State v. Perry

• Decision Date: 05 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 29718.,29718.
• Citation: 139 Idaho 520,81 P.3d 1230
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Craig T. PERRY, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

81 P.3d 1230

139 Idaho 520

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Craig T. PERRY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 29718.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 2003 Term.

November 5, 2003.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

Siebe Law Office, Moscow, for respondent. James E. Siebe argued.

BURDICK, Justice.

This case comes before the Court on an interlocutory appeal following the district court's grant of Craig Perry's motion in limine. The motion sought to allow expert witness testimony concerning the results of his polygraph test. The district court found that the testimony would be admissible so long as Perry took the stand. This Court reverses the decision of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Craig Perry was charged with second-degree murder of his uncle. Perry retained Dr. Charles Honts to administer a polygraph test. During the polygraph examination, Perry denied shooting the victim or arranging for his death, and testified that, as far as Perry knew, the victim shot himself. Dr. Honts rendered an opinion that Perry was truthful when making these statements.

Perry filed a motion in limine seeking to allow the testimony of Dr. Honts. Perry claims that the expert's testimony is not being presented to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to prove the truth of the involuntary physical responses. The State asserts that the expert's testimony will improperly vouch for the credibility of the witness and the testimony is inadmissible hearsay.

Following an extensive Daubert hearing, the district court found that the testimony of the expert witness would be admissible. However, the district court conditioned the admission of the results of the examination on Perry testifying in his own defense. A copy of the video of the test and the data supporting Dr. Honts' opinion was given to the State. The State moved for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, which the district court granted.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that the testimony regarding the results of defendant's polygraph examination is admissible evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence, and its decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001). "The district court's determination that a witness is qualified as an expert is discretionary." West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138, 968 P.2d 228, 233 (1998) (citations omitted).

When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the Court inquires: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by exercise of reason. Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A. 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).

DISCUSSION

The State contends that Dr. Honts' testimony should not be admitted because it would improperly vouch for the credibility of Perry. The State argues that this vouching usurps the jury's fact finding and its role in assessing the credibility of the witnesses. The State further asserts that Perry did not establish the scientific reliability of Dr. Honts' testimony under I.R.E. 702 and that Dr. Honts' testimony is inadmissible hearsay and should not be allowed under I.R.E. 801.

Perry contends that Dr. Honts' testimony meets the test prescribed by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Perry argues that the record shows that the scientific community generally accepts polygraph testing and the reliability of polygraph testing. Perry contends that Dr. Honts' testimony does not usurp the fact-finding role of the jury. Further, Perry argues that there are numerous circumstances where experts opine on issues to be decided by the trier of fact and that judges are empowered to sort out spurious attempts to mislead juries.

In addition, Perry argues that the polygraph test results are not hearsay because the results are not being offered to prove that he did not shoot his uncle because he said he did not, but rather are being offered to prove that his body's physiological response indicates that he is telling the truth when making that statement (i.e., to prove the truth by involuntary physical response). By requiring Perry to take the stand prior to the results being allowed, Perry asserts that the State will have a full opportunity to cross-examine him concerning the reactions recorded at the time of the test.

The district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and its decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001). It is clear that the district court perceived the issue as one of discretion. The second prong of the abuse of discretion test requires this Court to determine whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 provides in regard to expert testimony:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The parties do not object that Dr. Honts is a qualified expert in the field of polygraph testing.

The inquiry under I.R.E. 702 is whether the expert will testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, "not whether the information upon which the expert's opinion is based is commonly agreed upon." State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). "This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d at 482. This Court in State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 893-94, 980 P.2d 552, 557-58 (1999), held with regard to scientific evidence:

In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the "general acceptance in the scientific community" standard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence had been replaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular F.R.E. 702. The Daubert court held that pursuant to Rule 702, the trial judge is assigned the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Daubert, at 598-99, 113 S.Ct. at 2799,125 L.Ed.2d at 485-86. In other words, for scientific evidence to be admitted, it must be supported by appropriate validation, establishing a standard of evidentiary reliability, and must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Id. at 590-91, 113 S.Ct. at 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d at 480-81. The decision to admit or deny the evidence, therefore, is within the discretion of the trial judge in individual jurisdictions which may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be admitted. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 310, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1265, 140 L.Ed.2d 413, 419 (1998)

.

Id. (emphasis added).

This Court has previously held that:

As a general rule, results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible absent a stipulation by both parties. Where stipulated polygraph results may be admitted, the defendant's participation in the examination must be free and voluntary. The trial court has discretion to exclude evidence if it finds that an examiner was not qualified or that the conditions under which the test was administered were unfair. The opposing party must be permitted to cross-examine the examiner as to his or her expertise, the reliability of polygraph examinations, the accuracy of the apparatus used, and all other points reflecting on the accuracy of the polygraph both in general, and in the particular case. Also, the jury must be instructed that the examiner's testimony as to the results of the test is not conclusive, but is to be taken only as an expert opinion....

Moreover, the courts of many other states have held that results of polygraph examinations are not admissible in a criminal trial, regardless of whether the polygraph testimony is exculpatory....

The foregoing authorities reflect the prevailing judicial view that the physiological and psychological bases for the polygraph examination have not been sufficiently established to assure the validity or reliability of test results. While scientific developments may one day refine the polygraph examination so that the results of the test may more frequently merit admission into evidence, we will not now overturn the trial court's exclusion of such results absent a stipulation by both parties.

State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 86-87, 774 P.2d 252, 256-57 (1989) (citations omitted).

A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present evidence is fundamental; however, this right is subject to reasonable limitations. U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413, 418 (1998); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 (1973)

. The exclusion of evidence does not impair the defendant's...