried was adequate to inform him of the time, place, and nature of the offense charged against him. 1 The defendant was represented by competent counsel. If he thought the information did not sufficiently inform him of the essential facts he could...
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State v. Ramirez
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